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ABSTRACT
Richmond Public Schools: Post-Court Mandated School Desegregation (1986-2006)
By Joshua P. Cole, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009
Director: Maike Philipsen
Professor, School of Education

In 1970, cross-town busing was court mandated to enforce school desegregation in
Richmond, Virginia. Unitary status was declared in Richmond when cross-town busing
ended in 1986. Richmond Public Schools (RPS) no longer operated as a dual school
system for blacks and whites after 1986. Class and racial segregation continued to exist
in the City of Richmond. RPS remained predominately black and poor. Socio-economic
conditions of the city continued to impact the school district. Controversies,
mismanagement and low academic achievement stigmatized RPS until state and federal
performance measures forced the district to improve. By 2006, RPS was still segregated;
however, as a result of better leadership, academic success was demonstrated on
Standards of Learning (SOL) assessments.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Background of the Study
Since 1954, the United States Supreme Court’s landmark school desegregation
court decision in Brown v. Board of Education has impacted education. The
desegregation of schools is a process that requires greater analysis. The introduction of
this study provides a historical review of Richmond, Virginia’s dually operated school
system for blacks and whites beginning with Brown v. Board (1954) through Bradley v.
Board (1986), which ended cross-town busing in Richmond. This provides a background
for the present study of post-court mandated school desegregation in Richmond Public
Schools (RPS) from 1986 through 2006. Furthermore, the account of Richmond’s school
desegregation process outlined in this study’s introduction serves as a backdrop for the
historical analysis of RPS operating as a unitary school system for blacks and whites
between 1986 and 2006.

Massive Resistance: 1954-1959
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down its historic
school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education, (Brown I), (1954). It stated
that the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives the
children of minority groups of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, even though the physical facilities and
other tangible factors may be equal (Brown v. Board, 1954). This decision ended the
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) “separate but equal” era, which provided legal cover for
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segregated schools 58 years earlier (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). The Brown decision was
met with “massive resistance” by most of Virginia’s politicians. Massive resistance was
the process by which the political body of Virginia resisted the integration of public
schools. Politicians believed school desegregation was an unwarranted intrusion upon
states rights (Pratt, 1992).
However, officials of the Virginia branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) hailed the decision as “a landmark
comparable to the Declaration of Independence” (Pratt, 1992, p. 3). Thurgood Marshall,
the NAACP’s prominent black attorney for civil rights, was very pleased with the
decision, calling it “the greatest victory we ever had” (Pratt, 1992, p. 3). Although the
decision was a milestone step in the direction of equal access to education for all, many
supporters were anticipating immediate resistance from the anti-integrationists within the
political system.
As Virginia’s political leaders contemplated their next moves, the United States
Supreme Court sent down a second ruling on Brown v. Board of Education, called Brown
II on May 31, 1955. It placed the burden of implementation on the district courts and
offered only the vague command that racial segregation in public schools be eliminated
“with all deliberate speed” (Brown v. Board, 1955). This ruling on the lower courts to
implement appropriate plans, which was supposed to provide transitions to racially nondiscriminatory school systems, was met with opposition (Arkin, 1991). However, as
stated by Pratt, “the ambiguity of that phrase left room for deliberation to take place,
rather than speed, as the defiant Virginian politicians prepared for a direct confrontation
with the federal courts” (Pratt, 1992, p. 5).
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The Gray Plan was the first form of political opposition, including modifications
of compulsory attendance laws, legislative tuition grants and local options. One aspect of
this plan consisted of the General Assembly’s custom-made Pupil Placement Board. The
state’s Pupil Placement Board was a committee specifically designed for local districts to
decide what school a student attended based on the student’s race. In addition, a system
of tuition grants from public funds was used to keep schools from integrating by using
the money solely for white students to enroll in private schools. This system only
provided public money to preserve segregated private schools, not an integrated public
system (Pratt, 1992). Ultimately, the Pupil Placement Board was part of the machinery
that Virginia leaders created to perpetuate segregation.
In 1956, opposition strengthened against school desegregation. Virginia’s United
States Senator Harry F. Byrd declared that by organizing the southern states for “massive
resistance” to Brown II that the rest of the country would eventually realize that racial
integration would not be accepted in the South (Pratt, 1992). Virginia’s General
Assembly then passed a series of thirteen bills, called the “Stanley Plan,” (after the
Governor of Virginia at that time, Thomas B. Stanley). Among the devices established
by the Stanley Plan were the authority of the governor to close any school threatened
with integration, cutting off state funds to school districts that attempted to reorganize on
an integrated basis and the provision of private-school tuition grants from public funds to
parents in any district where the public schools were closed to prevent integration (Pratt,
1992). Further, by way of the Pupil Placement Board, the enrollment of a single black
student in a white public school would automatically bring about the closing of that
school under Virginia’s massive resistance laws (Arkin, 1991). All of these measures
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promised to have a severe impact on the quality of education throughout the state. The
General Assembly met in August of 1956 to determine the State’s policy on dealing with
segregation in the public schools. The “Pupil Placement Act” established the Virginia
Pupil Placement Board as the assignment authority.
In September 1958, three black students filed suit in U.S. District Court,
requesting assignment to the then-majority white RPS; two years later, the State Pupil
Placement Board assigned two black students to Chandler Junior High School (Callihan,
1992). Token accounts of school desegregation like this continued throughout the state.
After numerous schools throughout Virginia were closed and tens of thousands of
students were displaced by way of Virginia’s new governor James Lindsay Almond, the
courts finally intervened in 1959 (Pratt, 1992).
On January 19, 1959, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared in
Harrison v. Day, (1959), that school closings violated section 129 of Virginia’s State
Constitution, which required the state to “maintain an efficient system of public free
schools throughout the state” (Harrison v. Day, 1959, p. 11). This meant that the state
must support public free schools for managing an efficient system, including those in
which pupils of both races were enrolled. On the same day, a three-judge Federal District
Court in Norfolk decided that Virginia’s statutes calling for shutting down the public
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and denied to citizens “the equal protection
of the laws” (James v. Almond, 1959, p. 11). Shortly thereafter, a statement was made by
Governor Almond to hold onto the massive resistance movement, but eventually he
backed off from his defiant stance and offered no further resistance to integration. Thus,
on February 2, 1959, Virginia’s era of massive resistance ended abruptly when twenty-
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one black students entered previously all-white schools in Norfolk and Arlington without
incident (Pratt, 1992).

Passive Resistance: 1959-1970
As Virginia’s “massive resistance” ended, “passive resistance” began and
Richmond was the perfect illustration of what “separate but equal” was in reality by way
of their plan to prolong school integration for yet another generation. Individuals within
the state of Virginia who made decisions and took action to integrate the public schools
in a non-deliberate manner conducted the process of “passive resistance.” Confronted by
two educational minefields, Brown on one side and Virginia’s massive resistance on the
other, RPS cautiously negotiated their way through them. Each minefield had elements
that were attractive to RPS, but each side also had distasteful characteristics (Arkin,
1991). RPS’s plan was to convince the courts that they were acting in good faith by
admitting a few black students to formerly all-white schools. In 1959, Richmond’s
School Board Chairman Lewis F. Powell, Jr. promised: “public education would be
continued in our city–although every proper effort will be made to minimize the extent of
integration when it comes” (Pratt, 1992, p. 13).
In September 1961, Bradley v. Richmond School Board, (1962) was filed to seek
a “racially nondiscriminatory school system” in Richmond. The following year, eleven
black students were transferred to John Marshall and Chandler by order of U.S. District
Court Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. (Callihan, 1992). The parents of these eleven black
students began the process of dismantling the dually operated school system with this
class-action suit against the Richmond School Board. Through this case, the board was
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instructed by the Federal Court to eliminate its system of dual attendance zones for blacks
and whites (Bradley v. Board, 1962).
In the fall of 1963, a new plan was implemented entitled “freedom of choice”,
which forced a modest undermining of Richmond’s segregation system by allowing
children to transfer to any school of their choice, if they met certain criteria. The
plaintiffs’ attorneys in Bradley appealed on the grounds that the district court’s order to
eliminate its system of dual attendance zones did not extend to the entire black
population, nor did it dismantle the Pupil Placement Board. Plaintiffs in the original
Bradley case re-filed with the District Court, claiming that the “freedom of choice” plan
did not address faculty integration either, it was in essence not a true “freedom of choice”
plan (Pratt, 1992, p. 38). The Court determined in April 1965 that the plan was
acceptable; the plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1966, the Supreme
Court returned the case to the Federal District Court where an agreement was finally
reached stating that a new freedom of choice plan would be developed, which would
work towards faculty desegregation and recruitment of black administrators (Arkin,
1991). According to Callihan (1992), the school board revised its freedom of choice plan
to “conform to federal guidelines;” all parents were required to exercise a free choice of
school in each grade.
During this period, other developments helped to accelerate the desegregation in
the South, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, throughout the previous ten
years, residential segregation had become firmly established in Richmond through the
efforts of white business owners, real estate brokers, bankers and the Federal Housing
Administration. The process of de facto segregation lasted until Congress passed the Fair

7
Housing Act in 1968. Consequently during this period, whites began moving out of city
neighborhoods and into their own suburban enclaves. “White flight” was occurring at a
rapid pace from the city of Richmond, thus leaving many of its formerly all white
neighborhoods to become overwhelmingly black, as black residents moved in. This
process was impacting the racial demographics of Richmond’s schools; for instance,
J.E.B. Stuart Elementary School, which was all white in 1962, had 761 black students
and only 12 white students by 1966 (Pratt, 1992).
Richmond’s new freedom of choice plan continued in the city, but it contributed
very little to change the racial composition of the schools. Finally, in 1968, the case of
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, (1968) ruled that the freedom of
choice concept was unconstitutional so long as a basically dual school system resulted
(Green v. Board, 1968). According to Callihan (1992), in the last year Richmond used
the freedom of choice method (1969-70), there were 15 totally segregated elementary
schools with black students comprising 100% of their enrollment. The remaining
elementary schools were virtually segregated in that they contained 90-99% of either
white or black students.
After four years under the consent decree of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Green,
the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Bradley filed for further relief in March of 1970. The
motion asked the court to:
…require the defendant school board forthworth to put into effect a
method of assigning children to public schools and to take other
appropriate steps which will promptly and realistically convert the public
schools of the City of Richmond into a unitary non-racial system from
which all vestiges of racial segregation will have been removed (Bradley
v. Board, 1970, p. 4).
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On June 26, 1970, Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., of the 4th Circuit Court, advised
the school board that Richmond’s history of residential segregation had effected the
opportunity for the proposed pairing plan to be acceptable in the attempt for school
integration:
…no real hope for the dismantling of dual school systems appears to be in
the offering unless and until there is a dismantling of the all-black
residential areas (Bradley, 1970, p. 4).
The school board responded to the court that Richmond was not operating a
unitary school system free of racial discrimination; the court nullified the 1966 revised
freedom of choice plan by ordering Richmond to replace the “existing dual system.” On
July 23, 1970 the school board submitted a plan proposed by the U.S. Department of
Health, Education & Welfare (HEW); geographical zoning, grade pairing and clustering
of schools (Callihan, 1992).
The new HEW desegregation plan was created to reduce busing and keep students
together through their entire public education. After finishing elementary school, children
would attend a nearby middle school; after middle school children would go to one
central high school. Judge Merhige rejected this plan. After Merhige granted an
injunction halting construction of any new schools, he gave the school board one month
to prepare an acceptable desegregation plan; by all “reasonable means,” the possibility of
cross-town busing was to be considered (Callihan, 1992). At this time, Merhige also
suggested “the feasibility of the voluntary consolidation” of Richmond, Henrico, and
Chesterfield school districts. This suggestion was because resegregation had occurred in
the residential areas of Richmond. The reality of segregation in Richmond meant that
past plans for solving the issue of de facto segregation within RPS were no longer viable.
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Adding to the issue of residential segregation in 1970, the city’s annexation of a
predominantly white portion of Chesterfield occurred, which changed Richmond’s black
population from a 52 percent majority to a 42 percent minority (Pratt, 1992, p. 48).

Cross-Town Busing: 1970-1986
In the summer of 1970, Richmond came up with an interim desegregation plan,
which provided for some transportation, mainly of the impoverished (Pratt, 1992). The
school board’s 1970 plan called for busing 13,000 pupils (compared to the approximately
10,000 who would have used Virginia Transit and school buses before the new
desegregation effort). In August, two weeks before school opened, Judge Merhige
ordered implementation of the school board’s desegregation plan on an interim basis; he
gave the school board 90 days to come up with a “valid plan” to provide a unitary school
system. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to rule on the subsequent city/state request for
a stay of the interim order. Due to the extreme racial polarization that was taking place
throughout the residential areas of Richmond and many decisions of whites to not attend
the schools they were assigned, this interim plan was failing to integrate the schools
(Callihan, 1992, p. 386). According to Pratt (1992):
This plan had imposed a great economic strain on the city due to the
additional buses that had to be purchased in order to meet the court’s
desegregation requirements and because Judge Merhige had already
determined that this plan would not dismantle Richmond’s segregated
system, it was a foregone conclusion that a more extensive busing plan
was imminent (p. 53).
While the Richmond School Board attempted to come up with a new plan,
Merhige began searching for viable alternatives to desegregating Richmond’s schools and
with great interest studied the busing decision handed down in Charlotte, North Carolina:
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971). This case approved the use
of extensive busing to promote school desegregation (Swann v. Board, 1971, p. 1). On
April 5, 1971, Merhige ordered into effect a new desegregation plan for the city of
Richmond in Bradley v. School Board, (1971). This was later affirmed by the Supreme
Court to provide pupil and faculty reassignments and free city wide transportation for
school desegregation (Bradley v. Board, 1971). Plan III, as it was named, called for
busing approximately 21,000 pupils and desegregation of schools at all levels to remove
all vestiges of racial identity (Callihan, 1992). This plan utilized extensive cross-town
busing within the city limits to increase school desegregation. There was also a creation
of satellite attendance zones (students from one zone would be matched to a school in
another zone) to create more of a racial mix within the city schools (Arkin, 1991).
However, the city of Richmond and its surrounding counties became extremely racially
polarized because many whites left the city for the counties, thus making it difficult to
create a racial mix within the city based on the existing population demographics.
Richmond’s enrollment figures reflected this scenario; out of 15,439 black elementary
pupils, 10,312 were in schools that were 90 percent or more black; and of 9,051 white
elementary pupils, 4,138 were in schools that were 90 percent or more white (Pratt, 1992,
p. 53).
On January 10, 1972, Judge Merhige ordered the merger of the city of Richmond
and the counties of Chesterfield and Henrico to create a single school division:
All defendants, including the State Board of Education, the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, the school boards of the two counties
and the city, the boards of supervisors of the two counties and the City
Council of the city, were enjoined to create a single school division
composed of the city and the two counties. In great detail, set out on some
seven pages, methods and procedures for effecting consolidation were
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specified to be completed within time limitations. It is from this
injunction that the state and county defendants prosecute this appeal
(Bradley v. Board, 1972, p. 195).
On appeal, the Bradley case was heard before the Fourth Circuit Court on April 13, 1972,
in which it was argued that Merhige’s consolidation order was without legal precedent
and represented “an assertion of naked power by a federal trial court judge” rather than a
valid interpretation of Supreme Court desegregation guidelines” (Pratt, 1992, p. 70).
Thus, it would come to be that the consolidation plan would be denied approval.
In 1971, Article VIII, Section V of the Constitution of Virginia, entitled the
“Powers and Duties of the Board of Education” was revised to state that “the power to
operate, maintain and supervise public schools in Virginia is, and has always been, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the local school boards and not within the jurisdiction of the
State Board of Education” (Va. Const., Article VIII, Section V). Furthermore, the
Constitution was changed to state that the consolidation of city and county school
systems could not happen, either under the old Constitution and statutes in effect prior to
July 1, 1971, or under the new Constitution and statutes in effect after that date. Thus,
the State Board of Education, acting alone, could not have effected the consolidation of
the school systems of Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield into a single system under the
control of a single school board as ordered in the Bradley v. Board case of 1972.
The merger plan itself was designed specifically to create a racial mix within the
schools of the metropolitan Richmond area. The overall racial composition of the three
political subdivisions of Richmond, Chesterfield and Henrico in June 1971 was 66.3%
white and 33.7% black. At this time, the student population of Richmond city itself
consisted of 60% black students and 40% white students. The new plan would divide
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Richmond, Chesterfield and Henrico into six subdivided sections that would be racially
mixed. The racial composition of five of the six subdivisions would range from 62.6% to
70% white, while the sixth subdivision would consist of 81.6% white students. Each
subdivision would have a subdivision board to exercise closer supervision over
instruction and progress of instruction and to maintain closer contacts with parents of
students. Under the plan, the great majority of students would attend a school located
within the particular subdivision in which they reside. The plan called for busing
approximately 10,000 more pupils; however, 36 less buses would be needed to meet the
transportation requirements under this metropolitan plan than the number of buses being
used under Richmond’s busing plan already in use. Travel time and distance in each of
the three present independent school districts would have not been appreciably changed
by way of the consolidation plan (Bradley v. Board, 1972).
Despite the testimony of the plaintiffs, on June 5, 1972, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the school boundaries in question had not been established to
promote segregation, that each of the three systems in the metropolitan area were unitary,
and that no two of the systems had conspired between themselves for the purpose of
keeping one unit relatively white by confining blacks to another (Pratt, 1992). The
Fourth Circuit Court had this to say about Judge Merhige’s decision:
[W]e think the adoption of the Richmond Metropolitan Plan in total by the
district court, viewed in the light of the stated reasons for its adoption, is
the equivalent, despite disclaimer, of the imposition of a fixed racial quota.
The Constitution imposes no such requirement (Bradley v. Board, 1972, p.
5).
The Circuit Court went on to say that the root causes of the concentration of
blacks in the inner cities of America were simply not known and the district court could
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not realistically place responsibility on the counties for the effect that inner city decay
had on the public schools of Richmond. In order to approve the consolidation of these
three school districts would mean ignoring the tradition and history of the
Commonwealth of Virginia with respect to its establishment and operation of schools
(Bradley v. Board, 1972).
Once again, according to Virginia’s Constitution in 1971, the power to operate,
maintain and supervise public schools in Virginia is, and has always been, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the local school boards and not within the jurisdiction of the
State Board of Education (Va. Const., Article VIII, Section V). As noted in Bradley,
section 133 of the 1902 Constitution of Virginia provides that the “supervision of the
schools in each county or city shall be vested in a school board.” But school boards,
including court-ordered consolidated school boards, were not authorized by law to raise
funds for the schools. Instead, under Virginia laws, a school board is fiscally dependent
upon the local governing body, e.g., county supervisors or city council and has no
authority whatever to levy taxes or appropriate funds for school purposes (Bradley v.
Board, 1972). In its extra session in 1971, the General Assembly enacted into law
Virginia Code 22-30: “No school division shall be composed of more than one county or
city” (Virginia Code, 1971, § 22.1-25). This revision, which came into effect on July 21,
1971, was the ultimate blow to Merhige’s plan of what might have been the first
successful attempt at desegregating the public schools in the city of Richmond.
Finally the Fourth Circuit Court had the following to say about the Bradley case:
We think it is fair to say that the only ‘educational’ reason offered by the
numerous school experts in support of consolidation was the equalitarian
concept that it is good for children of diverse economic, racial and social
background to associate together (Bradley v. Board, 1972, p. 9).
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The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where one year
later, on May 21, 1973 the Supreme Court, by default, upheld the Circuit Court’s decision
in the Bradley v. School Board, (1973), (Pratt, 1992). It is important to note that the
decision was split 4-4, as Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., the former chairman of Richmond’s
School Board and president of the Virginia State Board of Education, recused himself
from the case (Pratt, 1992).
During the court deliberations over busing and school consolidation of the early
1970’s, RPS witnessed its student demographics change with the outmigration of many
whites and some middle-class blacks to the surrounding counties. According to Callihan
(1992), as changes occurred in student membership or in program needs that required
modifications to Plan III, major changes took place with at least 17 of the original schools
to adjust to changing conditions. In August 1975, a Parent Advisory Council (PAC)
submitted recommendations that evolved from its study of pupil assignment; the
administration did not favor adoption of the report because of “a number of educational
and administrative weaknesses.” However, the PAC views on the desirability of a K-5
elementary grade organization were later incorporated into the “K-5 experimental
project” (a modification to Plan III). In 1979, a court-approved K-12 feeder plan/high
school consolidation (“Plan G”) was implemented; all elementary schools had grades K-5
while 3 high school complexes were formed from the 7 high school buildings. Seven
years later, subsequent to recommendations of a Citizens’ Advisory Commission, “Plan
G” was dismantled with the implementation of a pupil reassignment plan that also
assigned most students, to the extent possible, to their nearest neighborhood school. The
Bradley case was revived in March of 1984, as the vehicle for the school board’s
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unsuccessful claim that the Commonwealth of Virginia was constitutionally required to
provide additional funding to eliminate the vestiges of the past state-mandated
segregation.

Post-Court Mandated School Desegregation: 1986-2006
In April of 1986, sixteen years after he ordered busing for Richmond, Merhige
approved a neighborhood plan, Bradley v. School Board, (1986), that ended the crosstown busing of students to schools within the city for desegregation purposes (Bradley,
1986). Furthermore, on July 10, 1986, Judge Merhige denied the 1984 claim by the
school board that the Commonwealth of Virginia was constitutionally required to provide
additional funding to eradicate the remaining segregated areas previously mandated by
the state by bringing the Bradley case to a conclusion with the following order: “The
Court also finds that the Richmond Public School District has now achieved unitary
status. The Court therefore relinquishes its jurisdiction over the School District, and this
case stands DISMISSED” (Callihan, 1992, p. 244). According to Orfield, Monfort, and
Aaron (1989), the Supreme Court did not decide on any major school desegregation cases
or set any new rules of law during the time period of 1974-1988. Orfield et al., goes on
to state that the broad legal principles were substantially unchanged from 1954 through
1974.
With the black population in Richmond schools in 1986 representing 87% of the
population, the Richmond school system was declared unitary. Meaning it was no longer
operating as a dual school system for blacks and whites. This declaration was because
there were so few white children attending RPS that forced cross-town busing served no
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useful purpose and had to come to an end (Pratt, 1992). According to Pratt, (1992),
“while the resegregation of the city’s schools was certainly racially motivated to a large
degree, discernible class divisions were becoming readily apparent by reflecting a clear
socio-economic division throughout the entire Richmond Metropolitan Area (p. 90).”
The attempted process of school desegregation in Richmond had actually helped spawn a
resegregation of the city and the development of a black underclass.

Overview of the Study

Demographic Trends: 1950-2000
To help provide understanding and clarity to the years of unitary status (1986
through 2006) in RPS, an illustration of the demographic changes and trends of the
Richmond Metropolitan Area since 1950 is presented. For instance, despite many
achievements of city development since the end of cross-town busing, metropolitan
Richmond continued to pay a heavy price for sprawling development, slow progress on
racial integration and rising economic segregation. Signs of progress were very visible,
such as a new convention center, expansion of Virginia Commonwealth University,
several thousand units of new or renovated housing downtown and a lively restaurant and
entertainment zone emerging in the Shockoe Slip district. However, lagging regional
progress and even a decline in other key areas related to the issue of equal access to
educational opportunity for all of Richmond’s residents became a rising concern for
many of Virginia’s educational and political leaders (Rusk, 2002).
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The suburban sprawl that took place after World War II is reflected by the
housing boom and urbanization of the city’s metropolitan area during that time. For
example, in 1950 greater Richmond’s urbanized population, meaning people living in
areas where commercial development had occurred, was 258,000 occupying 48 square
miles of urbanized land. Ninety percent of the urbanized population and 75% of the
urbanized land fell within the city limits. By 1990, greater Richmond’s urbanized
population had grown to 590,000 (only one-third within the city limits) occupying 303
square miles of contiguous, urbanized land (only one-fifth within the city). During four
decades, about a half-acre was consumed for each added resident. Primarily the
movement of middle-class families and the stores and jobs that followed them drove this
outward growth. The Virginia General Assembly ended Richmond’s annexation powers
in 1970, which had a devastating effect on the socio-economic profile of the city (Rusk,
2002). Table 1 illustrates this point by looking at the changes of a typical family income
for residents of Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield over a 50 year span.
Table 1
Median Family Income as Percentage of Metropolitan Median Family Income_________
Jurisdiction

1950

1960

1970

Richmond

97%

92%

86%

Henrico

113%

113%

98%

104%

Chesterfield

1980

1990

2000_

78%

72%

68%

112%

110%

105%

105%

111%

119%

120%

116%

(Adapted from U.S Census Bureau data, 2000)
As noted in Table 1, in 1950, before the Brown decision, the typical income in the
city of Richmond was almost equal to the median family income of the three-county
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metropolitan area (97%). However, by 2000, the city’s median family income fell to
only 68% of the three jurisdiction metropolitan area (Rusk, 2002).
As of the 2000 United States Census, there were 197,790 people living in the City
of Richmond. The racial makeup of the city was 38% white, 57% African American and
5% composed of Hispanic, Asian, Native American and other races (Census, 2000).
However, according to the Virginia Department of Education, (2005), the racial makeup
of RPS was 7% White, 90% African American and 3% representing Hispanic, Asian,
Native American and other races. Table 2 provides the evidence of this social trend with
statistics from Pratt, (1992), (Callihan, 1992) and the Virginia Department of Education
(2005).
Table 2
Racial Composition (White and Black Students) of Richmond Public Schools_________
1950-51

1960-61

1970-71

1980-81

1990-91

2004-05

White

18,037

18,078

17,203*

4,929

2,792

1,754

Percent

58.8%

44.5%

35.8%

15.6%

10.2%

Black

12,642

22,599

30,785

26,602

24,220

Percent

41.2%

55.5%

64.2%

84.4%

88.5%

40,686

47,988

31,531

27,368

Total

30,679

7.0%_
22,549
90.0%_
25,054

*Reflects an increase of 5,000 white students due to Richmond’s annexation of twentythree square miles of Chesterfield County.
(Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau data, 2000)
By looking at the figures in Table 2, RPS went through a radical change during
the years after the Brown decision, as did the overall residential composition of the city.
Residential segregation of blacks typically hit its highest level nationwide around 1970,
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after three decades in which federal mortgage policy reserved new suburbs almost
exclusively for white homebuyers. On a segregation index scale of 0 to 100 (with 100
indicating total apartheid), metro Richmond’s segregation index was 77 in 1970.
Thereafter, the index improved to 59 in 1990 (about the average rate of improvement for
southern metro areas in general). However, during the 1990’s the black segregation
index improved almost imperceptibly to 57 (Rusk, 2002).
Residential segregation based on race, coupled with the issue of suburban sprawl
and the decline of the median family income within the City of Richmond resulted in
concentrated poverty for many of the city’s black residents. For example, in 1990
roughly three out of four of metro Richmond’s poor whites (73%) lived in working-class
and middle-class neighborhoods. Poor whites were usually part of mainstream
neighborhoods and mainstream schools. By contrast, in 1990, almost three out of four of
metro Richmond’s poor blacks lived in poverty-impacted low-income public housing
projects. Poor blacks were isolated in high-poverty neighborhoods and high-poverty
schools. To illustrate this point, the use of the “fair share of poverty” index table below
compares a jurisdiction’s poverty rate against the regional poverty rate. If, for example,
the regional poverty rate were 10% and the jurisdiction’s poverty rate were 10%, then its
“fair share of poverty index” would be 100; it would have its proportionate share of the
region’s poor. The index of 200 would indicate that the jurisdiction would have twice its
fair share of poor people; an index of 50 indicates only half its fair share (Rusk, 2002).
Table 3 tracks trends in the fair share of poverty index for 1970-2000:
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Table 3
Fair Share of Poverty Index_________________________________________________
Jurisdiction

1970

1980

1990

2000____

Richmond

149

179

213

230

Henrico

45

58

55

67

Chesterfield

62

73

44

39

Note. 100 = fair share.
(Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau data, 2000)
As seen in Table 3, the economic segregation of poor people in Richmond rose
steadily from 149 to 230, which is more than twice its fair share. Richmond’s school
segregation by income also rose during the 1990’s from an index of 56 to 58, which was
the ninth highest among 82 large metro areas and the highest among southern metro
areas. Thus, while barriers based strictly on race were slowly coming down, barriers
based on income were going up. According to this data, Richmond became segregated
by income by the end of the twenty-first century. The schools within these
neighborhoods reflected these economic trends, with a clear division between wealthy
and poor schools throughout Richmond and the metropolitan area. According to Rusk,
“Jim Crow by income was being infused with Jim Crow by race” (Rusk, 2002, p. 5).

Theoretical Background of the Study
Theories regarding the consequences of school desegregation policies for
metropolitan public schools vary in the literature. These theories embedded in the
literature include social, economic and critical race theory. In addition, several classic
theorists (e.g., Marx, Simmel and Weber) have provided insight into defining the socio-
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economic phenomenon that is evident in many major metropolitan areas. Examples of
metropolitan transformation during the years after cross-town busing ended are examined
in this study’s literature review with a focus on research pertaining to Richmond between
1986 and 2006.
The social transformation of the inner city resulted in a disproportionate
concentration of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black population. As
Wilson (1987) notes, this social milieu is significantly different from the inner city
environments that existed within these communities before the drastic white flight of the
1960’s, 1970’s and into the 1980’s (Wilson, 1987). The resegregation of schools through
this period was a byproduct of this social transformation. Various implications on
metropolitan socio-economics are examples of the political, economic, cultural and
institutional systems associated with the social transformation of the city.
Wilson’s main thesis concerning socio-economic trends in large urban areas states
that when factories and other businesses leave the inner city, working and middle-class
blacks soon follow, resulting in a population ill-equipped to compete in a global economy
that rewards those with college educations and punishes the poorly educated (Wilson,
1980). As more and more people leave the cities, socio-economic stability also leaves,
sending many aspects of the inner city into decay, including the school systems.
Referring to the conditions of the black underclass, parents are unable to work with their
children as frequently or pay for their children to attend preschool, which unfortunately
deprives them of a sufficient education, which in turn leads them down the long road of
poverty (Powell, 2004).
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The concentration of poverty in America’s cities and the social isolation of
African-Americans within them are argued by Massey and Denton (1993) to be the result
of an interaction between the poverty level and the historical and contemporary patterns
of residential segregation that African-Americans have endured. In turn, racial
segregation is the result of a complex web of forces that can be examined within the
Richmond metropolitan area by way of the creation of public housing projects in lowincome areas and other such phenomenon. The underlying thesis of their analysis is that
an underclass is a systemic and natural outcome of racial discrimination perpetuated by
American social, economic and political institutions (Massey and Denton, 1993).

Rationale for the Study
Historians conducted research on school desegregation pertaining to Richmond
prior to 1986, but a void is identifiable in the literature between the years of 1986 and
2006; thus there is a need for a study of RPS as a unitary school system. Substantial
scholarly analysis of post-court mandated school desegregation (after 1986) in RPS is
lacking and there is a gap in the literature specific to RPS operating as a unitary school
system for blacks and whites between 1986 and 2006. Since the Bradley v. School Board
case was dismissed in 1986, little research has been conducted to help provide
understanding or to clarify meaning of what has happened within RPS. The present study
provides a history of what transpired within RPS during the twenty years after Judge
Merhige’s court decree. Previous studies, such as those conducted by Orfield, (1989),
Pratt (1989), Arkin (1991), and Callihan (1992) ended their particular studies near the
time this study begins. Building on their studies, the need to continue the story of RPS is
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necessary to better understand the historical repercussions of school desegregation in
Richmond since 1986.

Purpose for the Study/Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to tell the story of how the Richmond community
(i.e., its educators, policy makers, residents, parents, former students and others)
responded to the end of the desegregation process between 1986 and 2006. There is a
dearth of analysis regarding perspectives and accounts of what happened within RPS
after the court declared it a unitary school system for blacks and whites. Perspectives of
the twenty years after cross-town busing ended in Richmond were critically analyzed
along with the decisions and actions taken within RPS. This study also addressed the
difficult questions of racial and social class matters and analyzed them through a research
study specific to this period in Richmond. The unfulfilled promises of Brown left RPS
with the situation described above.

Research Questions
1. What role has de jure and de facto school desegregation in Virginia played in the
development of RPS since 1986?
2. What is the relationship of race and class in the perception of people working in
RPS from 1986 through 2006?
3. How have people associated with RPS dealt with the results of school
desegregation after the end of cross-town busing in 1986?
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Design and Methods
A historical case study was developed to help provide understanding and to
clarify meaning of events in RPS during unitary status. The research design involves
facets of Johnson, McGarth and Williams' 1989 study of RPS, which addressed the
citizens’ perspective of the district. Johnson et al., provided a basis for developing a
historical case study pertaining to the unitary status of RPS from 1986 through 2006. A
historical analysis research method was used in the present study, including informant
interviews, an in-depth examination of historical documents and archival information.
Interviews of people associated with RPS between 1986 and 2006 were also an
important source of data. These interviews along with other material such as historical
documents and other pieces of archival information were used as data sources. These
sources were critically analyzed to help provide a historical perspective for clarifying the
untold story of RPS during unitary status.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
School Desegregation’s Impact on Metropolitan Areas

Background Information
Since the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955, a considerable amount of literature
was published relevant to school desegregation. Details of school desegregation in
Richmond, Virginia were outlined in the introduction of this study as a framework for
researching Richmond Public Schools (RPS) as a unitary school system from 1986
through 2006. To illustrate how RPS grappled with the repercussions of school
desegregation decisions that occurred between 1954 and 1986, a literature review is
necessary. To begin, theories related to the impact of school desegregation associated
with social and economic theory are explored. A review of socio-economic
consequences of school desegregation on metropolitan areas is then conducted with
respect to the previously mentioned social and economic theories. Next, a review of
recent literature on RPS is examined relevant to the years after cross-town busing ended,
1986 through 2006. Finally, a literature review specific to historical research methods
and their best practices is provided.
According to Nancy John (1975) the phenomenon of desegregation must be
dissected into components and be eclectic in the search for clarifying concepts. Symbolic
interaction theory, as developed by Cooley (1902), Thomas (1931), and Mead (1934),
sheds light on several dimensions of school desegregation. Its basic idea is that people
live in a symbolic environment in which meanings and values shared with others guide
their behavior. It is the actor’s interpretation of the situation, rather than its structure or
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form, which is important. According to John, the most important aspect of school
desegregation is the symbolic message it conveys. It was this aspect that the Supreme
Court stressed in its 1954 decision. What has since been created during resegregation is a
racial composition of predominantly black schools that tend to have a reputation for low
standards, poor equipment and inexperienced staff—a reputation that outruns the facts
and acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The stigma of attending such schools might
depress pupil self-esteem, while the aura of a mostly white school might raise it (John,
1975). John’s work is significant to this study in that it speaks to the resegregation that
occurred within RPS. Her work also parallels the perception of the predominantly black
RPS compared to the majority white Chesterfield and Henrico County school systems
that border Richmond. Lacking in John’s study are personal accounts of this dynamic
and a more current conclusion as it relates to today’s schools.

Social and economic theory.
Critical race theory scholars argue that, despite the recorded history of the fight
for school desegregation, the process itself has been promoted in ways that advantage
whites, rather than serving as a solution to social inequality. For instance, Buffalo’s
“model desegregation” program reveals that African-American students continued to be
poorly served by the school system. African-American student achievement failed to
improve, and suspension, expulsion, and dropout rates continued to rise. Thus, the
benefits of whites that derived from the program were that they took advantage of the
special magnet school programs and free extended childcare while they seemed
supportive of school desegregation. Critical race theory emerged from the notion that
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racism is normal; in the sense of norm, not aberrant, in American society, especially as it
relates to educational inequalities (Parker, Deyhle and Villenas, 1999).
John and Parker et al., have established correlations between socio-economic
levels of black and white students and their academic success in the past; however, there
has been very little done through policy and educational reform to correct the
achievement gap among today’s students. This achievement gap has created problems
that educators have to deal with on a daily basis, with both individual schools and entire
school systems being held accountable by state and federal standards, such as the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act (2001). Due to social divisions in society, it has become
challenging for teachers to address all students’ needs. Theories, such as classical
insights derived from Max Weber and George Simmel are used to better explain the
dynamics that are associated with these educational issues and their relevance to society’s
current position of social change.
The specific social status of a child is often unknown by the child, but the reality of
knowing what one possesses in comparison with another, in terms of material and self,
can be apparent to even young children. With the ability to access information about
different aspects of current society though medias such as television, the internet and
other forms of news reporting, individuals, including children, begin to develop a concept
of self based on their material comparisons with others. As self concept develops, there
is a perception created within the individual about other groups of people possessing
contrasting material lifestyles. This in turn creates a perception of the other based on
their association with the social status of the class itself, versus seeing the person from
within. A number of theorists have explained the conditions of society as they relate to
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individuals and their interaction with others in society (Hurst, 1999).
One theorist who examined social change as it relates to class and group status was
Max Weber. Weber’s “iron cage theory” of how the rational structure of modern life has
increased within the lives of all human beings explains how a hardened shell of
rationalization and calculation has developed around people in society, leaving no room
for escape. Weber’s view is actually one of negativity, a sense of disenchantment, as a
result of science shedding more and more light on daily life. He believed society would
become more disconnected from the values of nonrational life and would develop a
purposively rational behavior based on a more calculated way of thinking. Weber also
believed that large bureaucracies and an alienated class structure would create an
impersonal society. Such a rational development of public life would leave individuals
with no option but to accept modern institutional processes of methodical calculation
apart from their sense of self. Such an impersonal approach to others would be based in
the capitalism and bureaucracy that was being created. This left society with classes,
which then fostered the development of status groups. Weber did, however, see
economic class differences as more meaningful in today’s society than old social status
groups (Hurst, 1999).
From Weber’s perspective, the rational thinking of individuals is based on the
class system and the social control of capitalistic and bureaucratic institutions. The
theoretical and conceptual tools of Weber’s theory of the social change are applicable to
today’s issues as well. Weber noticed differences in cultural attitudes and patterns of
behavior when he distinguished “class” from “status.” He wanted to convey that
classifications into classes are representing one thing and human social organizations and
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socialization represent something else (Bogenhold, 2001). Weber also had some insight
into the positions of social status and their effects on the esteems of individuals. He has
commented that, in general, there is a “social esteem” in terms of a label that
accompanies positions in society, resulting from education, which heightens, what he
calls the “status element” (Devoe, 2000). Bogenhold (2001) quotes Weber as stating,
“Classes can be divided according to their relationships to production, how they acquire
goods, ‘status’ according to the principle in which goods in the form of specific types of
life styles are consumed” (p. 7).
Pertinent to the present study, children in schools are often left without any choice
as to the label that is placed upon them when they enter a school due to the uncontrollable
conditions of their lives. This categorizing of individuals based on the status that they
represent, stemming from the class that they have no control over, allows for a system
where it is difficult for educators to see individual students, but rather the status group
that they represent in society. This structured system of rules and levels of power that
exists in society, as described by Weber, is important to the bureaucratic organization of
systems, such as schools in today’s society (Devoe, 2000).
George Simmel is another theorist concerned with group formation and the type
of stratification associated with it. Simmel saw people in the world as individuals
seeking domination while domination itself oppresses and separates people. Simmel
believed that dominant people created culture, while at the same time culture was a
separate thing that turned and dominated them. His ideas apply to today’s society in that
there is a social distance created in the spatial areas, such as public parks and
establishments of urban centers and the surrounding communities. For example, there are
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numerous concentrations of individuals from specific ethnic or status groups in today’s
cities that face a preconceived view of self by others, as well as self-fulfilling prophecies
of what those preconceptions represent, based on societal expectations that have been
created for them. Conflict is then created between groups, which in turn projects a type
of self-esteem on individuals based on their perception of self and others (Hurst, 1999).
Simmel defined the dynamics of social life in terms of social forms. Simmel’s
theory of social interaction concerns vast differences between those representing different
status groups in society. To continue with Simmel’s point of view, he has stated that
society promotes a leveling of its members. It creates an average and makes it extremely
difficult for its members to excel beyond this average. For Simmel, the individual is
doubly oppressed by the standards of society: he may not transcend them either in a
more general or in a more individualized direction (Simmel, 2004).
To conclude the review of the classical theories of Weber and Simmel, some key
elements have been highlighted for usage in the present study. In Weberian terms,
control by social institutions, such as today’s educational system, limits the degree to
which social equality is possible for children. Weber and Simmel’s classical theories
help illuminate the social processes that shape the minds of all individuals in society.
This content relates to the present study of RPS, which have had to deal with this social
process, as academic successes and failures have placed the district in a social status
constraint. This means that societal perceptions impact the educational equity of schools
due to the historical significance of segregation.
In terms of theory relating to the economic aspects of our society, convergence of
various patterns of urbanization is brought about by increased economic interdependence
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and the development of compatible organizational and institutional arrangements. Some
of the post-1980 migration and metropolitan growth patterns are similar to those of the
1960s (a more rapid growth of the metropolitan areas and of metropolitan areas in
proximity to their metropolitan core). Theories of metropolitanization and ecological
expansion help explain these developments. However, subsequent events of the 1980s
(the decline in parts of metropolitan areas showing general patterns of rapid growth or
population decline as a result of the decline in functional economic and sustenance base)
contradicted the trends established by these theories during the 1970s. It was concluded
by the neo-conservatives that economic activities in major American cities resulting in
economic dominance would be beneficial however inadequate for the diversification of
the economic base in these cities. In fact, this resulted in the consequence of inequities in
job access, housing, schools, and social services. In addition, these inequities draw
attention to the increasing pressures of immigration, multiculturalism, and the sharpening
of racial and ethnic cleavages, which create additional social stresses. Furthermore, there
is also a rapidly aging population that puts stress on health, housing, education, welfare
funding and the prospects of generational conflicts over increased scarcity of resources as
the economic base of cities decreased during this period (Peck, 1996).
In light of the impact, an examination of social class and status should take place in
order to apply the implications of both factors on the educational system of academic
achievement in relationship to the predefined self-esteem of today’s students. With class
being as prevalent as it is today, class-consciousness was examined as it relates to the
social issues encountered in Richmond between 1986 and 2006. It has been stated
through the works of Goldthrope and Marshall that class analysis of one’s status reflects
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the processes through which individuals and families are distributed and redistributed
among these status positions over time. The consequences thereof for their life-chances
and for the social identities that they adopt persist. Also, the social values and interests
that they pursue remain with them as a condition of society (Bogenhold, 2001).
However, the socio-economic consequences of school desegregation are still
vague. For a better understanding of the social status/academic success relationship, the
following sections examine the socio-economic consequences of school desegregation
and the post-court mandated school desegregation era in Richmond.

Socio-economic consequences.
The trends in the literature pertaining to the socio-economic consequences of
school desegregation and the failed desegregation process serve as resources for this
study. For instance, as a result of the school desegregation process, the concentration of
poverty in large urban areas between 1950 and 2000 can be explained, at least in part, by
the decentralization of inner-city manufacturing jobs and the rise of low-wage service
sector employment that significantly reduced the number of low-skilled jobs that paid a
living wage for its employees. The resulting high rates of joblessness in inner city
America were exacerbated by the middle-class and white flight to the suburbs (AlexAssensoh, 1998). These trends of income inequality that occurred during and after the
school desegregation process, as well as racial and class segregation in housing and
educational facilities are discussed later. For now, they provide a historical perspective
on the dramatic increase of poverty in large urban areas.
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An increased number of middle and upper class white residents exited the inner
city in the last half of the twentieth century and a highly concentrated number of AfricanAmericans have resided in large urban areas since. The social transformation of the inner
city resulted in a disproportionate concentration of the most disadvantaged segments of
the urban black population. This social milieu is significantly different from the inner
city environments that existed within these communities before the drastic white flight of
the 1960’s, 1970’s and into the 1980’s. According to Wilson, “Moreover, changes in
societal organization have created situations that enhance racial antagonisms between
those groups that are trapped in central cities and are victimized by deteriorating services
and institutions that serve the city” (Wilson, 1987, p. 136). Wilson’s main thesis behind
the decline of urban infrastructure results in city populations that are ill-equipped to
compete in a global economy due to the departure of working and middle-class blacks to
the suburbs (Wilson, 1980). As more and more people left the cities, more and more
economic stability left, sending many aspects of the inner city into decay, including the
school systems. The resegregation of schools, including that of Richmond, through this
period was a byproduct of this social transformation.
Table 4 illustrates the trends in neighborhood changes from 1960 to 1980 of seven
neighborhoods in Chicago, which demonstrates that nearly all of the middle to upper
class white population moved out during this time period, as did a small proportion of the
African-American middle to upper class population (Lynn, 1990). The figures shown in
Table 4 are that of residents representing middle to upper class status of seven
neighborhoods within the city of Chicago.
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Table 4
Average Neighborhood Changes_____________________________________________
___1960

1970

1980_______

Population

63,700

48,300

32,800

White

15,500

4,100

2,000

Black

45,000

41,000

27,300

Hispanic

3,100

3,000

3,300

Other Races

100

200

200

Note. Numbers represent middle-upper class residents.
(Adapted from Curtis, 2004)
The trend of these two decades, in terms of the outmigration of many middle-toupper-class individuals from the city is shown in Table 4. Thus, beginning the trend of
the increasingly concentrated and isolated urban poor. According to Curtis, poverty is
now extremely concentrated, with three-fourths of the poor living in metropolitan areas,
compared to about half in 1968; forty-two percent of today’s poor live in the very central
cities (Curtis, 2004). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in the year 2000, 86.5% of
African-Americans lived in metropolitan areas while only making up 12.9% of the
United States population. The largest metropolitan areas (1 million or more population)
had higher residential segregation than the middle-sized ones (500,000 to 999,999
population), which, in turn, had higher residential segregation than the smallest
metropolitan areas (Census, 2003). This data is useful for analyzing post-court mandated
school desegregation in Richmond because it illustrates the magnitude of this issue in
large urban areas.
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Table 5 illustrates the spatial proximity index of African-Americans, which is
defined by the Housing Patterns Office of United States Census Bureau, as being the ratio
of which blacks are likely to live near other blacks. The index is the decimal figure that
represents the likelihood of one African-American living near another African-American.
Table 5
Residential Segregation Spatial Proximity Index of African-Americans by Population of
Selected Metropolitan Areas_________________________________________________
Population

Number of

Size

Metropolitan Areas

1980

1990

2000__

1 million +

43

1.543

1.502

1.469

500,000-999,999

33

1.307

1.273

1.263

144

1.218

1.206

1.205

Under 500,000

(Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau data, 2003)
The data in Table 5 was taken from a total of 220 metropolitan areas in 2000 that
represented the population sizes of the year 2000. The data outlined in Table 5 shows an
extreme concentration of African-Americans living in large urban areas of the country
demonstrating that blacks are more likely to live near other blacks rather than another
racial group (Census, 2003). For example, the figure 1.469 in the 1 million or more
metropolitan area population size for the year 2000 is representative of the ratio of an
African-American living in proximity to another African-American at this time and place.
Due to the disproportionately over represented number of African-Americans, the simple
function of numbers must also be considered here, meaning that the lack of desegregation
of the cities factors into the extreme statistics. Meaning, blacks and whites are far less
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likely to interact in this large of a city compared to a city of less than one million
residents. However, this trend has created a significant social underclass that exists
within cities represented by these demographics. Furthermore, this documentation sets
the stage for the contemporary examination of RPS between 1986 and 2006. These
trends support the demographic changes of Richmond and were useful in developing a
critical analysis of the socio-economic conditions of the city and its school system.
The number of poor people living in concentrated urban poverty in the United
States grew by an enormous rate of 29.5% between 1970 and 1980. In 1980, the U.S.
Census indicated that there were over 1,800,000 poor persons living in concentrated
urban poverty in America’s 100 largest central cities. In 1980, the concentrated urban
poor living in large urban areas was made up of 67% African-American, 20% Hispanic
and only 12% Caucasian (Hajnal, 2004). Despite drops in concentrated poverty in the
United States by 2000, the percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics living within
concentrated areas of poverty increased to 68% for African-Americans and to 24% for
Hispanics. Caucasians decreased slightly to 8.5% of its population living in areas of
concentrated poverty (Census, 2000). According to the bureau (Census, 2000), by 1999
U.S Census data continued to show a large gap between median incomes among racial
groups. Non-Hispanic white households earned a median income of $44,366 while
African-American households reported a median income of just $27,910. Hispanic
households showed a median income of $30,735. With these figures staying consistent
since 1999, the total percentage of people living in poverty in 2005 was 12.6%. The
percentage of people living in poverty within different racial groups was as follows:
10.6% Caucasian, 11.1% Asian, 21.8% Hispanic, and 24.7% African-American, (Census,
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2005). These statistics in turn create a perpetuation of the perception acquired by those
observing the negative occurrences within large urban areas as representative of a race
rather than of a sociological trend. In truth, there are societal factors that can explain the
conditions of these highly concentrated poverty areas as they relate to racial groups.
These ideas were used to assist in the critical analysis of the RPS from 1986 through
2006.
The previously stated data illustrates the rate of middle-to-upper-class residents
exiting the inner cities since 1950, and the high concentration of an African-American
underclass existing today. Various factors underlying these changes are provided in the
next section. Also, the generation of policy to rejuvenate large urban areas and the
schools that reside within them is examined further in the following subsections. To
provide an understanding for this basis, the relationships between the economic issues,
political factors, institutional factors and the cultural contexts shaping this issue is
discussed.

Factors Impacting Poverty
To begin looking at the literature pertaining to the concentration of poverty in
large urban areas and its implications for education in Richmond, an overview of how the
United States defines poverty is conducted. The United States defines the poverty line
for a family of four as being less than $19,971, per year, or $4,993 per person (Census,
2005). People fall below this line for a countless number of reasons. Some have control
over this situation and others do not. Urban residents have been left behind with a
declining tax base, shrinking employment opportunities, a shortage of decent, affordable
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housing and a failing educational system. An economic incentive has been developed for
middle class suburban residents to keep out those with high needs and few resources, thus
relegating low income individuals to the core of the inner city. These points, coupled
with racial discrimination and the aversion of blacks by whites, all play a serious role in
sustaining the black underclass (Powell, 2004).
With the decline of manufacturing corporations in large urban areas, dilapidation
of neighborhoods began to occur. As previously stated, a declining tax base was created,
which left minimal opportunities for school funding to be increased. This fact left inner
city schools with limited funding, as compared to affluent schools within the suburbs
(Burns, 2003). For example, in 2004, the average poor student received about $1,000 per
year in resources at a New York public school whereas the school with the least amount
of poor children received around $3,000 per student in public schools. According to
Powell, this is the case in at least 37 of the country’s 50 states. Inadequate access to a
quality education for impoverished children only lessens their chances of making it out of
poverty (Powell, 2004). This point was helpful in the study of RPS in relation to
population changes in Richmond after cross-town busing ended.
The political environment had a tremendous impact on urban areas in the last half
of the twentieth century. As Powell sees it, poverty in America is frequently racialized
and systemic; some of it is the product of well-documented, formal and informal, racially
discriminatory federal, state and municipal policies (Powell, 2004). This literature
supplemented the study of RPS and policies created within the city between 1986 and
2006.
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These policies include housing and transportation, which have encouraged
middle-class whites to flee the cities for the suburbs, such as the case in Richmond. The
cause of poverty can be contributed to factors such as education itself, inadequate
education or lack of an education. Without a college education and a job in the work
force, people in poverty may never stop suffering from it (Powell, 2004).
Education for a child begins with the institutional group of the family. Children
who do not learn basic thinking skills at home before attending the more formal
institution of school, automatically fall behind. In most cases children in poverty do not
achieve these skills from the home to the extent that middle-class children do. It has been
documented that when poor children enter school, they are generally a year and a half
behind the language abilities of their middle-class peers. Referring to the conditions of
the black underclass, parents are unable to work with their children as frequently or pay
for their children to attend preschool, which unfortunately deprives them of a sufficient
education, which in turn leads them down the long road of poverty (Powell, 2004).
Scenarios such as these were helpful in the study of RPS as it pertained to conditions of
the district during unitary status.
The black underclass suffered from the withdrawal of economic support resulting
from the abandonment of businesses in the inner cities. Massey and Denton (1993) see
the economic restructuring of the mid-1970’s and 1980’s as the major transformer of
American cities. Middle-class and white flight to the suburbs exacerbated the resulting
high rate of joblessness in inner city America. This exodus happened along with a
decline in public services and private investment. These trends of income inequality led
to the road of class and racial segregation in housing and educational facilities.
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This concentration of poverty in America’s cities and social isolation of AfricanAmericans is argued by Massey and Denton (1993) to be the result of an interaction
between the poverty level and the historical-cum-contemporary patterns of residential
segregation that African-Americans have endured. In turn, racial segregation is the result
of a complex web of forces including restrictive covenants, redlined by banks and
insurance companies, zoning, corrupt practices by some real estate agents and the
creation of public housing projects in low-income areas. The underlying thesis of this
analysis is that the underclass is a systemic and natural outcome of racial discrimination
that is perpetuated by American social, economic and political institutions (Massey and
Denton, 1993). These points are supportive of the socio-economic conditions of
Richmond and its public schools since 1986. Massey and Denton’s theory was helpful in
critically analyzing the history of RPS since it was declared a unitary school system for
blacks and whites.
Many individuals in contemporary urban ghettos are poor, chronically
unemployed, welfare dependent, ill-housed and poorly educated; however, they are
invisible in the eyes of policy makers, political candidates and employers (AlexAssensoh, 1998). In reviewing Alex-Assensoh’s work it is found that during the Ronald
Regan administration in the 1980’s, inner city communities were seen as necessary
casualties of the economic and technological revitalization of America. This perspective
had a direct impact on the lifestyles of individuals residing in urban areas during this era.
Attention to social policy was neglected, thus leaving cities vulnerable to the frequently
devastating social consequences of economic changes and processes (Alex-Assensoh,
1998).
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As the percentage of students living in poverty rose in urban schools, the
conditions for academic success, including finances, teacher quality, educator stability,
small school sizes and facilities all declined. As such a condition is prevalent in today’s
inner city schools, federal and state authorities have called for accountability rises
through policies, without the resources to facilitate school improvement. In addition, the
implementation of annual high stakes standardized testing, the move to privatize public
schools, the retreat from Affirmative Action, the shifting of state budgets from public
schools to vouchers, the refusal to pay urban teachers and finance urban schools equitably
all plot to reduce the possibility that education will never change the opportunity
structure (Burns, 2003). Richmond is not immune to these intense implementations of
many social policies. This content is applicable to all facets of today’s diverse socioeconomic society, including that of Richmond. This documentation was helpful in
addressing the socio-economic and school conditions for Richmond’s youth as it
pertained to this study.
A look at Nicholas Lemann’s work on the urban underclass helps provide a
culture of poverty explanation. He states, “Many aspects of the underclass culture in the
ghetto are directly traceable to roots in the South, not the South of slavery, but the South
of a generation ago” (Lemann, 1986, p. 258). Lemann defines this as the nascent
underclass of the sharecropper south. Further commentary on this point by AlexAssensoh (1998) reveals that in his estimation, the behavioral characteristics of the urban
underclass like out-of-wedlock births, dependency, poverty, crime and lack of education
were brought to the north by southern sharecroppers. In terms of a historical perspective,
since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960’s, Richmond has seen this theory play out
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in its general population. Moreover, since the end of cross-town busing in 1986 the next
generation became a byproduct of this history. As more and more African-Americans
moved north, they moved to urban areas, thus becoming a part of the underclass resulting
from the trends described previously within cities. For the purposes of the present study,
this content contributed to the development of historical background for the
contemporary situation of RPS.
The implementation of high stakes testing and the call for highly qualified
teachers through current legislation represented an institutional component that can be
analyzed systematically. This analysis provides a broader understanding of RPS and its
implications on education since the end of cross-town busing in 1986. According to
Chirot, the state is our primary political institution, but there are many other institutional
levels below the state that are also involved with politics (Chirot, 1994).

A Contemporary Examination of School Desegregation in Richmond

In this section of the literature review, a closer look is taken at what happened
within RPS since the school desegregation era ended in 1986. When looking at the
question of how school desegregation decisions historically impacted RPS since 1986,
the literature that currently exists must be identified and reviewed to demonstrate how it
will help the present study. Various pieces of past research and historical case studies
related to Richmond during this transitional period in history were examined. A review
of the literature explaining various historical studies through primary and secondary
sourced material created a basis for the need of this study. Based on this section of the
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literature review, a full understanding of the need to conduct further research of RPS as a
unitary school system is accomplished.

An Examination of Richmond
Isaac states that a reconstruction of the past both systematically and objectively
must be done by collecting, evaluating, verifying, and synthesizing evidence regarding
historical research representative of a city and its school system (Isaac, 1997). The
selected sources of Johnson, McGrath and Williams (1989), Callihan (1992), Craver
(1993) and Philipsen (1999) are reviewed in an effort to utilize the content of their work
as it relates to the need to further study RPS under unitary status from 1986 through
2006.
Literature specific to what has occurred in Richmond and within its public school
system since 1986 is limited. However, Johnson et al., (1989) conducted a study entitled
Richmond Public Schools: A Citizens’ Perspective through Virginia Commonwealth
University’s Survey Research Laboratory and Department of Sociology. The study itself
provides information about citizen knowledge, perceptions, issues and concerns about
RPS as of 1989. Even though the Johnson study was not extensive and only focused on
the perspective of the citizens, it provided an outline for the historical research methods
of the present study. Also, when fused with the data collected for the present study it
helps create a template for critical analysis. Public opinion about RPS in the late 1980’s
was provided in the Johnson et al., (1989) study, but no questions were asked about the
aftermath of school desegregation per se. The Johnson study provided a very general
overview of the citizens’ perspectives as of 1989, but did not get to the core of the issues
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raised. However, the basics of the study were useful to the present study’s design
regarding the analysis of data from the narrative sections of the surveys. This source was
especially useful when combined with various historical research methods examined in
this chapter.
A Mini-History of the Richmond Public Schools 1869-1992 by Shirley Callihan
was published in 1992 to present an interesting and useful history of RPS. Callihan
(1992) used many primary sources such as interviews, individual school histories and
principals’ annual reports, school directories, maps and newspaper files along with
superintendents’ annual reports and school board minutes. Her chronological review of
RPS readily discerns between pre and post-segregation in Richmond, but much is left to
be desired about the unitary status years of 1986 through 2006. The years of 1986
through 1992 that pertain to the present study provide a comprehensive glimpse of what
was occurring within RPS during that time. Her documentation was conducted more as a
report versus an analysis (Callihan, 1992). Her work appropriately provided a basic
outline of the first six years of the present study; however, it does lack the critical
analysis essential to provide greater understanding of RPS as unitary school system for
blacks and whites.
Sam Craver supervised research (1993) on the Black Richmonders’ Experience
with School Segregation and Desegregation: An Oral History Project at Virginia
Commonwealth University that deserves review. This unpublished work is based on
interviews conducted as a field project by a selected group of students in the School of
Education in 1992. It provides several eye witness accounts of segregated schools in
Richmond prior to 1954, as well as several accounts of events during post-1954
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desegregation up to 1993. In review, some neighborhoods changed rapidly as blacks
moved in and whites moved out. This research relates to the present study in that it
speaks to the binding ties of the traditional black community and the loss of an important
cultural anchor. Interviewees in this study felt that some gains were had for blacks
during desegregation, while still something was lost during this process (Craver, 1993).
The present study continues with that thought and further explores questions to critically
analyze the history of RPS after court desegregation efforts ended. For instance,
perspectives gathered from people who experienced unitary status in Richmond provide a
continuation of this series of personal accounts compiled by Craver (1993).
Maike Philipsen’s (1999) book Values-Spoken and Values-Lived: Race and the
Cultural Consequences of a School Closing is based on a study revealing the
contradictions of the educational and social conditions within a community. Philipsen’s
study examined the perspectives of several females representing a community that
transitioned through school desegregation. The cultural consequences unveiled in her
research parallel those within Richmond during the same period. According to her study,
an understanding that many of the oppositional attitudes of females that have had
experiences in this type of social environment are a result of tensions—or
contradictions—within the cultural actor (Philipsen, 1999).
The present study used this understanding to help frame the context for which
data results were analyzed. In addition, the triangulation approach used by Philipsen to
validate her findings is replicated in the present study to provide further validity to the
research. To build on the interview approach used by Philipsen, a range of perspectives
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from both genders and people who were associated with RPS in various capacities was
acquired.
To illustrate where past literature fell short of critically analyzing RPS as a
unitary district, specific documentation about Richmond and the forces that shaped
resegregation in the region were reviewed. The book A Virginia Profile 1960-2000:
Assessing Current Trends and Problems by John Moeser (1981) looks at existing
conditions in Virginia in 1981 and forward to possibilities in 1982-2000, with analysis of
specific factors affecting urban education particularly in Richmond. This work is
meaningful to the present study for defining the political, economic and social
environment toward the end of the school desegregation era in Richmond. Moeser
(1981) was valuable in helping provide historical documentation of the state of education
in Richmond prior to the time period of the present study. The conclusions that Moeser
(1981) draws from his work along with his predictions for the future opened the door for
further historical analysis to be done on RPS from 1986 through 2006.
John Moeser continued his research with Rutledge Dennis in their (1982) book
The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a Southern City. This book is about
Post World War II Richmond and the expansion of the city related to race and politics.
The struggle for power during the era of school desegregation is highlighted through their
analysis of the effects of the annexation limitations that occurred for Richmond after the
1970 annexation of Chesterfield County. This work is relevant to the years after 1986 for
creating a context of the political, social and economic developments of the city and the
surrounding counties. This is illustrated by the litigation in the courts that predates the
present study. This content was critical to developing a historical background of the
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demographics of Richmond at the conception of the present study. Furthermore, Moeser
and Dennis (1982) only examined the aftermath of annexation through a political, social
and economic lens. However, the present study, delved deeper into the ramifications of
the effects had specifically on RPS during the twenty years after 1986.
In 1989, Gary Orfield, Franklin Monfort, and Melissa Aaron published a report of
the council of Urban Boards of Education and the National School Desegregation
Research Project at the University of Chicago on the Status of School Desegregation
1968-1986: Segregation, Integration, and Public Policy: National, State and
Metropolitan Trends in Public Schools. They found trends that demonstrated the
resegregation of blacks throughout the south without particular mention of Richmond,
Virginia. Their research was useful to the present study to show the specific parallels that
Richmond underwent related to the residential patterns of the city. In addition, Orfield,
Monfort and Aaron (1989) neglected to examine the effects desegregation had on schools
systems specifically. Orfield et al., (1989) state, “Federal research on effective school
desegregation techniques should be resumed” (Orfield et al., 1989, p. 30). This
documented request for further research is extremely supportive of the need to examine
RPS since it was declared unitary in 1986.
Daniel Arkin (1991) wrote his dissertation on Regime Politics Surrounding
Desegregation Decision-Making During Massive Resistance in Richmond, Virginia,
which outlines state and local politics surrounding the school desegregation process of
1954 through 1986. In his conclusions and reflections, Arkin (1991) talks about how “the
political regime still exists and believes that the methods and beliefs behind the regime
continue to play a critical role in Richmond’s regime of 1991” (p. 160). His point has
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bearing for the present study as it relates to the politics in Richmond during unitary
status. Arkin does not go into the possible effects the political regime had on RPS, which
is significant to the research of the present study. This assertion of his adds reasoning to
this component of the present study.
Another source that was very important in providing background for the present
study is the work of Robert Pratt (1992) in The Color of Their Skin: Education and Race
in Richmond, Virginia 1954-1989. In reviewing Pratt’s research from 1954 through
1989, inevitable social and legal forces moved Richmond toward segregation in the
1950’s and racial divisions seemed to tense. As pointed out by Pratt (1992), the policies
of racial separation hardened as a result of Brown and the forces it unleashed. The
struggle to desegregate the schools in the 1960’s, 1970’s and into the 1980’s left
Richmond with a resegregated city. The concept of busing students within the city fell
short in 1986 when the school system saw its black population representing 87% of the
student enrollment (Pratt, 1992).
Pratt’s analysis of material from 1986 through 1989 is relevant to the basis of the
present study. The concepts utilized to revitalize the city and its school system was
subject to further analysis through 2006 in the present study. For instance, Pratt defines
the experimentation of magnet schools as potential luring mechanisms for whites to come
back into the city. In 1989, Community High saw 19 of its 41 seniors receive National
Merit or national achievement commendations and had a 99% college acceptance rate.
The school’s racial breakdown was 70% black, 25% white, 4% Asian and 1% Hispanic.
The superintendent of Richmond at the time, Albert Jones, wanted to expand magnet
schools in 1990 and beyond while not using this concept as a “carrot for desegregation”
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(Pratt, 1992, p. 95). Pratt also points out in his research that people had concerns about
the magnet school concept in that it would eventually lead to socio-economic segregation
within RPS (Pratt, 1992). Pratt’s work leads into the twenty-year historical analysis of
the present study to help continue the story of RPS as a unitary school system.
According to Christopher Silver and John Moeser’s (1995) book The Separate
City: Black Communities in the Urban South 1940-1968, when examining Richmond’s
contemporary situation, neighborhood settlement patterns of African-Americans are a
distinctive feature of this southern city. These settlement patterns constitute a relatively
self-contained, racially-identifiable community separate from the white city. In the case
of Richmond, this was no different. As the 1954 Brown decision unfolded and the effect
of the battle over public schools ensued in Richmond and throughout Virginia, the
political mobilization within the separate cities of Richmond occurred (Silver and
Moeser, 1995). However, their research only addressed the outcomes of the separate city
that was created in Richmond through the mid 1980’s with some brief connections made
to the school system.
For example, Silver and Moeser’s (1995) description of Richmond’s changing
black community after 1940 as sort of an unavoidable flow in one direction provides
meaning to the residential changes in Richmond prior to 1986. Furthermore, the
historical residential facts pertaining to Richmond help address the neighborhood school
situations that were controversial during unitary status. Significant racial change in
neighborhoods occurred after 1970, and by the 1980’s, the increase of black
neighborhoods overwhelmingly composed of low-income families and individuals
confirmed the precarious state of the black separate city. This point is a direct reflection
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of the neighborhood schools in Richmond during this period. The separate city, which
was previously an exclusively central city phenomenon, was transformed by the 1980s
and 1990s into a metropolitan condition (Silver and Moeser, 1995). The lack of analyzed
effect this phenomenon had on RPS is where the present study attempted to fill the gap in
the literature.
An article in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, “Schools’ Disparities Studies: Group
urges study of integrating city, suburban schools by income” by Robin Farmer (2006) is a
recent newspaper clipping that addresses metropolitan Richmond’s school disparity issue.
The article asks the question: “Whether or not now is the time to talk about integrating
classrooms in the city and suburbs by income as a way to achieve ‘world-class public
schools’” (Farmer, 2006, p. 1)? She notes that there is a need for action to address the
current issues of inequality in schools, twenty years after cross-town busing ended in RPS
(Farmer, 2006). Farmer’s points present the status of RPS as a unitary district; however,
further analysis about the significance of the school desegregation process on the district
is needed.
Further literature regarding RPS as a unitary school system is lacking and has
seemingly been stymied beyond the sources highlighted in this review. Interestingly,
Callihan (1992) stated at the end of her report: “There is no good time to break off the
review of the Richmond Public Schools history. It is left to the next historian to complete
the record of Richmond Public School’s ongoing history” (p. 262). Thus, the need to
research the answers to various questions related to the history of the desegregation
process associated with RPS is essential to adding to the body of knowledge that
currently exists about the district’s operations as a unitary school system. The purpose of

51
this present study is to help fill the existing gap pertaining to RPS as a unitary school
system for blacks and whites between 1986 and 2006.

Historical Research Methodology Literature Review

Several books on historical research methodologies were reviewed in this section
starting with Professor William Brickman, who laid the groundwork for historical
research methodology with his book Research in Educational History (1973). In this
book, Brickman covers the entire conceptual plane of research in educational history.
Being that some of the methods for preliminary searches for information are dated; for
the use of the present study, there was still a great deal of pertinent information in using
methodological searches for source materials. The ample listing of sourced material for
primary and secondary sources was extremely helpful as the researcher categorized the
data sources for analysis purposes. Brickman (1973) outlines over 10 primary sources
that are relevant to this study, including, laws, court decisions, institutional records,
professional records, published records, newspaper and magazine sources, public
documents, remains, pictorial sources, reproductions and translations. His principles of
appropriate evidence derived from authenticated primary sources or, from genuine
secondary sources were essential for drawing realistic inferences (Brickman, 1973).
The section of Brickman’s book that was especially helpful to this study was his
chapter: “Aids in Writing of History.” In this chapter, he thoroughly discussed the
methodology of educational historiographies. His analysis of the available literature on
this topic consists mainly of general historiographies in which he advises researchers to
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keep focus on the educational aspects of their research (Brickman, 1973). By focusing on
RPS during post-court mandated school desegregation, Brickman’s point guided the
critical analysis of this study’s findings.
James Hoopes’ (1979) Oral History: An Introduction for Students continues with
Brickman’s (1973) points of documented literature on historical educational forms of
research. Hoopes (1979) provides an outline for the researcher to approach history and
oral history from its appropriate perspective. He suggests intelligent criticism and an
alert audience on the part of the researcher in order to achieve the best possible form of
historical documentation for its greatest usefulness (p. 18). His book, which contains
content drawn from published oral histories, provides a basis for researchers to
understand the culture and society in which they will be researching. His in-depth
dissection of the interview process was particularly helpful as the set up and execution of
data sources were established for the present study. Specifically, Hoopes’ documentation
of how to arrange, prepare and conduct an interview was relevant to the research design
development of this study. Furthermore, Hoopes’ words regarding the actual writing of
historical research as it pertains to the legal and ethical aspects of oral documentation was
critical to the analysis of the collections and sources in the present study (Hoopes, 1979).
Another book that speaks to the art of conducting historical research is Oral
Historiography by David Henige (1982). Henige provides a more contemporary practice
for conducting oral history. He brings together some of the strands of Brickman (1972)
and Hoopes (1979) as they apply to the art of interviewing. His main thesis is for the
researcher to provide answers without raising questions of doubt. Henige (1982) makes it
clear that the methodical emphasis in his book “is squarely on accumulating data
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effectively, testing them thoroughly, and meshing them with other evidence so that they
can be widely regarded as reliable” (p. 6). This directive was used as a guide in creating
a methodology for the present study that took into account more than just the oral history
that was uncovered through the research. Other attainable sources were utilized to render
a complete historical research study on RPS between 1986 and 2006.
To bring the review of literature of historical research methods to a close, Prager,
Longshore and Seeman’s (1986) School Desegregation Research: New Directions in
Situational Analysis was examined. This book covers a variety of approaches to
historical research including both quantitative and qualitative content. For the purposes
of this review, the content pertaining solely to the present study was reviewed. Four
types of historical research approaches were found to be applicable for the purposes of
the present study. These types of approaches are as follows:
1. Sources and effects of levels of self-esteem on minority groups
2. Desegregation and academic achievement
3. Desegregation and interracial and interethnic content
4. Community effects of school desegregation
The most relevant type of approach for this study on RPS was the effect on the
community after school desegregation. The community represents the individuals
involved over the twenty year span of the present study. This approach was most
applicable to intertwine into the research design of the present study.
Prager et al., (1986) also note that there are several levels of analysis that can be
used to advance one’s understanding of the complicated process of school desegregation.
They note the parameters of society as a whole, in addition to relationships among and
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within school districts, schools, classrooms and those with individuals as the levels of
analysis (Prager et al., 1986, p. 250). For the benefit of the present study, the level of the
relationships within the Richmond school district is used. Variables that were
considered, as documented by Prager et al., (1986) include demography, major technical
and economic changes, housing polices, laws bearing desegregation, court decisions,
media attention, school board policies, ratios of different groups and the sorting process
within the district’s schools (p. 250). These variables were utilized in the study of RPS
(1986 through 2006) to help provide understanding and to clarify meaning, by way of a
critical analysis, of district operations as a unitary school system.

Conclusion

The outmigration of stable families, both black and white, resulted in the
increasing isolation of an underclass in the inner cities of America. The works of
Simmel, Weber and Marx provided insight into how society shaped a structured system
of status groups through various theories of their own. Their insights provided the
foundation for investigating the trends in the outmigration patterns of middle-and-upperclass residents, both white and black, when considering the implications on education.
Further literature was reviewed on the social and economic theories that relate to the
issue of desegregation.
From this, much was discovered about the role of socio-economic disparities in
large metropolitan cities during school desegregation. As the data illustrated, a black
underclass was developed through racial and class segregation. As stated in this literature
review, poverty was more concentrated in 2004 than in 1954, with 75% of poverty
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stricken families living in large urban areas (Curtis, 2004). Subsequently, according to
Curtis (2004) the schools within these large urban areas were suffering tremendously
from lack of funding and highly qualified educators. The segregation of metropolitan
areas remained at high levels while the concentration of poverty became even greater in
these areas of the United States.
Primary and secondary sourced literature pertaining to Richmond and its public
schools was reviewed to explain the impact that school desegregation had on RPS, the
city and its surrounding metropolitan area. However, there was a noticeable gap in the
literature relevant to critically analyzed documentation of the years after school
desegregation. Thus, further research on RPS as a unitary school system between 1986
and 2006 is needed.
From reviewing what the literature says about historical research methods
documented by Brickman (1973), Hoopes (1979), Heinge (1982) and Prager, Longshore
and Seeman (1986) an appropriate research design was developed for this study. In
addition, aspects of Johnson, McGrath and William’s (1989) survey study of RPS were
utilized to tailor this study’s design.
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CHAPTER 3
Research Design and Methodology
Introduction

Conceptual Framework
An important history of Richmond’s 1954 through 1986 school desegregation
process exists, but there is little analysis of the history since 1986, and this set the context
for the present study. Theories related to the social and economic conditions of urban
areas effected by the process of school desegregation were explored. Conditions of postcourt mandated school desegregation pertaining to metropolitan areas including
Richmond, Virginia were also closely examined; however, there is a dearth of critical
analysis pertaining to Richmond Public Schools (RPS) after it was declared a unitary
school system for blacks and whites in 1986. A historical case study of varying
perspectives and personal accounts of what happened within RPS between 1986 and 2006
should be informative to educators, policy makers and citizens alike.

Historical background.
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down its historic
school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education, (1954). This decision,
often referred to as (Brown I), stated that the racial segregation of children in public
schools deprives children of the equal protection of the laws (Brown, 1954). Many
Virginia politicians met the landmark decision of Brown I with “massive resistance”.
They believed that it was an unwarranted intrusion upon state’s rights and would result in
the decline rather than the improvement of education (Pratt, 1992). As noted throughout
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the previous two chapters, numerous reasons have precluded the desired implementation
of desegregated schools to occur.
The research design of the present study utilizes similar studies from the past as
well as a historical case study methodology as a template. In addition, aspects of
Johnson, McGarth, and Williams’ (1989) survey study of RPS were incorporated into this
study’s research design. Thus, this study explores RPS since it was declared a unitary
school system in 1986 through 2006.

Research design.
Johnson et al., (1989), which used a case study approach, served as a guide in
creating the present historical case study of RPS from 1986 through 2006. The present
study is in the form of a qualitative research design and focuses on twenty years of
history after Judge Merhige declared the system unitary in 1986. The work by Johnson et
al., (1989) helped influence this writer’s perspective in the present study. The research
includes a critical analysis of archival information, historical documents and informant
interviews associated with RPS during the period of 1986 through 2006. Interviewees
were selected for their association with and experiences flowing from the decisions made
after court ordered cross-town busing ended in Richmond. Interviews were critically
analyzed in conjunction with school board minutes, newspaper articles, court decisions,
government documents, school board policies and directives, census maps and other
pertinent primary records. In addition, archival information such as student
demographics, census reports and other related records and documents helped provide
understanding of RPS as a unitary school system.
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Research goals.
The perspectives from interviewees, information from historical documents and
data from public archives were critically analyzed to clarify meaning of what occurred
within RPS between 1986 and 2006. The school desegregation era (1954 to 1986) in
Richmond actually spawned a resegregation of the city, which since developed a larger
social underclass. This social underclass, including the remaining black and poorer white
students whose families settled in the city due to the lack of financial resources, created
many challenges for school leaders in Richmond. The goal of this research was to
critically analyze the data derived from the personal accounts of interviewees,
informative historical documents and public archival information. This data was used to
help provide understanding and to clarify meaning of how RPS grappled with unitary
status over a twenty year period.

Research questions.
1. What role did de jure and de facto school desegregation in Virginia play in the
development of RPS since 1986?
2. What was the relationship of race and class in the perception of people working in
RPS between 1986 and 2006?
3. How did people associated with RPS deal with the results of school desegregation

after the end of cross-town busing in 1986?
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Research sites.
Richmond, Virginia was the location used as a base for research development.
Specific information was obtained within the city of Richmond regarding historical
documents and archival information such as school board minutes, policies and
directives, superintendent’s annual reports, as well as other city and state measures
included in local and state government reports.
Educational documents were found within the record department of RPS. The
Virginia Historical Society, Virginia State Library and Richmond City Library were
specific locations used for retrieval of other important documents. The Internet also
served as a technological location for the retrieval of archived data from websites that
were accessible via the World Wide Web. These documents included, but were not
limited to legal decisions, newspaper articles, census data, documented policy papers and
other school archival items that were sufficiently related to RPS under unitary status.

Methods of Data Collection

The research design for this study is a qualitative historical case study. This study
explains certain aspects of historical conditions in RPS between 1986 and 2006 based on
the contextual framework outlined in the introduction and the review of literature
(Maxwell, 2005). The work of Johnson, McGarth, and Williams (1989) also influenced
the methodological development of the present study. As noted in the literature review,
this reference source provided citizens’ perspectives of RPS as of 1989. Johnson et al.,
(1989) provided a contemporary research outline that was combined with the historical
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research methods of the present study. Hence, a template was provided for the critical
analysis of RPS as a unitary school system.

Primary Data Sources
To begin this study, interviewees were selected as primary sources from the
personnel records of RPS as well as from newspaper articles and historic documents
related to the specific events occurring within the district from 1986 through 2006. In
order to reach the research goals, people were specifically identified who were involved
with or directly impacted by the decision-making processes of school desegregation.
These interviewees were all associated with RPS and represent various fields within local
levels of Richmond, Virginia. Specifically, employees under the administrations of
Superintendent’s William Harrison in 1986 through that of Deborah Jewell-Sherman in
2006 were targeted for questioning. Eighteen people representative of the beforementioned criteria accepted a letter of request (see Appendix A for an example of this
letter).
They were asked to participate by being contacted personally and they were given
an explanation of this research. A synopsis of the study’s proposal was shared with them
so they would have a clear understanding of the research. The participants were asked a
series of questions (see Appendix B) derived from the research questions of this study.
Additional questions were added dependent upon the course of the individual interview
processes.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was secured before the interview
process with interviewees began so that their rights were protected through their consent
to participate in the present study (see Appendix C for an example of the consent form).
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Data collection was derived from a digital recorder, used during the interviewing sessions
with each interviewee. The transcripts of the interviews were created from the usage a
digital recorder for accurate playback consistency. Recorded transcripts were used to
keep track of the research process. An index card system detailing all major concepts
revealed throughout the interviews was also used for data organization. In detail, these
notes highlighted the day to day research activities, which helped guide the
methodological decision making process. Materials related to the persons interviewed
and the researcher’s experiences with each of them were also included. The exact
instrumentation of this ongoing process included asking questions of the interviewees and
analyzing their answers.
Other primary sources used for the present study included historical documents
located in Richmond, Virginia. Historical documents such as mapping demographics,
school board minutes, city and state policies and programs, newspaper clippings and
news articles from 1986 through 2006 that pertained to the research goals of the present
study were analyzed. Specific documents such as school board minutes including
policies and directives, superintendent’s annual reports, as well as other city and state
measures included in local and state government reports were examined. Many of these
historical documents were also retrieved from the Richmond School Board office,
Virginia Historical Society, Virginia State Library and the Richmond City Library.
Archival information obtained from the Richmond’s School Board office and its website
also served as data sources. These pieces of data were specific to the demographic
changes of Richmond and its public school system during the time period of this study.
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Other archival documents included pertinent records regarding the programs and policies
developed since unitary status was declared in 1986.

Secondary Data Sources
Previously reviewed published works were utilized as secondary sourced material
in the analysis of the present study. Details from these books as well as other relevant
secondary sources of information from the field were examined and viewed
appropriately. In order to help strengthen the information received from the primary
sources, such as interviews, the previously reviewed secondary sources in the literature
review were essential to the critical analysis. As interviewees referenced information that
was consistent with other primary and secondary sourced data, greater credibility was
gained for the present study.

Methods of Data Analysis

The first step in the data analysis process was to organize data from interviews,
historical documents and archival information. The initial organization of data was done
according to the data source. Information from interviewee transcripts, historical
documents and archival information provided the basis for a coding system. The codes
developed were used as categories to organize the data systematically. The data was
summarized, relationships were identified and generalizations were suggested as part of
the analysis process. Inferences were also made relevant to the patterns that emerged
from the data. Emerging patterns and themes related were connected to existing literature
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for critical analysis. The integration of contemporary concepts with the findings of this
historical study helped provide understanding of RPS as a unitary school system.

Coding Methods
Once interviewee transcripts were read and the information from the historical
documents and public archives were organized by source, the coding of data began.
Specific topics and patterns began to materialize from interviews and events mentioned in
each source of data received a code. In addition to organizing data on a computer, an
index card filing system was utilized to help manage the organizing of the data from each
of the sources. A systematic organization of coded data then occurred, placing the data
into categories for summarizing purposes. The summation process helped develop
relationships from the information in each category and patterns that were identified.
These categories materialized into time periods that highlighted specific events in history.
Inferences were made based on the researcher’s inductive interpretation of the findings.
After the synthesizing of the information took place, patterns began to emerge based on
the interpreted data that was collected. From this, additional data was found that was
consistent with the emerging themes and patterns through history.
An emerging pattern developed from the data representative of historical time
segments that occurred between 1986 and 2006, which provided a natural outline for the
subsequent chapters. This emerging pattern resembled a timeline of what transpired
between 1986 and 2006 in terms of events within RPS during unitary status. The
interpretations themselves were plentiful and helped provide understanding to the twenty
years after cross-town busing ended in RPS.
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This same process was utilized for other primary and secondary sourced data. For
instance, documented evidence was integrated with historical documents and public
archival information to demonstrate relationships within the retrieved data.

Reliability and Validity Issues
Using systematic methods and procedures for choosing data sources for this
study helped ensure both internal and external reliability and validity. An in-depth search
for interviewees, historical documents and public archival information was conducted in
order to preserve the authenticity of past events. In addition, member checking with the
participants of the interview process occurred. Triangulation also occurred between
interviewee accounts, historical documents and archival information. For example, when
patterns from archival information emerged and the same patterns were repeated in
interviewee testimony and found in historical documents, the findings were viewed as
credible. Peer debriefing was done with historians during and after the data collection
period in order to conduct an on-going auditing process to protect the reliability and
validity of the present study (Maxwell, 2005).
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CHAPTER 4
The Transition from Cross-Town Busing to Unitary Status
Introduction
“So from 1970 to 1986 was a—what I would consider—a major transitional period for
the Richmond Public Schools and Richmond City. There were problems. Don’t think
that there weren’t problems, but you can get comfortable dealing with anything over a
period of time. That becomes ingrained in you and you learn how to work with it or
around it.”
---“Mr. Anderson” (43 year veteran Richmond Public School educator)
The unitary status of Richmond Public Schools (RPS) was officially established
in Judge Robert R. Merhige Jr.’s decision in Bradley v. Board on April 16, 1986, to end
cross-town busing by declaring the district be no longer dually operated for blacks and
whites. The transitional period of managing a resegregated school system developed
before Merhige’s 1986 decision and continued for several years thereafter. Actions taken
by RPS prior to the 1986 court decree are analyzed first to provide background for the
first five years the district was no longer operating as a dual system. Indeed, by 1986
RPS had become 87% black, and Merhige obviously believed that cross-town busing was
no longer the answer to desegregating the district. To develop an understanding of how
RPS grappled with the after effects of cross-town busing, the remainder of the chapter is
devoted to analyzing the restructuring efforts of the district from 1986 through 1991.

Preparing for the End of Cross-Town Busing

Participants of the present study who experienced school desegregation help
provide a personalized framework of the past. RPS educator and interviewee “Ms.
Smith” said:

66
I thought it was challenging for them [black students who were being
bused across town]. They would complain about having to drive so long.
As I think about them now, I feel upset. I don’t know what gave me the
feeling that the education they might have been receiving prior to being
bused was somewhat inferior (Smith, 2008).
Former RPS student and interviewee “Mr. Grant,” who was a black student bused
to a white school during desegregation said:
Well, for one thing, I didn’t want to be there. I wanted to be at a black
school with my friends…but everyone in the black community was pretty
much united behind the effort of desegregation, so everybody's general
attitude was very similar. I mean, in those days, the black communities
were pretty isolated, but it was also about cross-pollination across socioeconomic levels, across educational levels. But there was unanimity of
attitudes and efforts towards desegregation. So, I think, people's
experiences were pretty much the same (Grant, 2008).
Former Richmond administrator and interviewee “Mr. Bean” provided a
principal’s perspective of school desegregation and what it was like to manage the
process of cross-town busing from within a school: “It just took a toll on you,
really” (Bean, 2008).

Modifications to Existing Desegregation Policies
In 1983, three years prior to the end of cross-town busing, the controversy of
whether or not to spend $12.7 million to build Boushall Middle School on the South Side
of Richmond sparked a debate in the community about the value of busing students
across town to achieve racial desegregation. Due to school enrollment and population
projections at the time, the busing issue came to the forefront. At the time of the debate,
Richmond parent Barbara Weaver was quoted in the Richmond Times-Dispatch as
saying: “Busing hasn’t achieved anything. I wish they’d do away with it.” Another
parent Diane Riddick said, “There’s too many school buses using too much gas
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transporting kids back and forth across the river. I’m for the school, but I’m against
busing” (Squires, 1983, p. 1). RPS administrator and interviewee “Mr. Snyder” was an
outsider at the time busing was coming to an end. He viewed the situation as follows:
I think there was a feeling for many, many years that the whole concept of
busing is it’s a dismal failure and that it destroyed the school system, and
that’s what a lot of people in the community felt. And it wasn’t really like
it was a major topic. At the time it [end of cross-town busing] occurred, it
certainly was (Snyder, 2008).
During the cross-town busing era, Judge Merhige approved several modifications
to Plan III of Bradley v. Board (1970). Most significantly was the K-5 Plan of 1977-78,
which returned Fox Elementary and Mary Munford Elementary back to neighborhood
schools. In 1979, Plan G was adopted as a feeder plan system to consolidate 7 high
schools into 3 complexes (Epes, 1986). According to the Richmond Times-Dispatch,
during the decision making process to build Boushall Middle in 1983, Richmond
Superintendent Richard C. Hunter noted on several occasions that most busing was being
done primarily to transport students who lived more than a mile from their schools and to
take pupils with special needs to schools offering appropriate programs. He stated that
socio-economic factors were also taken into consideration for busing after the feeder plan
was adopted in 1979. Hunter was quoted in 1983 saying,
Most busing done today is not to achieve racial balance, because the
school population is 85 percent black. Even when busing began in 1970,
the system was 70 percent black. Since that time, total enrollment has
dropped from 47,239 to 30,349 and 15 schools have been closed (Squires,
1983, p. 4).
According to 1983 school census data published by Chuck Epes, Richmond was still a
city of segregated neighborhoods. For example, 51 of the 69 census tract areas in
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Richmond were either predominately black or white. This meant that nearly 75% of
Richmond’s neighborhoods were segregated by race (Epes, 1986).
On November 8, 1985, just five months before Merhige’s decision to end crosstown busing, the results of a poll conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory at
Virginia Commonwealth University were published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch.
The survey showed that, of those interviewed, 70% of black people and 69% of white
people, wanted an integrated school system, but 53% of the blacks and 78% of the whites
were against cross-town busing. Overall, 63% of those interviewed did not favor crosstown busing as the method for achieving racial desegregation in RPS. All of the parents
interviewed believed the sole purpose of cross-town busing was to integrate schools;
however, only 19% favored it while 75% were opposed. In light of the final decision to
build Boushall Middle School, and after the findings of this survey were provided to the
Richmond Public School Board, a commission was formed to take a closer look at the
Pupil Assignment Plan (Young, 1985).
In a chronological review entitled A Mini-History of the Richmond Public Schools
1869-1992, Shirley Callihan described the details of the Citizens’ Advisory Commission.
The commission held hearings in late 1985 for public comment and compiled the
community input into a final report that recommended the following:





All elementary schools go back to neighborhood schools
Limitations be put on the assignment of secondary students from
public housing developments
Feeder patterns be retained
Plan G be evaluated (Callihan, 1992, p. 415)
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In respect to Plan G’s attempt to consolidate high schools into complexes, for RPS
administrator and interviewee “Mr. Wright,” who was a central office administrator
during this transitional time, said:
We operated under Plan G for six years before reverting back to separate
high schools, but not before spending an awful lot of money, [and]
sending buses with two and three children all over town all times of the
day (Wright, 2008).
Wright felt that higher academic programs were a good idea; however, the school
division was struggling to find a way to increase the quality of education while resources
and student enrollment were declining. Another community group called “The Standards
of Quality Planning Council” presented its responses to the Advisory Commission’s
report at the January 15, 1986 Richmond School Board meeting. The Standards of
Quality Planning Council’s recommendations were:








Assign children attending traditional elementary schools primarily to
neighborhood schools
Assign elementary school students so that no students would pass
more than two elementary schools to attend school; a distance of no
more than two miles from home is preferred
Make an effort to create a feasible socio-economic mix of students,
limiting the number of students from public housing projects not to
exceed a range of 40-50% of the total enrollment of any one secondary
school
Transport secondary students no more than three miles except where a
lack of space requires traveling greater distances
Retain the feeder plan concept
Evaluate Plan G to determine its feasibility (School Board Minutes,
1986, p. 5)

Pupil Assignment Plan
On January 22, 1986, Superintendent Hunter announced in his report to the school
board:
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An attempt has been made to preserve features of the Pupil Assignment
Plan that enhance the quality of education; to reduce the volume of crosstown transportation and numerous satellite zones; and to more effectively
utilize facilities. There would be a more functional distribution of the
student population in all grades (School Board Minutes, 1986, p. 12).
On February 19, 1986, the school board announced the new Pupil Reassignment
Plan, which assigned most students to their nearest neighborhood school while trying to
avoid, to the greatest extent possible, the over-concentration of public housing
development residents in a single school. The board also passed the elimination of most
satellite zones. These satellite zones were designed in the early 1970’s to assist with the
organization of busing students from one school’s zone to another. Also, a third open
enrollment model school (Fisher) was announced. In addition, the creation of attendance
zones for five open enrollment schools at Bellevue, Cary, Fisher, Henderson, and
Thompson were presented. It was claimed by the school board that these zones would
create a minimal percentage change in the racial breakdown of students in schools
throughout the system because the application process for open enrollment would foster
diversity (School Board Minutes, 1986, p. 20). Further statistics were announced
regarding the new Pupil Reassignment Plan on February 21, 1986, stating the plan was
designed to reduce transportation costs by eliminating satellite zones and to maximize the
neighborhood school concept. It was reported there would be no significant change in
the racial composition for the schools (School Board Minutes, 1986, p. 23).
The public had the opportunity to respond to these plans at the February 25, 1986
school board meeting. A black community member, Onslow Minnis, Sr. stated, “75
percent of our students really need help, and reassignment is not the answer; additional
programs must be set up to meet the needs of blacks at the elementary level” (School
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Board Minutes, p. 24). Marilyn Bloun, a black parent of a RPS student, said she was
concerned about her children now having to walk the busy streets to Blackwell
Elementary School versus having the security that her child would be safe riding a bus
across town as they had before; she also sought information and assurance that the
proposed plan was not just designed to separate blacks from whites (School Board
Minutes, 1986, p. 26). On March 4, 1986, the school board approved the Pupil
Reassignment Plan and rejected the Commission’s recommendations to convert John B.
Cary and Bellevue Model Elementary Schools back to neighborhood schools. Instead,
the board grandfathered Cary and Bellevue’s current students for the remainder of their
elementary experience. Despite many parents’ concern about rezoning and the quality of
education, the board presented its response to the Advisory Commission’s report by
listing the following decisions:











Provision of a student population for two additional schools (Boushall
and Franklin)
Return of the fifth grade to elementary schools and the eighth grade to
middle schools
Assignment of most students to their nearest regular school
Creation of six high schools to be implemented over a two-year period
Consolidation of compatible secondary programs in single buildings
Avoidance, to the greatest extent possible, of the over-concentration of
public housing development residents in a single school
Elimination of most satellite zones
Establishment of a third open enrollment model elementary school
(Fisher) and an open enrollment component at Thompson Middle
Creation of zones for the five open enrollment schools
Creation of a minimum change of the racial percentages of students at
each school (Callihan, 1992, pp. 414-15)

With the adoption of the new Pupil Assignment Plan, RPS was preparing for the
changeover to unitary status, which meant the courts would no longer recognize them as
a racially divided district. The final verdict from the Fourth U.S. District Court on the
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status of cross-town busing would soon be announced. RPS seemed prepared for unitary
status.

The Changeover to a Unitary School System

On April 16, 1986, U.S. District Court Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. ended crosstown busing in RPS with the federal court decision of Bradley v. Board (1986). This
decision legally ended school desegregation in Richmond. The end of court ordered
school desegregation was officially documented in the Richmond Public School Board
minutes on May 6, 1986. The United States District Court order dated April 17, 1986
read:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOURTH FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION
Carolyn Bradley, et al. Plaintiffs, v. Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Virginia et al. Civil Action No 3353-R
Order
Upon motion of the School Board of the City of Richmond and without
objections by the plaintiffs, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the
present Plan III assignment plan for the Richmond Public Schools be and
the same is hereby modified to conform to the Pupil Reassignment Plan
approved by the said School Board at its meeting of March 27, 1986. Let
the Clerk send a copy of this order to all counsel of record.
Robert R. Merhige, United States District Judge (Bradley v. Board, 1986,
p. 1)
On April 18, 1986, two days after Judge Merhige’s decision to end cross-town
busing, the Richmond Times-Dispatch published the following synopsis of the new plan:
Merhige signed late yesterday an order that gave the federal court's
approval to the board's plan. The court's approval was required because
Richmond schools remain under a desegregation order dating from 1971.
In his order, Merhige said the school board must report in writing to the
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court when various facets of the plan are implemented and these reports
should not be filed later than the expiration of a two-year school period
dating from September 1986. The city hopes to implement the plan in
September. The assignment plan will put an end to most cross-town
busing and return Richmond to a neighborhood school concept at all grade
levels. The new plan also will eliminate "satellite" zones created for racial
mixing purposes and to ease over—and under—utilization of schools.
The plan will not alter substantially the racial composition of any school.
Richmond has a school enrollment of about 29,500 children, about 87
percent of them black. In addition, the plan will split the three high school
complexes into six independent schools and establish a third model
elementary school (Goode and Epes, 1986, p. 1).

Court Deliberations
After the court order to end cross-town busing, the school board still sought
additional state financing to remove the vestiges of segregation in the city. A lawsuit was
filed on March 21, 1984 by the board requesting money from the state to eliminate
segregation in the city’s public schools. The board believed that with additional money,
programs could be developed that would attract white and middle-class blacks back to
RPS. The board wanted to use those funds to buy computers, hire additional teachers to
reduce class sizes, and to create more remedial and individualized instructional programs.
During the court hearings, school board lawyers and parents attempted to show how
racial isolation during the desegregation process left black pupils with little hope. They
said the consequences of racial isolation were low grades, high absenteeism,
unacceptable dropout rates, discipline problems and low self-esteem. Expert witnesses
on both sides debated how much good additional funding would do. State lawyers from
the Attorney General's office said the city schools already received a higher level of
financing than nearby localities. They stated that more money would not solve the
problems of RPS (Goode and Epes, 1986). During the 1986-87 school year, RPS
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received $1,709 per student, which was higher than the state average of $1,623
(McCalister, 1986).
Roy A. West, who simultaneously served as Richmond’s Mayor and Albert H.
Middle School principal in 1986, disagreed with the notion that massive amounts of state
money would bring RPS onto an academic par with neighboring localities. To support
his argument, West referenced his school where major improvements were made on
reading, math and science standardized tests. West said this was not accomplished
through transfusions of money, but through working with available resources in the
system. Opposed to West’s point was former Richmond Public School Board Chairman
Melvin E. Law. Law supported the school board’s lawsuit that requested an estimated
$48 million for new programs. He noted that even after desegregation, RPS was still
87% black and some schools were 100% black due to the shunning of the city’s schools
by whites. His point was that this money would be valuable for developing programs to
address the resegregation that had taken place in RPS. He believed programs could be
developed to attract white and middle-class blacks back to the city’s public schools
(Goode and Epes, 1986).
On July 10, 1986, Merhige dismissed the 1984 lawsuit. He ruled that the
problems in the city’s school system were not related to the vestiges of a segregated
system. He said the public schools were fully integrated under the federal desegregation
order of Bradley v. Board (1971). Merhige ruled that RPS was a unitary rather than a
dual system that provided unequal opportunities for black and white pupils (Goode and
Epes, 1986). Merhige said, “The city system currently offers a high-quality education
program for all its students, and the city already receives a disproportionately large
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amount of funding from the state” (Bradley v. Board, 1986, p. 2). He elaborated in an
interview saying, “Although increased state financing would be desirable and have a
beneficial effect on the quality of public education, the court only has the authority to
order such financing if it is necessary to remedy the effects of state-imposed segregation"
(Goode and Epes, 1986, p. 1). The judge believed poverty was a prime reason for the
previous low achievement levels of Richmond schoolchildren, but now the Richmond
system was doing well financially and academically. He noted that scores on
standardized tests had increased steadily during the past 10 years. Merhige said:
Although the court feels that one of the reasons for the high poverty rate in
Richmond is the inferior education that was provided to blacks under the
former dual (school) system, it is not within the court's power to remedy
either the poverty itself or the ancillary effects (Goode and Epes, 1986, p.
2).
Virginia’s Attorney General Mary Sue Terry said:
This is a landmark case. It proves Virginia has fully met its constitutional
responsibilities to eliminate segregation, not only in Richmond, but also in
schools across the state. This decision shows the nation that our
educational system is indeed colorblind (Goode and Epes, 1986, p. 2).
In another interview, she said: “I am proud of my staff and of the people of Virginia, for
providing the atmosphere for a unitary school system that finally closes the pages on a
tragic chapter in Virginia's history" (McCallister and Young, 1986, p. 1). The final order
denying financial relief for RPS was submitted to the school board on July 16, 1986. It
read:
With regret, the US District Court has denied the Board’s request for relief
in the matter of Bradley v. Commonwealth of Virginia. The following
order is included for the record:
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
Richmond Division
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Carolyn Bradley, et al, Plaintiffs, vs. Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Virginia et al., Defendants. Civil Action No 3353-R
Final Order
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum entered this day,
and deeming it just and proper so to do, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED
that plaintiffs’ claim that the Commonwealth of Virginia is
constitutionally required to provide additional funding to the Richmond
Public School District to eliminate the vestiges of the past State-mandated
segregation be and the same is hereby DENIED.
The court also finds that the Richmond Public School District has now
achieved unitary status. The Court therefore relinquishes its jurisdiction
over the School District, and this case stands DISMISSED. Defendants
are entitled to their taxable costs.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this order and the accompanying
memorandum to all counsel of record. Robert R. Merhige, Jr. (School
Board Minutes, 1986, p. 81).
Thereafter, a motion was made by the Richmond School Board to appeal Bradley
v. Baliles (1986) (School Board Minutes, 1986, p. 91). The U.S Fourth Circuit Court
panel consisting of Judge Donald Stuart Russell, Chief Judge Harrison L. Winter and
Senior Judge Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. rejected the appeal. The panel said there was no
evidence of lingering segregation in Richmond’s schools that could be blamed on the
state. The panel refused to allocate any funds for remedial education to the district, and
agreed with Merhige’s decree that Richmond was now a unitary system. The panel’s
ruling was based on its judgment that state defendants adequately discharged their
constitutional obligation to eliminate the vestiges of state-mandated segregation. In
summary, the remarks of 4th Circuit panel represented the belief that efforts to eliminate
the effects of segregation had been successful due to increases in recent standardized test
scores (McAllister, 1987). The panel did note that the state already provided substantial
money to Richmond for remedial education; even though the panel felt programs should
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be implemented, they said there was not a legal basis for ordering the state to make them
possible through increased funding. After the panel rejected the school board’s appeal,
Merhige said in an interview: "What was done was the law” (Epes, 1986, p. 4).

Impact on the Community
For the purpose of the present study, reactions of people associated with RPS
have been collected and analyzed to provide the community’s perspective on unitary
status of the district in 1986. “Ms. Miller,” a white administrator and interviewee, had
the following to say about the impact felt at her school after the changeover to a unitary
system. Hers was one of few schools that saw a demographic change in the racial
composition of staff and students after 1986:
Well, it was quite dramatic at the time to be put in a culture where you
didn’t have any cultural competence, as they call it now. I think you
might have had one half day training on diversity issues, and so it was
pretty dramatic (Miller, 2008).
As a result of the declining student enrolment after 1986, a teacher surplus was
created at some schools. “Mr. Bean,” a black administrator, who experienced this
situation, recalls one of the challenges he faced:
I had teachers crawling out of the ceiling, and they [central office] came
over and told me to identify teachers that could be transferred and one day
they just came over and read the riot act to me, and said, ‘Before we leave
today, you’re going to identify who you declare a surplus.’ And at that
time I had two librarians, one white, one black and the white librarian was
just tops. And the black librarian was a nice lady and that’s about all she
was, was a nice lady. And so, I made a decision to keep the white
librarian. And, oh my God, I had to stand my ground on that one. It was
very devastating for some people. And you had to do a lot of—just
humanity stuff…that was a very trying period (Bean, 2008).
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Former RPS administrator and interviewee “Ms. Lee” saw the district’s changeover
process of becoming unitary unfold first hand as an RPS administrator during the 1970’s
and 1980’s. She said,
I think it was a long process and I think that the end result was that
probably the students who remained in Richmond City who had no other
choices once again felt disenfranchised, felt that they were abandoned, felt
that they weren’t important. You know, if you look at the condition of a
lot of the schools in Richmond right now, you’ll see that the conditions in
many of those schools have remained the same…from ’70 to ’86, I
watched a gradual progression with a few little surges. Okay, let’s build
the school system back up into an integrated system and then it would
kind of fall back. And now let’s try this effort, and then that would come
under fire from other people. But generally speaking, I think you still
ended up with a large population of students who probably have felt
disenfranchised (Lee, 2008).
Richmond journalist and interviewee “Mr. Jackson” was asked how he thought the new
plan to end cross-town busing affected the development of RPS thereafter. He said,
It had a profound effect not just on the public schools, but the Richmond
region itself. I think I would describe it as the definitive event in the
shaping of this region (Jackson, 2008).
Another point made by Lee specific to the end of cross-town busing was:
Eighty-six—I mean that was more like a whimper than a bang. I don’t
think that was a big moment that anyone who saw it was going, ‘Oh wow,
this is great or this is awful or this is anything.’ It was just more of the
same. It was just things continued without a lot of serious effects, I think,
from that decision…the middle-class of whites unless they are given
choice in an inner city environment continued to move away to the
counties (Lee, 2008).
As depicted by two different participants of the present study, the decision to end
cross-town busing in 1986 had differing impacts on RPS. These contradicting
points demonstrate that Jackson, a black man, felt the impact that the end of crosstown busing had on the socio-economic conditions of the Richmond metropolitan
area was more significant than Lee, a white woman.
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According to Richmond Newsleader writer Paul Bradley, “the aftermath of
white middle-class flight from Richmond and the end of cross-town busing
developed a new type of dual education—a private school system for the affluent
and white, and a public school system for the poor and black” (Bradley, 1992, p.
1). Bradley believed that busing was a failure. He did not claim that it was illadvised given the extent of residential segregation in Richmond; however, he
implied that the decision to end the efforts of desegregation diminished the hope
that racism might one day disappear from the racially divided Richmond and the
nation (Bradley, 1992).
The ramifications of the events regarding the students leading up to 1986 varied
according to participants in the present study. RPS educator and interviewee “Ms.
Smith” said,
I don’t think the children were affected by it. I don’t remember anything
that affected them that much…. It was like nothing had happened. I can’t
say if they appeared relieved. It was just over. I don’t think it meant that
much to them (Smith, 2008).
Smith’s view of the students’ feelings reflected a sense of unawareness on their part.
Opposed to this view was Richmond legal authority and interviewee “Mr. Wilson.” He
believed the students were conscious of the changes taking place. He said,
I think children are resilient. I think that parents are the most intolerant
force and can become the most inflexible. But I think for the most part that
students found common ground. They felt that what had happened was
important (Wilson, 2008).
Not only did Wilson see the students as aware of what they were a part of, he also saw
them as vested in making the most of the situation. Furthermore, Richmond religious
leader and interviewee “Mr. Sanders,” said:
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Emotionally there was a slight improvement. I’m talking about black kids.
Remember white kids were not [impacted] the same. Emotionally for
black kids, there was a slight improvement in that the absolute rhetoric
and legal differentiation of this process [cross-town busing] was
fundamentally debilitating (Sanders, 2008).
Sanders viewpoint delved deeper into the ramifications of cross-town busing on the lives
of the students who were black. Wilson felt that the result of the desegregation process
had a positive lasting affect on the students. He said,
I've talked to some of them [black and white students] and some of them
have turned out very successful despite the racial tensions of the times
(Wilson, 2008).
With race being central to the issue of ending cross-town busing in 1986, the RPS
employee publication The School Bell featured an article on race relations from a political
and community perspective. It claimed: “In the past decade the city of Richmond,
Virginia has probably changed, with respect to race relations, more than any other
southern city of comparable size and racial demography” (Stanley, 1986, p. 3). It was
stated that, in 1986, people who were black remained at the lower rung of the financial
ladder; however, the coalition of black and white political and financial powers had
become more comfortable. Race relations were improving at the time because the belief
that blacks and whites could not work well together was being refuted by this example.
However, there was a sense that RPS still had a long way to go toward equal access,
equal opportunity and equal resources (Stanley, 1986).
Confirmed by political writer David Rosenthal, the years of contentious and
racially charged governance had come to an end by 1986. In fact, the tradition of
divisiveness was dramatically altered in July 1982, when black city council member and
middle school Principal Roy West was named Mayor of Richmond. West gained support
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from the four white members of council to help him become voted in as mayor. The
racial division and bitterness on the council under the former Mayor Henry Marsh III
began to diminish after West’s appointment. By 1983, the bickering subsided in
Richmond’s political realm, and the political coalition became helpful to the city,
especially the school system (Rosenthal, n.d.). Prior to this improvement, the political
decisions of the 1970’s prevented the city from annexing any additional land and left the
public school system with no alternatives but to use cross-town busing as the vehicle for
desegregation. When former RPS student and interviewee “Mr. Grant” was asked how
the district was affected by the history of racial politics in the city, he said,
Well, I think the shadows of all those racial politics are still all around.
There's one other historical thing I think that was important at one time,
annexation by the city was used as a way of diluting the black vote as we
started to have more and more of a black majority in the city. But then
again with white flight, the legislature also passed those laws preventing
any further annexation which was originally now landlocked and having
no way to improve the tax base. And I think that’s a direct—that was
certainly a reflection of racial politics of the day and, I think. Richmond
today is still suffering from the effects of that kind of action (Grant, 2008).
Leading up to 1986, the political decisions that reflected the racial division of the past
formed a context for the social and economic developments of the city and the school
system (Moeser and Dennis, 1982). Given the city politics of the past and the status of
race relations in 1986, interviewees were asked how they thought RPS dealt with the
changeover to a unitary system, and administrator “Mr. Anderson” responded by saying:
I think Richmond has dealt with it probably as well and even better in
many instances than many other urban areas that went through the same
thing. And the reason for that is we made every effort to adhere to the
letter of the law (Anderson, 2008).

82
Since the end of cross-town busing, RPS tried to adjust along with the changing
dynamics in the city. In attempting to gain a foothold during a transitional period, the
district’s new unitary status provided the opportunity to restructure for the future.

Restructuring Efforts

A closer look is taken at the restructuring efforts of Richmond’s educational
leaders for improving the system during a transitional period. The decisions made from
1986 through 1991 demonstrate an attempt to restructure RPS in a manner that embraced
its unitary status through district wide initiatives. Beginning in the 1986-87 school year,
however, school leaders were facing restructuring challenges from in and outside of the
system. In a Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial on July 13, 1986:
Judge Merhige's landmark decision gives Richmonders a grand
opportunity to unite by taking pride in their unity, improving the school
system and resolving to make it even better through voluntary actions.
Cross-town busing is ending. So should outdated victim theories (“Step,”
1986, p. 1).
One year later another editorial was written:
I hoped with the end of a long, bitter struggle at hand, Richmonders would
turn their full energies to their racially unitary, improving school system
and eschew outdated victim theories. Again we urge the School Board:
Let this case be closed. It's time to open a new, more optimistic chapter for
the city's schools (“Case,” 1987, p. 1).
The challenge of overcoming the effects of failed desegregation was summed up by
former RPS student and interviewee “Mr. Grant.” He said,
Well, I think everybody was trying their best to adjust. In the cities we
had an exacerbation of this problem because of resource issues for the
most part. I think it’s something that’s beyond the capacity of a single city
to fix, that’s the point. And if there had been a nationwide resolve to raise
our education system, I think, it could have been done by now, but it’s not
(Grant, 2008).
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Public Opinion
In an effort to keep the public informed and to help strengthen the image of RPS,
the school board released a publication on March 9, 1987, entitled: What You Need to
Know about Richmond Public Schools. The premise of the document was to promote the
development of the Pupil Re-assignment Plan, which permitted most students to attend
schools in their own neighborhoods. It touted free transportation available to middle and
high schoolers that lived more than 1.5 miles from their neighborhood schools. The
document also highlighted the above average composite percentile rankings of the
highest performing schools on the Science Research Associates (SRA) Tests (School
Board, 1987). An improvement from the previous year’s data was reported in the
Superintendent’s 1985-86 Annual Report. Highlighted were three of Richmond’s open
enrollment schools: John B. Cary Model Elementary, Open High School and Community
High School (Harrison-Jones, 1986). These three schools were products of the magnet
and model school programs of the 1970’s and 1980’s to attract a diverse population.
Cary, Open and Community were perceived as the premiere schools in the community.
Aside from the attempt to promote some of the schools and the positive features
of the system, RPS was preoccupied with trying to contain the negative public opinions
of the school system. For instance, parent Katherine Lawson expressed a fear that RPS
would become a system for black children rather than one for all children who lived in
the city (School Board Minutes, 1988, p. 345). On the surface, RPS appeared to be at a
loss on how to respond to negative comments such as this. Instead, the school board and
superintendent were seemingly searching for a restructuring plan to get the system back
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on track. However, in light of controversy over the direction of RPS, board member
Reginald L. Brown voiced his concern that many fine and positive things in the schools
are often ignored and overshadowed by the negatives. He shared details of recent student
achievements, awards, and citations as representative of the effective things taking place
in Richmond schools (School Board Minutes, 1988, p. 290).
On August 2, 1988, two years into unitary status, school board member Melvin D.
Law stated: “I must speak out when it comes to choosing between the best interests of
children and continuing the political shenanigans and the chicanery that has characterized
much of the operations of this board for the last two years” (School Board Minutes, 1988,
p. 290). Richmond parent Deborah Pellman stated that the past busing failures and the
uncertain future of Richmond schools are the main fears that keep many neighborhood
parents from sending their children to public school (School Board Minutes, 1988, p.
393). Another citizen appealed to the school board to put aside their differences, personal
vendettas, and political motives for the best interests of the students in Richmond
(Callihan, 1992). Former RPS administrator and interviewee “Ms. Newman” stated:
Basically, the schools went back to being segregated, the whites moved
out and in some ways the quality of education went down. Now some
people still think, ‘No, it was very good.’ At that time, some school board
members were very hard lined about the right of education in the school
system. They did not want the whites to come back. They were angry
(Newman, 2008).
The effort to change the perception of RPS was described in the district’s 1988
publication of The School Bell. Enhancing community confidence became one of the
main objectives for the upcoming year. Richmond was engaged in a vigorous campaign
in the late 1980’s to market the attractions and unique opportunities in the city. Efforts
were made to encourage corporations to relocate or invest in Richmond. The district
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realized that a visibly superior school system was a great bargaining tool. The system
made efforts to address the needs of all students as major assets contributing significantly
to Richmond’s future economic expansion (Castro, 1988).

Development Plans
As RPS developed an infrastructure plan for moving forward, Harrison-Jones
announced that she would not be seeking reappointment as superintendent at the end of
her four-year term. She was granted leave from her position effective September 16,
1988. Former Superintendent James W. Tyler was called upon by the Richmond School
Board to fill the void for nine months until a new superintendent was hired (Callihan,
1992). On July 1, 1989, the school board appointed Albert L. Jones to be the next RPS
Superintendent. Some of the first actions taken by Jones included an announcement of a
major thrust to address the dropout problem through the Youth Experiencing Success
(YES) and Educare programs (Callihan, 1992). The dropout rate in Richmond during the
1988-89 school year was 12.5% compared to the neighboring county figures of 3.45% in
Henrico and 4.2% in Chesterfield. The Richmond Times-Dispatch reported that
Richmond’s lower-income student body was at a greater risk of failure than students in
Henrico and Chesterfield. According to Richmond city school officials, this was because
60% (16,063 out of 26,900) of Richmond’s students were eligible for subsidized lunches
(Farmer, 1990). Jones set a goal to cut the dropout rate in half over his first two years as
superintendent. A dropout prevention and recovery team was formed at each high school
enabling the system to better track the whereabouts of students (Jones, 1990).
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Jones also proposed significant restructuring and revitalization of the high schools
and middle schools. He believed this effort would have a long-range impact on student
enrollment with potential for drawing students from local private and nearby county
schools. To support these efforts, “The Rockefeller Center” collaborated with Virginia
Commonwealth University, the Southern Education Foundation and the State Department
of Education on a project designed to restructure urban schools to improve learning for
at-risk students. The program focused on direct involvement by parents, teachers and
principals to share in decisions. Another proposal slated for the fall of 1990 was the
implementation of three magnet programs to be phased in over a four-year period
(Callihan, 1992). When RPS administrator and interviewee “Mr. Snyder” was asked how
he thought the efforts of RPS after cross-town busing ended were affecting the system as
a whole, he said,
I think [Richmond] did what it could to try to allow families some choice
within the system, but I don’t think any of it was proactively done. I think
that when busing stopped, it just stopped. I don’t think there was any
direct effort on the part of the school system to do anything, except there
was a really strong interest in trying to rebuild interest from middle-class
families in the school system through the magnet and model schools
(Snyder, 2008).
Jones’ vision for implementing magnet programs in Richmond was different from
nearly every other magnet school effort in the country. In many U.S. cities magnet
programs had been used to help desegregate schools by drawing members of one ethnic
group to schools where another group was the majority. However, racial balance was not
the primary concern for Jones. He stated, “Magnet schools will have little impact on the
racial makeup of Richmond's enrollment, which overall is nearly 90 percent black”
(Bradley, 1989, p. 1). Instead, magnet schools were touted as a way to rebuild
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Richmond's public education system, which was suffering from a number of challenges,
including lagging student achievement and a high dropout rate. Jones said, “The magnet
school proposal is a way of packaging education differently" (Bradley, 1989, p. 2).
Richmond’s magnet schools did not restrict students to specified geographic boundaries;
however, the plan called for students living in a school's attendance area to have
enrollment priority. Proponents of the plan stated that magnet programs were not about
race or the attempt to draw white students in from the nearby counties; rather, it was an
attempt to focus on the skills and abilities of the majority black student body living
within the city of Richmond (Bradley, 1989).
During this changeover in RPS, Times-Dispatch staff writer Katherine Calos
investigated the question: “What happened to desegregation?” She found that after
several years of trying to lure whites back into the system by reducing busing and
creating magnet schools, educators and legislators wanted to shift priorities back to
education. These stakeholders poured tremendous amounts of money into RPS. Schools
took on completely different appearances. She discovered that as tuition in private
schools were increasing; white parents began looking at the city schools. She interviewed
historian Robert Pratt who said,
The desegregation that can occur, and I think ultimately will occur in
Richmond, will come about not because of court orders, not because of
policy or decisions of the elite, but because of ordinary men and women,
black and white, coming together to find common ground. When white
residents realize that they have as much at stake in the future of public
education as do blacks, then I think changes will be made. But you
improve the schools first (Calos, 1990, p. 4).
Superintendent Jones’ Annual Report of the 1989-90 school year highlighted the
implementation of the magnet and model school programs. His primary vehicle for
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restructuring Richmond’s schools involved a movement toward system-wide magnet and
model schools rather than attempting to further desegregate the system. The goal was to
have the curriculum revolve around a specific instructional theme at each school. A
Magnet School Task Force was formed to devise a plan of implementation for this
program. The task force consisted of parents, educators, business and community
leaders. It was recommended that the first three magnet programs be held at Thomas
Jefferson, John F. Kennedy and George Wythe high schools (Jones, 1990).
At the school board meeting on January 3, 1990, the Magnet School Task Force
made the following general recommendations for the board:
1. Change title to Magnet Programs until they grow larger. A program
within a school
2. Implement three programs in fall (Jefferson, Kennedy and Wythe)
3. House programs at identified schools with other programs
4. Phase program in over 4 years, 100 kids/year
5. Redirect and restructure funding of current resources
6. Expand past 400 pupils in future
7. Encourage growth
8. Develop innovative ways to involve students in the non-magnet
program into the curriculum
9. Develop future programs at three remaining high schools (Marshall,
Armstrong and Huguenot)
10. Emphasize impact on specialized service such as special education
11. Involve schools, parents and kids in future magnet themes bids
12. Review RTC, Open High Richmond Community and Richmond
Career Education center programs
13. Convey expectations to students and parents prior to enrollment
(School Board Minutes, 1990, pp. 128-29)
The magnet programs began serving freshmen in the fall of 1990. Government and
international studies became the theme at Jefferson while Kennedy focused on
math/science and computer-based technology; Wythe concentrated on visual and
performing arts. Former RPS administrator and interviewee “Mr. Bean” had the
following to say about magnet and model schools:
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All of those were gimmicks—I mean—I’m using the term ‘gimmick’ on a
much higher scale here. But they were gimmicks to really entice students
to stay. You had magnet schools, you would have baccalaureate programs,
you have all kinds—all those programs really started at the time when the
schools had resegregated (Bean, 2008).
Former school administrator and interviewee “Ms. Lee” felt Richmond’s efforts to
restructure the system were:
Okay, what I think the administration has tried to do is keep the balance
between whether it is more important to integrate their schools and
whether it is more important to make certain that the children who come
there willingly, without any enticements, are educated and educated well. I
think that’s been their battle in trying to balance all of that (Lee, 2008).
Jones moved forward with his efforts to increase the number of model elementary
schools in RPS. In his 1989-90 Annual Report, he cited the success of John B. Cary and
Bellevue Model Elementary Schools. Jones formed committees at nine additional
elementary schools to plan model school programs for the 1990-91 school year. The
schools slated to add model school programs included Mary Munford, Ginter Park,
Swansboro, Southampton, Blackwell, Whitcomb Court, Westover Hills, Fox and
Woodville Elementary (Jones, 1990). Jones announced that contributions from private
sources would help establish a “Richmond Public Schools Foundation” to secure funding
for the magnet and model school programs (Callihan, 1992). Community responses to
Jones’ initiatives were positive as noted in a Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial: “The
good news is that as the city schools open for the 1990-91 year they are initiating a form
of freedom of educational choice that offers some hope of rebuilding community-wide
support and patronage of the schools over a period of years” (“Opening,” 1990, p. 1).
On March 9, 1991, Jones presented a proposal to the board for the reorganization
of RPS. The plan was adopted on April 23, 1991 (School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 405).
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Efforts to promote RPS were increasing with the development of magnet and model
school programs. Consistency within the system was being gained by way of Jones’
leadership; however, he was abruptly removed without cause from his superintendency
effective June 30, 1991. This announcement was made amid controversy in June of
1991, regarding allegations that Jones was involved with consulting services in other
school divisions (Callihan, 1992).

Conclusion

The search for a new superintendent began immediately while the future of RPS
was yet to be determined. The efforts of the five years (1986 through 1991) after the end
of cross-town busing demonstrated hope for a system that previously experienced many
difficulties related to school desegregation between 1954 and 1986. The events leading
up to Judge Merhige’s decision to end cross-town busing and the changeover to unitary
status provided a historical context for the restructuring efforts of moving forward from
the past.
This chapter analyzed RPS under unitary status beginning with preparations for
the end of cross-town busing in 1986 and included court deliberations, impact on the
community, public opinion and development plans through 1991. Measures were taken
for managing a resegregated school system prior to Merhige’s court decree. The
decisions made in preparation of unitary status were important for transitioning from
cross-town busing. In anticipation of the changeover to unitary status, the district
deliberated in the courts to remove remaining vestiges of segregation. By 1986, RPS was
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no longer operating as a dual system as it was prior to cross-town busing; however, the
community was impacted by the past school desegregation process. Negative public
opinion of RPS motivated the district to redefine itself by attempting to develop
improvement plans. Neighborhood schools and open enrollment for students to attend
any school in the city were promoted from 1986 through 1991.
The changeover to a unitary school system included five years of restructuring
efforts to reorganize the district after court mandated cross-town busing ended. The next
fifteen years of RPS as a unitary school system are told in the remainder of this study
through accounts of interviewees, historical documents and archival information.
Specifically, a critical analysis of individual schools caught-up in the marketing conflict
of the neighborhood concept and open enrollment is explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
Internal School Marketing
Introduction
“To survive in circumstances characterized by a lack of consensus regarding the best
approach to desegregation, Richmond Public Schools had little choice but to initiate
seemingly incompatible policies in order to placate various constituencies.”
---Daniel L. Duke (Author of The School that Refused to Die)
This chapter explains the marketing chronology of Richmond Public Schools
(RPS) for retaining and attracting white and middle-class black students during and after
cross-town busing. First, an examination is conducted of the neighborhood school
concept that dates back to the K-5 Plan of 1978-79, which gave students from two
attendance zones the opportunity to enroll on a first come first serve basis at their
neighborhood school instead of being bused across town. Then, Richmond’s open
enrollment policy is analyzed through the conception of magnet and model schools that
began in 1969, which entailed an application for student enrollment based on a lottery
system. Next, the attempt at balancing two contradictory enrollment policies in RPS is
analyzed: neighborhood schools, which assigned most students to the school in their
attendance zone after cross-town busing ended in 1986, and open enrollment schools,
which allowed students the option of applying to schools outside of their attendance zone.
Finally, the controversial 1992 clustering of students by race at Bellevue Model and
Ginter Park Elementary Schools is presented.
The next segment of the post-court mandated school desegregation in RPS started
in 1991 with the appointment of Lucille M. Brown as Richmond’s new superintendent.
Her main initiative was to put students first by working in partnership with parents.
During the 1991-92 school year, more than 10,000 parents of the 27,338 enrolled students
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signed a parent-school agreement, pledging to cooperate as partners in their children’s
education. Aside from the recent firing of Superintendent Jones, RPS was beginning to
move in a positive direction. For example, a month before Brown was appointed
superintendent, Richmond Public School’s Community Affairs Manager Peter Habenicht
reported to the school board:
The public relations campaign shows the reality of RPS with two 30second commercials and radio spots. Details include accomplishments
and initiatives of the past two years of magnet and model schools, plans
for a Governor’s School at Thomas Jefferson, partnerships with
corporations and Universities, decreasing the dropout rate and attracting
more than 1,500 volunteers for the public schools though the Volunteers in
Public Schools (VIPS) program (School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 307).
Other fundamental educational reforms were taking place during Brown’s first
year as superintendent, including the communitywide initiatives of Metro Richmond
2000 and the Richmond Renaissance Education Committee, to improve education in
Richmond over the next decade. The school board also approved Brown’s reorganization
of the neighborhood school plan in 1992 (Callihan, 1992).

Neighborhood Schools

The neighborhood school concept went through many changes before being given
a new definition in 1992. During segregation, neighborhood schools were assigned by
race. Children went to the nearest neighborhood school for their race, which could be
close or distant to where they lived. Plan III of Bradley v. Board (1971) transported
many children out of their neighborhoods for desegregation purposes. In 1979, Plan G
was implemented by the court to consolidate all elementary schools into grades K-5
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while 3 high school complexes were formed from the 7 high school buildings. Plan G
was dismantled in 1986 with the implementation of a pupil reassignment plan that
assigned most students, to the greatest extent possible, to their nearest neighborhood
school.
In 1977, Fox Elementary School was the first neighborhood school established
during cross-town busing under the 1977-78 K-5 Plan. The enrollment process was
based on a first-come-first-serve basis. The success of Fox Elementary as a newly
defined neighborhood school was evident by the area residents’ determination to enroll
their children there. A former school administrator and interviewee, “Mr. Snyder,” talked
about Fox’s success at becoming a neighborhood school in the late 1970’s: “Fox was
fortunate to be sort of in a liberal community, and they just started attracting families, but
remember it’s a very small school (Snyder, 2008). Another former school administrator
and interviewee, “Mrs. Lee,” had the following to say about Fox’s enrollment process:
People stood in line all night long literally. I mean, they would start
standing in line at 5 o’clock in the afternoon and would stand all night
long. And this was in January (Lee, 2008).
Former school administrator and interviewee, “Ms. Wright,” recalls the success of Fox:
In the early 80’s, Jonathan Kozol (author and researcher of urban school
systems) came to speak at the University of Richmond, and he was very
interested in visiting Fox. And at the end of his visit, he said, ‘This is the
most successful integrated urban school I have ever visited’ (Wright,
2008).

Mary Munford Elementary School
One of the 1977-78 K-5 Plan goals was to keep white families in the city, so in
1978 Mary Munford Elementary was added as a second neighborhood school. Different
from Fox, Mary Munford struggled to attract white families. The white families in the
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Munford neighborhood withdrew their students from RPS when cross-town busing began
in 1970 and enrolled them in nearby private and parochial schools. After Munford was
designated as a neighborhood school under the K-5 Plan in 1978, bringing those families
back to their nearby public school was extremely difficult. Mary Munford became
predominately black after 1970; however, with the new redistricting of the K-5 Plan in
1978, white students in the attendance zone could now attend Munford, their
neighborhood school in Richmond’s West End. The previous practice of having to be
bused to the black neighborhood of Highland Park Elementary School on the North Side
of Richmond was no longer mandated for the students in the Munford zone. According
to Shelley Rolfe’s Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial in 1979:
Very few Richmond schools have had as much white flight as Mary
Munford. Its percentage of black students reaches into the 90’s. Unlike
the Fan, in which Fox Elementary School resides and saw an increase in
white enrollment in the 70’s when designated a K-5 neighborhood school,
many parts of Mary Munford’s neighborhood did not have strong public
school ties in the pre-busing past. There was a [nearby] private school
option and it was taken by middle-class whites (Rolfe, 1979, p. 1).
Efforts to bring white families back to Mary Munford began when the Chairman
of Mary Munford’s Neighborhood Committee, Louise Edge, a parent of a white Munford
student, hosted a meeting at her home on August 22, 1979. About 40 middle-class white
parents attended the meeting to discuss the K-5 Plan, which increased white enrollment at
Fox Elementary over the past two years, as an option for Munford. Discussion regarding
the public school option of sending children to the neighborhood school of Mary
Munford instead of the private and parochial schools in the West End continued in the
Munford community. Louise Edge said,
It’s no longer a question of whether my child should go to school with
blacks, but a question of numbers. I want her to go to Mary Munford with
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friends. I don’t mind her being number one, but I want her to go with
number two and number three and number four, [enrolling] race probably
has very little to do with this. People are touchy about their children
(Rolfe, 1979, p. 2).
A few months later in January of 1980, a community open house was held at
Mary Munford Elementary School. Over 100 white West End residents attended and
listened to school officials and community leaders explain why they should send their
children back to RPS. Some people at this meeting said that fears of violence, poor
educational opportunities and prejudices were the reasons why the white enrollment at
Mary Munford declined over the past decade. Others said Mary Munford had the
opportunity to become a real neighborhood school, not based on racial segregation.
School administrators backed the neighborhood plan at Mary Munford, where only 40 of
its 608 students were from the surrounding white neighborhood. The other 568 students
were being bused from the predominately black Highland Park neighborhood on
Richmond’s North Side (Bacque, 1980). To help convince white parents to send their
students to Munford, white parent Louise Edge said: “Whites who do attend the school
are clustered in certain classrooms rather than being dispersed evenly throughout the
classrooms” (McCreary, 1980, p. 1). Efforts to persuade neighborhood residents to enroll
their students at Mary Munford also came from local realtors who took part in open
house meetings. They explained that tax assessments on homes in the neighborhood
surrounding Mary Munford Elementary School were rising and so was tuition at nearby
private schools. These financial reports were attempts of swaying families into sending
their students to the tuition free Richmond public school (McCreary, 1980).
After six more years of trying to bring neighborhood parents back to Mary
Munford, cross-town busing came to an end with the court decision of Bradley v. Board
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(1986). After RPS was declared unitary, the school board made the decision to assign
most elementary students to their nearest neighborhood school. However, not all of
Richmond’s public schools became true neighborhood schools in 1986. Some
predominantly white neighborhoods of the city, including Munford’s West End, still
bused black students to their schools because white families in those attendance zones
shunned the city’s schools and left their neighborhood schools virtually empty.
Despite recruiting efforts, Munford’s enrollment dropped to 415 pupils by 1998,
and only 68 were students from the surrounding white neighborhood. About 900 students
were eligible to attend Mary Munford based on their residency; however, the disparity
between actual and potential attendance was due largely to misinformation about the
school and district policies. For instance, parents were still concerned about their
students being bused out of the district, even though the court ended cross-town busing
with Bradley v. Board (1986). According to the Richmond Times-Dispatch, white
parents were also concerned about the educational offerings at Mary Munford, such as
the arts and humanities, pupil-teacher ratios and the ability of children to realize their
potential in a school with socially and economically disparate backgrounds (Bacque,
1988).
In 1989 Mary Munford was still one of the last vestiges of court-ordered crosstown busing. RPS educator and interviewee “Ms. Miller” had the following to say about
the difficult task of recruiting families to Munford in the late 1980’s:
As the principal, I had to go find kids to go there. People were not beating
the door down to go to Mary Munford. I had to go to nursery schools,
preschools, try to market, you know. If a parent showed up that was
interested in the school, I tried to develop a relationship with them and
bring the community back into the school. And I would say that nobody in
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the central office brought anybody to me…. The system did less than the
individual principals did (Miller, 2008).
Efforts to bring white students back to Munford included activities to reinvigorate the
parent-teacher association and to invite residents from the community into the school to
see the quality education taking place. Mary Munford also developed an early childhood
program that drew many parents away from nearby St. Christopher’s $5,000 per year prekindergarten program (Squires, 1990). “Friends of Mary Munford” was also founded.
The goal of this group was to attract business support to help upgrade the school (Farmer,
1991). When asked about the challenges of marketing the school, Miller said:
We didn’t get any extra resources, but we still tried to provide an enriched
curriculum, a project-based curriculum, a thematic curriculum; market the
school, do things that you might typically see done in more of a middle,
upper middle class school; you know, hang class pictures on the wall
every year; make sure the school is beautified; make sure you have a lot of
parent involvement; have parent-student-teacher community activities,
those kinds of things (Miller, 2008).
Efforts were slow to catch on with some parents because of the deeply rooted mistrust
that stemmed from the cross-town busing era (Bradley, 1989). Looking back on those
struggles, former school administrator and interviewee “Mr. Snyder” felt that the former
principals were truly the most important part of Mary Munford during the efforts to
recruit parents (Snyder, 2008). During the difficult task to bring the West End white
children back to their neighborhood schools, the director of community affairs for RPS
Peter Habenict said:
I agree that neighborhood support is vital. But I think we often fall into
the trap of thinking that if we increase the number of white students in a
school, that it will improve the school per se. A school improves when it
reflects the sensibilities and character of its neighborhood, of black or
white, or whatever. That’s the definition of neighborhood schools
(Squires, 1990, p. 11).
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According to parents who were helping with recruiting efforts in Mary Munford’s
predominantly affluent white neighborhoods like Windsor Farms, race was not often
publicly discussed. However, some parents did express concerns about the school’s
socio-economic mix. Their main worry was having their children attend Munford with
disadvantaged students who were being bused from the North Side area of Highland
Park. Fifty percent of the students coming from Highland Park were eligible for free or
reduced-priced lunch. Many parents from the West End, who were reluctant to send their
students to Mary Munford, feared their children would not be able to make friends with
students of a lower socio-economic status. These parents also said that they opposed of
their children not being able to socialize with their classroom friends from Highland Park
after school because those students would be bused back to their side of town after the
school day (Farmer, 1991).
Some parents did not subscribe to this position. For instance, Katherine Lawson,
a West End parent, chose to enroll her white children at Mary Munford. She felt white
children from Munford’s neighborhood were doing well academically and enjoying the
mix of students (Squires, 1990). She said, “It’s been a good exercise for them in race
relations…. I think for Richmond to be a successful city that we, as citizens, need to
affiliate…one of the best places to do that is in the educational system” (Squires, 1990, p.
11). Miller agreed by saying that she had heard parents say, “that what their kids miss in
the private schools is diversity…they like having the multi-ethnic and socio-economic
mix in their school” (Squires, 1990, p. 11). Still, some West End neighborhood parents
had concerns about enrolling their students at Munford. They also began complaining
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about the presence of John B. Cary Model Elementary School in the West End robbing
their neighborhood school of its brightest pupils.
By 1991, other parents in the city were electing to take advantage of the open
enrollment policy at one of Richmond’s three model schools; John B. Cary, Bellevue, or
J.B. Fisher. Depending on which of the three zones of the city one lived in, West End,
North Side or South Side, parents could send their children to one of the model schools
located in that zone. Still, almost all of the white students who resided in certain pockets
of the city, and who were not attending an open enrollment model school, were attending
private or parochial schools instead of their neighborhood public school. Snyder points
out:
In the late 80’s white families were going to private schools or they were
going to a school with an established white enrollment like the
neighborhood school of Fox Elementary, John B. Cary Model School, or
the Governor’s School at Thomas Jefferson High School (Snyder, 2008).
A closer look at the history of open enrollment in RPS provides greater
understanding to the difficulty of balancing two separate internal marketing policies.

Open Enrollment Policy

The open enrollment policy in RPS, like its neighborhood school policy, went
through changes over time. In 1969, before cross-town busing began in Richmond, John
B. Cary became the city’s first open enrollment school. Cary desegregated and was
framed as a model school to be an example of how schools could and should function in a
desegregated system. The creation of the first model school, according to Snyder,
occurred as follows:
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In 1969, a whole group of parents got together and they saw that
something big was coming [cross-town busing]. They wanted to have a
school that would be a fully desegregated school, so [Cary] was a set up to
be exactly 50-50 black-white. It was set up as an open enrollment school,
so everybody had to apply. Anybody that knows how school choice works
knows that as soon as you set up an application process, you can get
higher performing kids and parents interested in the education of their
kids. So, you had a school that ended up being exactly half and half a year
before bussing had taken place. And after bussing, it ended up being the
only school that really was desegregated because all the other ones
became all black (Snyder, 2008).
According to Miller and Snyder, John B. Cary was considered to be the best school in the
city during the 1970’s. Former Cary educator and interviewee “Ms. Richards” said,
My experiences had been so wonderfully positive…. I was participating in
this model school program with the parents who were there by choice and
with their full support—my parental involvement was just fantastic. In
fact, parents actually signed a pledge that they would be full participants
in the school program as a result of having a child in this school (Richards,
2008).
RPS designated Cary as a model school due to the fact that it was modeling the best
educational practices in a desegregated environment. According to local religious leader
and interviewee “Mr. Sanders” the following process was taken to create Cary
Elementary School:
It was basically put into place by the black leadership for their children.
The target model school was maintained by mutual support between white
folks who wanted to stay in the city and black leadership who wanted to
make sure they had a good middle-class school for their kids. Well, it
won’t be written anywhere. But if you wanna look at that list of those
children who went to John B. Cary [in 1969-1970] you’ll probably find
Mayor Henry Marsh’s kids and the kids from most of the members of city
council and other members of the black elite (Sanders, 2008).
Model schools
After the success of Cary, RPS was pushing to develop more open enrollment
schools. In 1978, Bellevue Elementary School was designated as another open
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enrollment model school on Richmond’s North Side. Unlike Cary, Bellevue’s student
enrollment was not very diverse; only 2% of its pupils were white, but efforts to increase
diversity at this model school eventually increased the white student enrollment to 17%.
In 1985, there was discussion about whether to keep or scrap the model school concepts
at Cary and Bellevue and pursue alternative instructional approaches in all elementary
schools. The issue brought to the school board by the Citizen’s Advisory Commission
stated that model schools were perceived in the city as elitist or “private” public schools
and only popular among middle-class white and black parents. School Board Chairman
Law stated, “There’s nothing elitist about the schools…it’s just old-fashioned school
ideas.” Lois Harrison-Jones, Superintendent in 1985 said, “There’s nothing highfalutin
about [Cary and Bellevue]” (Epes, 1985, p. 17). The board unanimously agreed to keep
the designation of model school at Cary and Bellevue. In 1986, after assessing the
popularity and demand for model schools, the board created another open enrollment
zone on the South Side of Richmond that designated J.B. Fisher Elementary as the city’s
third model school. According to Snyder, at the time when cross-town busing was
ending, the problems of internal marketing started to emerge:
Bellevue and Fisher became the next two schools that had open
enrollments. And that really was what differentiated Cary from those
schools—is it [Cary] didn’t have a neighborhood zone. If you lived across
the street from Cary [Prior to the new open enrollment policy] and you did
not get in, you would get on a bus and head off somewhere else (Snyder,
2008).
The complexity of internal marketing increased in the late 1980’s with the system’s push
for open enrollment model schools, and the principals’ efforts to attract students to their
neighborhood schools. The effort to attract whites and middle-class blacks that
abandoned Richmond for the counties during cross-town busing peaked with the creation
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of these internal markets. Open and Community High Schools were initially successful
in this endeavor by boasting selective admission policies and promoting challenging
college preparatory curricula. The open enrollment model school concept expanded to
the middle school level in 1988 when Binford Middle School became a model school as
part of a high-priority statewide effort to revamp middle schools. Among the goals of the
model school program at Bindford was an initiative to provide programs for at-risk pupils
who were most likely to encounter problems in school and drop out (Epes, 1988).
Subsequently, the Governor’s School for Government and International Studies opened at
Thomas Jefferson High School (Tee-Jay) in the fall of 1991. Eight neighboring school
divisions participated in Tee-Jay’s magnet program. Three new magnet programs also
began in 1991 at Marshall, Armstrong and Huguenot High Schools. Amid the
restructuring effort of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in RPS, Snyder felt the model
elementary school concept turned into something different than originally intended. He
said,
The whole concept of the model schools came from Cary when it was
supposed to be actually a model of something. I mean, that was the
definition at that time, but it kinda gradually changed from ‘model’ to
‘special’ (Snyder, 2008).
Cary, Bellevue and Fisher Model Elementary Schools were featuring the open enrollment
policy of allowing students living in their attendance zone the opportunity to attend their
school. Some aspects of these model schools involved a high priority put on academic
achievement with critical and creative thinking emphasized. A variety of instructional
techniques were used based on students’ interests, talents and needs. The success of
these model schools was the impetus of the district’s intention of moving to a systemwide model elementary school concept.
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In 1991, Swansboro, Southampton, Blackwell, Whitcomb Court, Westover Hills,
Fox, Woodville, Ginter Park and Mary Munford Elementary Schools implemented model
school program. Open enrollment applications were available at each of these schools
that centered their model instructional curriculum on a specific theme. The theme at
Swansboro put an emphasis on writing in addition to the construction of a swimming
pool to include aquatics in the curriculum. At Southampton, environmental science
became the central theme where students learned about their impact on the world’s
environment. A family and community education center was created at Blackwell where
parents were encouraged to participate in classes through its extended model school
concept. Whitcomb Court constructed a theme around building students’ self-esteem
through a curriculum stressing technology, global studies and the arts. Communications
and technology both served as the theme at Westover Hills, which offered a computer
and communications center, functioning as a publishing station for the students. Fox and
Woodville both focused on visual and performing arts by having students study the
international spectrum of the arts. Ginter Park and Mary Munford both emphasized
international studies as their primary theme through a multicultural curriculum, which
helped students understand their own culture and its relationship to others (Jones, 1990).
Prior to the adoption of the model school program at Mary Munford, a great deal
of effort was expended to make it a neighborhood school. Now with open enrollment
allowing any student the opportunity to attend Mary Munford, the doors to a new
approach of diversifying the school were opened while potentially closing the doors of
creating a neighborhood school. Mary Munford’s popularity grew as more and more
residents from across Richmond heard about the quality education there. Snyder had the
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following to say about the role he played in marketing Mary Munford as both a
neighborhood school and one with a model school program in 1991:
The superintendent met with me and said, ‘The parents really want
somebody who’s gonna be able to do this. They want somebody who’s
gonna be a part of the community and really market and work with these
families.’ And we would go to churches and community centers, and it
became—I was probably as much a salesman first of all—I mean for a
long time. I would spend—easily 50% of my time is what I would give to
parents. Talk to the parents, doing on the ground recruiting, doing a lot of
sort of marketing-related guidance (Snyder, 2008).
By 1991, the new marketing ploy of model school programs at nine elementary schools
and the promotion of the three model elementary schools, along with one model middle
school, seemed to be canceling out the neighborhood school concept.

Policy Balancing

The mission of RPS for attracting and retaining whites and middle-toupper-class blacks was evident in their neighborhood and open enrollment
policies for magnet and model schools. However, these two contradictory
policies clashed in the early 1990’s, forcing the district to balance the two internal
marketing strategies. For example, as Mary Munford’s popularity grew in the
early 1990’s and John B. Cary’s diminished, parents began to take their children
out of Cary and started sending them to Munford. According to Snyder:
I came to Munford right about the time that Cary was falling apart. And all
of a sudden, all these people that have been at Cary started looking
elsewhere. And so here’s a school [Munford] that’s really actively
recruiting parents, and so we started getting people that had belonged to
Cary that were in this neighborhood and in the Cary model school zone
(Snyder, 2008).
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This began the internal competition in RPS to promote neighborhood schools
while marketing open enrollment model schools (Bradley, 1989). On February 4, 1992 to
help the public understand this internal marketing paradox, Superintendent Lucille Brown
presented her neighborhood plan, which proposed to reaffirm and support the open
enrollment magnet and model school concept while embodying the neighborhood
concept (Callihan, 1992). Brown stated, “Students can attend schools near their home,
reduce transportation cost and travel time, and natural boundaries would be followed
wherever possible” (School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 13). Recommended minor
adjustments to the elementary, middle, and high school zones were also presented.
According to Brown,
Building capacities have been exceeded in some schools, and there is a
need to adjust student assignments…. Boundary adjustments to Thomas
Jefferson High School will not upset the co-existence of the Governor’s
School and the magnet school program (Callihan, 1992, p. 429).
Since the end of cross-town busing in 1986, the Richmond Public School Board
had not formally addressed the community on its position of the neighborhood school
concept until February 14, 1992. The “Neighborhood School Plan” would:
1. Establish attendance zones for all elementary schools.
2. Provide a zone school [model school] close to the Highland Park
neighborhood for students who travel to Mary Munford.
3. Provide relief for overcrowding at Westover Hills.
4. Reduce travel time for some students who attend Southampton (School
Board Minutes, 1992, p. 17).
Over fifty people spoke at the February 25, 1992 school board meeting
regarding the neighborhood school proposal. The following comments represent
some of the different perspectives shared at the meeting:
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Richmond parent Ms. Mary Gravett stated that she wants a school that
provides racial and economic diversity; she asked the model schools be
continued (School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 24).
Mary Munford parent Ms. Deborah Pellman supported the proposed plan;
she cited a 1985 Richmond Public Schools Citizens’ Advisory
Commission report that recommended the neighborhood school concept
(School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 25).
Cary parent Ms. Cassandra Ray said what works at Cary could work for
other neighborhoods and the plan should not significantly diminish the
diversity at model schools. The myth needs to be dispelled that only the
bright and well to do are admitted to model schools (School Board
Minutes, 1991, p. 26).
Cary parent Glenda Hicks-Haggins spoke in support of the neighborhood
school plan. Neighborhoods are now becoming more diverse with the
return of young middle class citizens to the city (School Board Minutes,
1991, p. 27).
At this meeting, a parent asked the school board: “What has happened to the commitment
of integrated schools? Returning to neighborhood schools will bring back segregation.”
In response, the School Board Chairman stated,
The board is not diminishing, deleting or curtailing the concepts of model
schools, open enrollment, and choice. The proposed plan has been
received and is begin considered; no one is being denied participation in
this process (School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 27).
Brown also responded by stating, “95% of [Richmond’s] patrons have already chosen
schools close to their homes” (School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 27).
On March 3, 1992, the Richmond School Board voted 4-3 to approve the
neighborhood school plan as proposed by the superintendent. The chairman said the
following:
The neighborhood school plan, as approved by a majority vote, maintains
commitment to open enrollment and model schools while providing
parents the opportunity to send their children to neighborhood schools. I
acknowledged the concerns of parents and encouraged them to maintain
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their involvement with schools (School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 30).
Commentary on this decision in the media included Paul Bradley’s Richmond TimesDispatch article entitled: “Busing Divided a City Against Itself.” He wrote,
The central issue should be the quality of the education that is offered in
the public schools. There is no valid reason why a black majority public
school system in Richmond cannot be successful. Whether whites return
to public education or not, the issue is the improvement of public
education. Even though there have been instrumental attempts to bring
white students back into Richmond (Bradley, 1992, p. 1).
Given the Richmond Public School Board’s officially endorsement of the new
neighborhood school plan, it appeared that the system was forced to balance its
neighborhood school policy with its open enrollment policy designed for model
schools (Duke, 1995). RPS Community Affairs Staff Writer Steven Bolton gave
the following overview in light of the cross-purpose endorsement of both policies:
Objectives are to increase parental and community involvement in
neighborhood schools and to build a positive perception of RPS within the
community at large. Individual schools will be assisted in marketing
themselves through a direct, hands-on approach while developing system
wide strategies that promote the positive aspects of the entire school
division (School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 43).
The complexity of the system’s internal marketing approach between the neighborhood
schools, and open enrollment policies grew during the 1991-92 school year. The
question was being asked: “Why reintroduce a policy assigning students to schools on the
basis of their neighborhood if another policy allowed them to attend the school of their
choice” (Duke, 1995, p. 209)?
During the Richmond School Board meeting on March 3, 1992 at which the board
adopted the new neighborhood school plan; a review of the application process for open
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enrollment into the districts model schools was conducted. The following key points
were made:
1. Available slots are filled by application in the order received; there is
no lottery.
2. A sibling of a pupil currently in the school will receive priority based
on space availability; otherwise on a waiting list.
3. All schools follow a centrally established time frame for open
enrollment (School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 30).
RPS managed the two concepts in an effort to maintain and recruit enrollment numbers
for the system. Former central office director and interviewee “Mr. Conner” had the
following to say about the process:
I think that we made tremendous strides. We tried to keep our programs up
front. We had neighborhood schools, and then we had some model schools
that were providing outstanding instruction programs. And I never saw, in
my time in central administration, any inequity in terms of schools…. We
made sure that schools were treated fairly in that process. And if there was
a time that schools could apply for small grants, they had the opportunities
to do so (Conner, 2008).
Efforts continued in the district to work with parents who wanted to send all of their
children to a model school or one with a model school program. On April 21, 1992,
Section 8.49 of the Bylaws and Policies: “Enrollment of Siblings in Model Schools” was
passed stating:
Model schools shall enroll all applicants who are residents of the
neighborhood attendance zone, students currently enrolled in that model
school, or siblings of students currently enrolled in that model school. The
remaining vacancies, if any, shall be filled by applicants who are selected
by procedures approved by the Superintendent (School Board Minutes,
1992, p. 55).
Brown and the school board continued to balance the policies of open enrollment and
neighborhood schools to ensure RPS was keeping student first. They stood behind their
position of reaffirming and supporting open enrollment and the model school concept
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while embodying the neighborhood concept for the upcoming 1992-93 school year
(Callihan, 1992). Local legal authority and interviewee “Mr. Wilson” commented on the
marketing efforts of RPS by saying:
Let’s stop this believing in the [white] flight…. You [white people] don’t
have to go to the counties. There are safe harbors, if you will. And I think
that was sort of what led to some of these modalities of the clustering
issue, which was very difficult for the city (Wilson, 2008).
The issue of clustering arose at Bellevue Model Elementary School in the fall of 1992,
which greatly impacted the internal marketing of RPS.

Clustering Controversy
At the December 1, 1992 school board meeting, a parent of a black student at
Bellevue Model Elementary School, Reverend Hylan Carter voiced his concern regarding
the school’s classroom assignment of pupils. He told the board that his second grade son
was placed in a predominately white class with a white teacher, while two other second
grade classes were all black with black teachers. Rev. Carter told the school board that
he and his wife were advised by Bellevue’s principal Sylvia Richardson, that section 8.20
of the Bylaws and Policies: “Pupil Assignments” permits “clustering” to attract and
maintain white students in the division. He said, “If this is a policy, it is fundamentally
wrong, both socially and morally, as it promotes separation/segregation of black and
white students (School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 273). Table 6 illustrates the classroom
composition at Bellevue during the 1992-93 school year:
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Table 6
Class Composition at Bellevue________________________________
Grade Level

________

Classroom 1

Classroom 2

Classroom 3__________

blacks/whites

blacks/whites

blacks/whites_________

Kindergarten

11/12

12/11

23/0

First Grade

13/13

23/0

24/0

Second Grade

10/14

22/0

24/0

Third Grade

19/6

22/0

24/0

Fourth Grade

13/10

23/0

23/0

Fifth Grade

17/8

23/0

--

(Adapted from Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 7, 1993)
School Board Chairman, Clarence L. Townes assured Rev. Carter that his concern would
be examined and a communication would be forthcoming from the Board/Administration
(School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 233). For the record, Superintendent Brown made the
following clarification statement regarding questions raised by Rev. Hylan Carter: “There
is no policy in the Richmond Public Schools nor are there any administrative procedures
that support segregation of students in any of our schools” (School Board Minutes, 1992,
Revised per January 19, 1993 Minutes, p. 237).

Misguided attempt to diversify.
The allegation of grouping students by race was first reported to the Richmond
community in the Richmond Times-Dispatch on December 3, 1992. The Richmond
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Times-Dispatch obtained a letter written to the Carter family from Principal Richardson
that said:
The procedure of clustering students at Bellevue and other Richmond
public schools dates back many years. The most recent policy was
adopted in 1978 and revised in 1984…pupil assignment has both an
administrative and instructional connotation, taking into consideration the
pupil’s social, intellectual, physical and emotional development. The
number of white students at Bellevue represent 12 percent of the total
population, thus they have been clustered for social and emotional reasons
(Farmer, 1992, p. 2).
According to reports from the Richmond Education Association (REA), complaints about
clustering based on race were received prior to the Carter’s objection. The executive
director of the REA said, “Based on a teacher complaint several years ago, I advised then
Superintendent Albert Jones about clustering and no action was taken and the teacher was
later transferred” (Lazarus, 1992, p. 13). The policy that Principal Richardson was using
to justify clustering was described as a way to help reverse the white flight of the late
1960’s and early 1970’s by allowing all of the white students who applied to the model
school to be accepted, while black students were put on a waiting list and into a lottery to
determine their ranking (Farmer, 1992). Some white parents believed clustering helped
Bellevue’s white population grow. Sherry Finneran was one of the first white parents to
send her child to Bellevue and she stated, “I think the only reason why whites went to
Bellevue is they felt safe going there…. I think the clustering had something to do with
that (Farmer, 1992, p. B6).
Three days after Carter informed the School Board of clustering at Bellevue; a
special meeting was called to address the public about the matter. School Board
Chairman Clarence Townes reported that the Superintendent Lucille Brown was asked to
investigate the charges at Bellevue. He also stated that she was asked to determine
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whether similar charges could be applied to any other school in the division and to report
her findings back to him within twenty-four hours. Townes then read aloud Brown’s
report:
Per your directive I have conducted an investigation of the clustering
practice currently at Bellevue. I have also reviewed the pupil assignment
procedures at all of our other elementary schools to determine if this
practice is being used anywhere other than Bellevue. Bellevue is the only
school where this practice is currently used. In addition, I have reviewed
all of our board policies and administrative regulations on pupil
assignments. I found none that support the practice. When the model
schools were organized in the early 1970’s, it was decided by the
administration at that time that vacancies would be filled by lottery in a
manner that would maintain balance according to age, race and sex of
pupils. I am of the opinion that clustering as currently used at Bellevue far
exceeds that original intent of this idea. This administration is no way
endorses Mrs. Richardson’s interpretation of this practice at Bellevue. I
have directed her to cease this practice immediately and to prepare a
reassignment plan to become effective beginning the second semester of
this school year. I am very concerned that this practice has been
continuing without my knowledge. My investigation is continuing to
determine any other person who may have been involved in perpetuating
this practice and will report my finding to you be the next regular board
meeting (School Board Minutes, 1992, p. 238).
The chairman expressed that the superintendent’s report was self-explanatory and that he
was also satisfied that the clustering practice, which occurs only at Bellevue, reflects an
error in judgment. He said, “Neither the Board nor the Administration in anyway
endorses the clustering practice at Bellevue.” To the parents and public he said,
The goals of the school board are to ensure that students in RPS learn to
relate to students of other races and backgrounds. We hope this view is
shared by the parents of Bellevue, both black and white (School Board
Minutes, 1992, p. 239).
A few days later, the probe into the grouping of white pupils in RPS’s 30
elementary schools was extended after Townes observed the clustering of white students
on a visit to Ginter Park Elementary. Several years earlier, former Richmond school
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administrator and interviewee “Mr. Wright” visited Ginter Park and recalls the principal
telling him that one thing they did there for white students was cluster them in a couple of
classes so they wouldn’t feel like they were all by themselves (Wright, 2008). The
school board’s 1992 discovery of clustering taking place at Ginter Park put the school in
the middle of the current controversy surrounding Bellevue. Associate Superintendent
Willis B. McLeod said the clustering of white pupils at Ginter Park was inadvertent and
only due to parent requests for specific teachers, which were granted by Principal Frances
McClenney. In response to the claim that several classes had a preponderance of whites
in them, McClenney said, “Other classes lacked whites because I assigned them to a
predominately black class and they didn’t show up” (Farmer, 1992, p. B6).
At the next school board meeting on December 14, 1992, several black parents of
Bellevue students expressed concerns regarding the clustering issue. They asked that
clarification be given on how to handle the situation would be handled. They requested
that no reassignment of students take place until the end of the school year, that
consideration be given to the principal’s response and that a task force be formed to study
the issue. Responding to their concerns, Brown stated:
A meeting has been held with Bellevue parents and no professional
response has been received from the principal. The Administration will
assist the school in developing a plan to address the issue. There will be
some modification to the pupil assignments at Bellevue, but all significant
practice in developing a plan will involve the school, PTA, parents, and
administration…. No surprises will be made; parental involvement will be
sought before the implementation of any plan (School Board Minutes,
1992, p. 240).
The submitted options by Bellevue to the superintendent were the following: The
reassignment of all pupils, the transfer of pupils in kindergarten through second grade and
the transfer of pupils in the majority white second grade class (Farmer, 1992). As stated
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in her response at the December 14th school board meeting, Brown did not think any of
these proposals were viable options to proceed with. Controversial statements and public
opinion were reported in the local news over the next several weeks. At the following
school board meeting on January 5, 1993, Dean Simpson, a parent at Bellevue, stated his
concern with misinformation reported by the media regarding the clustering issue at
Bellevue. He referred to Cary and Fox schools being shown as positive examples of
clustering. He stated that magnet and model schools were designed to promote
desegregation, and cited the increased number of white students at Bellevue (School
Board Minutes, 1993, p. 255). Some other parents said they believed other city schools
were clustering white students in classrooms with white teachers too (Farmer, 1992).
Parents and some educators came forward and said that an unwritten policy to group
whites, so they won’t be racially isolated, had existed for years to woo back whites that
left the system during cross-town busing. Bellevue parent Skip Banks said, “Clustering
is a policy practiced by a number of model schools. It’s helped some schools like Fox
and Fisher be balanced” (Farmer, 1993, p. A3). Former administrator and interviewee
“Mr. Snyder” said, “Fox was clustering all along. Bellevue just got caught” (Snyder,
2008). According to the Richmond Free Press, Fox Elementary School clustered
students until a new principal changed the policy (“Superintendent,” 1992). Previously
stated, and reported in a 1980 Richmond New Leader article, Louise Edge, a white parent
in support of bringing other white neighborhood parents back to Mary Munford said,
“Whites who do attend the school are clustered in certain classrooms rather than being
dispersed evenly throughout the classrooms” (McCreary, 1980, p. 1). Critics of
clustering said it was a form of segregation and advocates credited clustering with
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helping to integrate (Farmer, 1992). White enrollment at Bellevue increased from 3% to
12% since cross-town busing ended. Bellevue Principal Sylvia Richardson said,
Clustering students has thus helped us to move slowly towards developing
a school population which is multicultural in composition and to
simultaneously provide for the social and emotional needs that our
students have (Farmer 1992, p. B6).
The community’s reaction on how RPS should precede with the clustering issue
varied. One concern was its impact on the psyche of the students; meaning white pupils
might perceive themselves as superior and black pupils as inferior, and that this situation
may validate white pupils’ fears of blacks (Williams, 1992). Former Fox educator and
interviewee “Mrs. Lee” said,
I talked with my friends about [clustering]. I talked with the administrators
about it. I talked with other teachers about it. And nobody really seemed to
have a problem with it. I don’t think that anybody thought that it was a
racist practice. I think that everyone thought it was in an effort to bring the
middle-class back into the school system. And maybe the ends justified
the means. That’s a speculation on my part (Lee, 2008).
A black parent Gilda Anderson was quoted in the Richmond Free Press saying, “Black,
white, I’m tired of it. I just want my child to have a good education, and that is what is
available at Bellevue. I don’t want this controversy to disrupt classes” (Lazarus, 1992, p.
13).
As the Richmond Public School Board was attempting to push through the
decision made at their February 2nd meeting to cease clustering at the end of the first
semester, a dozen black and white parents hired Attorney Gerald T. Zerkin and filed suit
against the board. They claimed that class changes for 17% of Bellevue students were
damaging to their children’s education and under state law are illegal and violated the
pupil reassignment policy of the school board. The lawsuit cited state legal requirements
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for an advertised public hearing when 15% or more students are to be reassigned at any
school. The parents filing the suit said that they were not opposed to end clustering;
rather, they just wanted a say in the reassignment process (Lazarus, 1993). The lawsuit
was seeking an injunction against 74 homeroom reassignments designed to better
distribute the schools white pupils. The lawsuit stated: “The Superintendent and
members of the School Board have been aware for years that clustering was used at
Bellevue” (Farmer, 1993a, p. B6). On February 6, 1993, Circuit Court Judge Theodore J.
Markow ruled that the Richmond School Board must hold a public hearing before
Bellevue Model Elementary School makes reassignments to end the clustering of white
pupils. Markow said, “The public hearing requirement is the only issue for me to decide,
everything else is administrative and beyond my scope” (Farmer, 1993b, p. B1).

Public scrutiny.
Prior to the public hearing ordered by the Court, some of Bellevue’s parents
sought community support in their fight against reassigning students’ midyear. They
claimed the current plan proposed by the superintendent was untimely, disruptive,
unresponsive to parent and faculty input, unfair, racially based and hastily formulated
(Farmer, 1993). The February 19th school board meeting served the purpose of the
public hearing ordered by the court regarding the proposed “Pupil Reassignment Plans”
for Bellevue and Ginter Park. Brown made the following remarks to review the premises
on which she based her plans:




There is no sound educational basis for clustering.
Placement by race is illegal and inherently inequitable.
All students can learn, and learn best when organized into classes, which
are heterogeneous with respect to ability and socio-cultural variables.
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Clustering is potentially harmful to the social and emotional development
of children.
Continuing the practice of clustering would not only run the risk of further
damage to the involved children, the entire school system would be placed
at risk.
Children are adaptable, and with few exceptions, could adjust to
reassignments and regroupings with relative ease, given appropriate adult
support.
The student reassignment plan for Ginter Park Elementary School
involves homeroom adjustments for 32 randomly selected black and white
students from a population of 725.
The plan for instructional delivery will utilize a Team Teaching Model
involving classes at each of four grade levels.
The integrity of the instructional program will not be compromised—
rather, the program will be enhanced through increased student interaction
by way of Team Teaching.
The Ginter Park plan employs a combination of reassignment and
instructional regrouping through team teaching. The Ginter Park faculty
understands team teaching and collaborative learning and so we are able to
utilize these strategies, which have also made a real difference in
promoting a higher level of learning in other elementary schools (School
Board Minutes, 1993, p. 292).
Over 200 people attended the three-hour public hearing, and nearly 70 parents and

community members voiced their opinions on the matter. Speaking out at this meeting
was Oliver Hill Sr., a predominate citizen in the Richmond community and long time
Civil Rights lawyer in the fight to end desegregation. He stated, “There is only one way
to deal with the violation of the law and that is to end clustering now” (School Board
Minutes, 1993, p. 294). At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Chairman made the
following closing remarks:
…I see white and black people struggling to live together, to work
together, throughout this our beloved city. I see racially integrated school
staffs that have been successfully educating children of one race or
another without discrimination every day for more than a generation….
Make no mistake; we still have a long way to go (School Board Minutes,
1993, p. 298).
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On February 23, 1993, the clustering at Bellevue and Ginter Park Elementary
School ended. Before the vote, School Board Chairman Townes expressed his
disappointment over the media’s “concentration on controversial items” versus focusing
on the positives aspects of RPS (School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 301). The board voted
unanimously to approve superintendent’s proposed reassignment plans for Bellevue and
Ginter Park. Reassignment procedures were to:





Develop a modified random selection process, which would increase
the probability of producing individual class lists, which reflects the
racial/cultural composition of the school while minimizing the total
number of students to be reassigned.
Review class lists to ensure that they reflect the racial and cultural
composition of the school prior to implementation.
Entertain any regrouping recommendations for instructional purposes;
however, any individual student reassignment should not result in a
gross imbalance in racial composition (School Board Minutes, 1993, p.
302).

Ginter Park’s pupil reassignment plan stated:
The plan for instructional delivery will utilize a team-teaching model
involving classes at each grade level. Each pupil will have a lead teacher
and co-lead teacher. The lead teacher is responsible for the daily
homeroom duties and organizing each student’s overall educational plan.
The co-lead teacher provides enhanced instructional activities as
collaboratively identified by both teachers.
The integrity of the
instructional program will no be compromised, rather the program will be
enhanced through increased student interaction via team-teaching (School
Board Minutes, 1993, p. 302).
Two amendments were inserted into the School Board’s resolution:
Part 1:
Whenever possible, the current homeroom teacher for a particular class
will be the lead teacher or the co-lead teacher for that class.
Part 2:
Recognizing the special stress placed on the youngest pupils in situation
involving mid-year changes and disruptions of established routine, the
Superintendent will not reassign a kindergarten pupil in either school from
one class to another without the consent of that pupil’s parents
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notwithstanding any other provision of this resolution (School Board
Minutes, 1993, p. 303).
After the reassignment plan was passed, Brown said, “Before pupils are
reassigned, the human factor will be considered…. The plans no longer use computerized
random sampling” (Farmer, 1993, p. A1). Townes commented that the process of
reassigning pupils would be carried out in the kindest way possible (Lazarus, 1993).
However, Bellevue’s 76 pupil reassignments were delayed by transfers and absences that
were 20% higher than normal during the weeks after the decision to end clustering was
made by the board. One saddened parent of a first-grader who was reassigned said, “This
was our chance to come up with a real creative solution to a difficult problem that
everyone in the country was watching to see how we would handle it and we just put a
band-aid on it” (Farmer, 1993, p. A8). Central office administrator and interviewee “Mr.
Wright” felt the clustering controversy was perhaps Superintendent Brown’s most
embarrassing moment (Wright, 2008). Legal authority and interviewee “Mr. Wilson”
had the following to say about the leadership during the clustering controversy:
Dr. Brown did a great job in terms of, you know, dealing with the process
of two clashing forces. There was no monster at any rate; there was no
ogre…there was no winner. And so, it was difficult…they were trying
times (Wilson, 2008).
The controversy surrounding RPS was felt locally, nationally and internationally.
When former school administrator and interviewee “Mr. Bean” was asked how this
situation impacted RPS he replied, “The Richmond Public Schools were really hit hard. I
was really right in the middle of all of that mess, and I think that they did as well as they
could” (Bean, 2008). To help with building support for the decision to end clustering, the
Richmond City Council endorsed the efforts of the school board by passing a resolution
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that described clustering as discriminatory and a racist practice that fosters resegregation
in RPS. Interestingly, the resolution vote was broken along racial lines with five black
council members voting for the resolution and three white members abstaining (Wasson,
1993).
Media coverage of the clustering controversy in RPS was widespread. The news
was reported by the New York Times, the Washington Post, CNN, the Philadelphia
Inquirer, the Boston Globe, Atlanta’s Journal and Constitution, as well as Canadian
television (Williams, 1993). In addition, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the United
States Department of Education investigated RPS to determine if students were assigned
to classes at the elementary level on the basis of race. The probe sought to find out if
elementary schools in Richmond were complying with Section 6 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in any program. OCR found
RPS in violation of Section 6, but since they had corrected the problem, OCR found the
issue to be resolved (Farmer, 1993). With the clustering of students by race at Ginter
Park and Bellevue Model Elementary School resolved, the district prepared to move
forward from the internal marketing setback.

Conclusion

RPS undertook marketing efforts to improve the district’s ability to retain and
attract whites and middle-class blacks. The balancing of the neighborhood school
concept, which assigned most students to the school in their attendance zone after crosstown busing ended in 1986, and the open enrollment model school concept, which
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allowed students the option of applying to schools outside of their attendance zone, were
contradicting each other by 1991.
The difficulty of creating neighborhood schools was illustrated by Mary Munford
Elementary School’s marketing struggles to convince white residents to re-enroll in the
school that they had abandoned during cross-town busing. The concept of open
enrollment schools was analyzed to show the marketing developments of magnet and
model school programs. Eventually, the marketing of Cary, Fisher and Bellevue Model
Elementary Schools through open enrollment policies clashed with the efforts of creating
neighborhood schools. By 1992, RPS reaffirmed their position in support of the open
enrollment model school concept while embodying the neighborhood concept.
Attempting to balance these two policies, the misguided effort of clustering students by
race at Ginter Park and Bellevue Model Elementary School played out in the media
during the 1992-93 school year. Public scrutiny of this situation created further
controversy for RPS. Legal authority and interviewee “Mr. Wilson” felt that the outcome
of the internal marketing debacle left a stigma on RPS. He said:
There's an old African proverb, ‘When elephants fight, ants get stomped.’
So there are the kids, you know, right there until they’re in the midst of
they have no way of protecting themselves. And then, you have to avoid
everybody else's perceptive of what's best for them (Wilson, 2008).
The clustering of students by race at Ginter Park and Bellevue Model Elementary
Schools had a negative impact on RPS. Public debate on the handling of the situation
damaged the marketing efforts of the district. Previous efforts to desegregate schools
before and during unitary status diminished after this misguided decision. Redirection in
RPS became difficult with socio-economic resegregation in Richmond increasing once
again. RPS, under the leadership of Superintendent Brown, had to find a way to recover
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from this incident that left a defining mark on the district. For the remainder of the
1990’s, redirection efforts to develop consistency were attempted with an increasingly
high turnover rate in superintendents.
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CHAPTER 6
Working to Establish Consistency
Introduction

With the adversity of the clustering controversy still lingering in Richmond, the
school system set out to establish a sense of continuity to recover from the instability of
the recent past. The findings in this chapter begin with a critical analysis of the high
turnover rate of superintendents in Richmond Public Schools (RPS). Then, redirection
efforts that followed its unsuccessful internal marketing approach are examined. Next,
programs and initiatives implemented to help establish direction are analyzed. Ongoing
district challenges are outlined with a focus on the rapid changes in leadership during the
mid-1990’s. Specific obstacles facing RPS including the Standards of Learning (SOL)
state assessments are dissected to further understand the complexities facing the district
during an inconsistent period.

High Superintendent Turnover Rate

To further understand the impacting stigma on RPS, a closer look is taken at the
high turnover rate of district superintendents. The frequently changing school
administration in Richmond presented a strenuous setting for consistent educational
practices to be adopted, especially after the clustering of students by race controversy in
1992. Former school administrator and interviewee “Mr. Wright” felt that with the
turnover of superintendents in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Richmond became a very difficult
work environment (Wright, 2008). Another school administrator and interviewee “Mr.
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Snyder” said the following about post-court mandated school desegregation: “I think
things floundered along for a while…things just kind of set in and nobody really did
much. Eventually, we went through many superintendents, which brought struggles”
(Snyder, 2008). Snyder alluded to the fact that unresolved disputes between the
superintendents and school boards existed after cross-town busing ended in Richmond,
which gave way to educational uncertainties. Listed below are the seven Richmond
Public School Superintendents since the end of cross-town busing in 1986, including
their dates of service and reasons for leaving.








Dr. Deborah Jewell-Sherman:
Dr. Albert Williams:
Dr. Patricia Conn:
Dr. Lucille M. Brown:
Dr. Albert Jones:
Dr. James W. Tyler:
Dr. Lois Harrison-Jones:

2002-2006 (present)
1997-2002 (retired early)
1995-1997 (dismissed)
1991-1995 (retired early)
1989-1991 (dismissed)
1988-1989 (interim)
1985-1988 (resigned)

Lois Harrison-Jones replaced Richmond C. Hunter, Richmond’s first black
superintendent, after 8 years of service in 1985. She was an employee of RPS for 30
years prior to her appointment as superintendent. Harrison-Jones said, “I hope my long
tenure with Richmond Public Schools will help me eliminate the normal transitional lull
that follows the arrival of a new chief executive officer into a school system” (Nance,
n.d., p. 28). Her longevity with the district proved beneficial to RPS during its transition
from cross-town busing to unitary status; however, with her resignation coming only two
years into post-court mandated school desegregation, unstable leadership began to
negatively impact the direction of the district.
After Dr. James W. Tyler’s short stay as Interim Superintendent from 1988-1989,
Albert Jones worked diligently to restructure RPS for nearly three years until he was
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dismissed without cause in 1991. His leadership spawned ideas and initiatives that were
handed to the next Superintendent, Lucille M. Brown. Her four-year stretch as the
superintendent was filled with ups and downs including the clustering controversy of
1992. After Brown’s efforts to redirect the district in the early 1990’s, Patricia Conn was
hired in 1995 and then dismissed from her position as superintendent after less than two
years. She said, “In retrospect, I erred in trying to do too much too fast in Richmond”
(Weatherford, 2003, p. 124). She went on to say that the board micromanaged the system
rather than sticking to its mandate of setting policy (Weatherford, 2003). Albert
Williams took over as superintendent in 1997, but even with his five year stay, high
turnover in the position led to frequent upheavals in how the system was run over time.
For instance, each person’s changes to district policies, processes and philosophies made
it difficult to build stability. Local reporter and interviewee “Mr. Jackson” said,
There has been so much turnover…. You had all these different regimes.
There was no real continuity, so it’s hard to point at any cohesive entity as
being consistently and uniformly positive (Jackson, 2008).
The reputation of RPS became one that was difficult to manage, and the school board was
viewed as hard to work with. A former president of the Virginia State Board of
Education said, “There’s no doubt that a lack of consistency in that position [of
superintendent] has hit the Richmond Public School system very hard” (Weatherford,
2003, p. 122). There were also persistent complaints from inside and outside of the
district that favoritism played a role in the hiring practices of RPS, especially in the upper
administrative positions (Kollatz, 2002). Jackson said, “There were people, who’ve
never seemed to retire. When they retired, they became consultants, kind of stayed on the
payroll” (Jackson, 2008).
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To dispel the notion of faulty hiring practices, the school board hired the Virginia
School Board Association (VSBA) to look for Richmond’s next superintendent. After
four months of searching, 13 candidates were presented to the board, with only one
recommended from in-state, Deborah Jewell-Sherman, Richmond’s Associate
Superintendent. School board member Reginald Malone said, “Many of the out-of-state
candidates were leery of Richmond, because of its reputation of not keeping
superintendents” (Weatherford, 2003, p. 124). After great debate among board members,
in July of 2002, Jewell-Sherman was named Richmond’s new superintendent with a 5-3
vote (one member abstained). Her responsibilities were vast and her challenges were
multifaceted. Before examining the superintendency of Jewell-Sherman, a closer look at
the redirection efforts after the controversial clustering of students by race highlights
various programs and initiatives. Also, a closer look at the rapid changes in leadership
outlines the ongoing district challenges into the twenty-first century.

Redirection Efforts
After a decision was reached on February 23, 1993, regarding the clustering of
students by race in two of Richmond’s public schools, the system began focusing its
attention on improving its image. Superintendent Lucille M. Brown provided leadership
to promote many policies, community programs and developmental efforts to help erase
the stigma that was impacting RPS. The efforts to redirect the mission of RPS began
immediately after the previous goal of bringing white and black middle-class families
back into the city schools foundered on the clustering controversy. Following a difficult
time in RPS, former school administrator and interviewee “Mr. Bean” felt the district
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needed to deal with its past mistakes and change its ways (Bean, 2008). The school
board looked at ways to start redirecting their mission to move on from the past and look
to the future.
On February 25, 1993, the Richmond Public School Board began this process by
agreeing to hire an independent consultant to conduct a school census to revalidate school
enrollment, determine population trends and to help develop a needs assessment. The
city manager of Richmond indicated the city administration would cover the cost of the
census (School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 305). A baseline effort started on March 2,
1993, when the results of the one and a half year study by the Richmond Renaissance
Education Task Force were reported to the board. The task force found many current
practices in RPS to be “state of the art” compared to most systems in the United States.
From this assessment an action plan was devised for the system:
1993 Action Plan:
 Begin building support in the entire community
 Start on a detailed implementation plan to address:
1. Pre school initiatives
2. Learning barriers
3. At risk students (over 50%)
4. High mortality rate (5th highest in nation)
5. Foster care kids (4 times the state average)
6. Juvenile arrest rate for drugs (5 times the state average)
7. Juvenile homicide rate (School Board Minutes, 1993,
p. 318-20)

District wide programs and initiatives.
At this same meeting, the board directed the superintendent to evaluate the
potential of joining the Council of Urban School Boards (CUBE) that consisted of 70
urban school systems (p. 310). On March 16, 1993, RPS joined CUBE for $5,250.
Action goals included achieving racial, ethnic and socio-economic integration within the
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metropolitan area and building confidence in urban public education (School Board
Minutes, 1993, p. 322). The CUBE program was a method for RPS to share
programming ideas with other predominately black school districts recovering from the
effects of school desegregation.
On April 20, 1993, the Community Outreach Program was created. The program
involved 200 businesses, organizations, religious groups, institutions and individuals to
help build partnerships with the Richmond community. The Weed and Seed Program
was also installed on April 20th. This federally funded drug related program was
designed for communities to reclaim neighborhoods, with safe havens established in
places like Blackwell Elementary School in Richmond. On May 4, 1993, the Toyota
Families for Learning Program was instituted as a collaborative early intervention model
for family education. In addition to early childhood intervention, the need of addressing
the graduation rate within the district was a priority. On February 25, 1993, the drop out
rate was down to 5.5% from 12.6% in 1989; however, the rate was still above the state
average of 3.26%. On December 6, 1994, RPS adopted the Cities in Schools Program to
address the dropout rate through community partnerships (School Board Minutes, 1994,
p. 177, p. 320, p. 336, p. 344). The Cities in Schools Program was seen by the board as a
valuable resource to combat truancy.
The board also worked on improving the lines of communication in the system
with the Richmond Education Association (REA). Bylaws to Section 7.04 of the School
Board Policy were passed on April 20, 1993 to increase communication procedures
between school board employees and outside parties in Richmond (School Board
Minutes, 1993 p. 340). On May 11, 1993, a public forum was held with diverse segments
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of the community to improve lines of communication for delivering support services to
youth. The idea was to present strategies, ideas or programs for helping each person
view themselves as a part of a greater whole (School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 344).
Local politician and interviewee “Mr. Thompson” recalls the efforts of the community to
support programs such as this. He said,
We adopted the schools, particularly businesses adopted schools to do
things in a particular school like work with enrichment programs and
reading programs. They used public figures. I know I used to go to the
schools every year and read to the kids. So they did a lot of enrichment
things to help the kids in the stressful environment (Thompson, 2008).
Another example of the greater Richmond community’s involvement started on
August 24, 1993, when the Colonial Williamsburg Pilot Project was adopted by the board
to focus on the reversal of the present trend among students toward historical illiteracy
through hands on living interpretations (School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 456). To help
prepare students in RPS for academic assessments, the board adopted a Division Wide
Improvement Plan on September 7, 1993; for continued improvement on test scores
(School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 478). In working with the City of Richmond, the school
board was striving to allocate money to address the infrastructure needs of the district,
and on May 4, 1994 the Capital Improvement Plan for 1994-1999 was adopted for this
purpose. The plan called for $86,365,500 in funding for the five-year period. To address
the immediate needs of the district, $18,655,000 was recommended for the 1994-95
school year (School Board Minutes, 1994, p. 604). Former school administrator and
interviewee “Mr. Wright” felt that financial investments were good for the schools;
however he also said:
It’s easier for a school division to manage growth than it is to manage
decline. But trying to retrench is extremely painful. And so you have
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teachers and students working hard in schools but on top of them is the
layer of bureaucracy and political intrigue in the city trying to control the
organization for reasons other than the education of the children (Wright,
2008).
Exemplifying this point was the debate among newly elected school board
members in the fall of 1994 over the installation of a new mission statement. For two
months, these members struggled to propose a new School Board Mission Statement,
which was finally passed on October 4, 1994. Principles of the mission were for students
to appreciate cultural diversity, become responsible citizens, and to lead productive lives
so that RPS would be the choice of all Richmonders (School Board Minutes, 1994, p.
108). In the middle of the new school board’s efforts to address the multifaceted needs of
the system’s students, Reverend Michael Williams of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) presented his concerns to the school board.
His concerns pertained to the high concentration of poverty in Richmond and the low
levels of literacy amongst its students. He offered a proposal that would enhance the
efforts of the board and the division’s initiatives relative to increasing community
involvement and partnership in education. He stated:
Many of the inner city children and youth are at risk; they are without
hope, adequate attention, and unable to handle life. As a result, two
generations of black children and youth are about to be lost to drugs,
violence, early parenthood, poor health, unemployment, family
disintegration, and the spiritual and physical poverty (School Board
Minutes, 1994, p. 104).
The school board listened to his concerns and attempted to address them with the
programs that were in place. The following year, on June 6, 1995, the Greater Richmond
Community Corps Concept was approved by the school board to continue its intervention
in the community. Superintendent Brown explained in her Annual Report that a
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partnership between Richmond’s schools and the Greater Richmond Community Corps
was adopted to address the rising crime and violence that was occurring in the Richmond
community (School Board Minutes, 1995, p. 304). Former school board member and
interviewee “Mr. Higgins” had a first hand look at the before mentioned efforts of RPS
during the 1990’s. He said,
Starting probably in the mid-to late 90s, the futures for a lot of these kids
started to change because we started to believe that they could do it. I
know the kinds of challenges that existed before all this reform stuff
started. I know how bad it was (Higgins, 2008).
The efforts of RPS to address the needs of the students attending public schools
were evident through the many programs and policies implemented since 1993. As
beneficial as these initiatives were to students, the system was still struggling to deal with
the lingering complexities of the failed school desegregation process. RPS central office
administrator and interviewee “Mr. Smith” was not aware of any programs that were
implemented to directly repair the racial resegregation that was regaining momentum
during the 1990’s. Rather, according to “Mr. Wright:” “The school system was just
responding to the minor issues that were popping up” (Wright, 2008). Furthermore, local
religious leader and interviewee “Mr. Sanders” said,
Classrooms can come up, but the fact of the matter is it ain’t just about
your effort. It’s really about resources. So you basically are in as bad of a
situation as you were before, if you don’t do something with what you do
have (Sanders, 2008).
Sander’s felt that even though RPS was implementing many programs, they were
neglecting the major issues of class and race, and the lack of resources devoted to
addressing these problems. Former Richmond student and interviewee “Mr. Grant” saw
the efforts of RPS as a battle against a force to be reckoned with. He said:
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And so the quality of teaching started to decline, the tax base support for
their schools started to decline. And so there were a series of events,
almost like a perfect storm of things that were happening that I think
adversely affected the school system’s efforts (Grant, 2008).
While efforts to reform were taking shape, the Governor’s School at Thomas
Jefferson High School was going through a difficult situation. City Councilman Henry
W. Richardson was concerned that students attending the Governor’s School at Thomas
Jefferson (Tee-Jay) were being treated differently than the neighborhood students,
causing resentment among the community (School Board Minutes, February 25, 1993, p.
208). Local journalist and interviewee “Mr. Jackson” said, “The Thomas Jefferson
Governor’s School was perceived as elitist” (Jackson, 2008). Discussion ensued to move
the Governor’s School from Thomas Jefferson during the early 1990’s. A decision was
made on December 16, 1993 to keep the program at Thomas Jefferson with modifications
to the enrollment; it was decided that Richmond students would have enrollment priority
(School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 531). Eventually, by 1998, the Governor’s School
moved to Maggie Walker High School, and Thomas Jefferson High School continued to
house several other magnet programs. Maggie Walker was vacant for years, and was
renovated to exclusively house the Governor’s school by 2001-02.

Ongoing District Challenges

Controversy at Bellevue Model Elementary School was looming since 1993.
Principals Sylvia Richardson of Bellevue and Frances McClenney of Ginter Park were
reassigned at the end of the 1992-93 school year. This situation raised concern about
how RPS was viewed in the press (School Board Minutes, 1993, p. 435). At the
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conclusion of the 1993-94 school year, the white enrollment at Bellevue had dropped
from its peak of 75 students to 30. At the conclusion of the 1994-95 school year, the
white enrollment at Bellevue plummeted to 6 students out of about 370 pupils. Reports
were surfacing about a secret plan to bring white pupils back to the school, and Brown
was heard saying that Assistant Principal of Bellevue Jean Whitlock would not become
the next school’s principal because she lacked the proper image to attract white parents to
the school (Rowley, 1995); (Farmer, 1995).
Ginter Park’s white students also declined from 70 to 50. The following table
lists the most racially mixed Richmond public schools for the 1993-94 school year, which
did not include either Bellevue or Ginter Park.
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Table 7
“Clustering” Split City: Separation in School Sparked Political Storm_
School

Black

White

Open High

32%

66%

Fisher Elementary*

52%

46%

Fox Elementary

52%

45%

Munford Elementary

56%

42%

Cary Elementary*

68%

31%

Community High

69%

27%

Binford Middle*

74%

24%

Summer Hill Elementary

80%

19%

Ruffin Road Elementary

81%

18%

Elkhart Elementary

88%

9%

_________

*Model School
(Adapted from Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 16, 1994)
Table 7 lists the ten schools in RPS that had a higher percentage of white students then
the district had overall in 1994. RPS was 91% black, 8% white and 1% other in 1994,
while the city itself was 55% black, 45% white and 1% other. Commenting on post-court
mandated school desegregation “Mr. Higgins” said, “We don’t have an integrated school
system anymore, and it’s really a black school system” (Higgins, 2008). Brown wanted
the city’s demographics to be reflected in the school system; however, school officials
had no specific integration strategies (Farmer, 1994). To complicate matters, on January
11, 1995, Brown presented a graph to the school board showing the percentages of youth
living in poverty in urban areas of Virginia. According to the graph, Richmond ranked
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the highest compared with Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Hampton, Newport News, Arlington,
Alexandrea, and Roanoke (School Board Minutes, 1995, p. 203).

Rapid Leadership Changes
By 1995, RPS was faced with many challenges. In the spring of 1995, Brown
added to these challenges by announcing her retirement. RPS now embarked on the
difficult process of trying to fill its superintendent vacancy in the middle of trying to
establish orderliness within the district. Brown’s retirement came at a juncture where
RPS was striving to build consistency with its policies and programs. According to
School Board Chairman Melvin D. Law, “The future of the City and its ability to realize
its potential and to enhance its reputation is tied to the perception of the school system”
(School Board Minutes, 1995, p. 262). This intensified the need to quickly select a new
superintendent to manage the turbulent district during a demanding period.
In July of 1995, Patricia Conn was named the new superintendent of RPS. In her
first report to the school board on July 6, 1995, she presented her vision and goals for the
upcoming school year. Her vision stated: “To make the Richmond public schools the
standard by which all other urban school districts are measured, demonstrating high
student achievement, peaceable schools and a supportive learning environment” (School
Board Minutes, 1995, p. 419). Her main goals were somewhat in line with Brown’s six
year comprehensive Education Plan that was put into effect four years prior. The 19911997 plan outlined the division’s major goals, methods for assessment, and strategies for
improving the quality of education (School Board Minutes, 1991, p. 387). Conn took the
basics of Brown’s plan and added the goals of enhancing the image of the school division
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and maintaining a healthy fiscal environment. In addition to revamping the district’s
goals, Conn presented a proposed logo to the board that she believed would improve the
public concept of the division’s image. The new logo showed an adult and a child
standing in front of the City showing the connection between the public schools and the
community. The words on the logo read: “Richmond Public Schools: The Hub of Our
Learning Community.” She recommended that the proposed logo replace the current
division logo. The board agreed to defer any decision on this item to a subsequent
meeting (School Board Minutes, 1995, p. 419). Other changes that were instituted by
Conn for the 1995-96 school year were:
















Change the name of the downtown offices from Central
Administration to the Support and Accountability Center (SAC)
Integrate and streamline SAC operations, emphasizing boundarycrossing teams
Combine the Curriculum Materials Center and the Professional
Development Center into a new entity: The Instructional Resource
and Training Center
Request four new Board policies; civic values and service learning;
collaboration with community; student progress; site-based
planning and management
Begin planning the conversion of comprehensive high schools to
theme focused schools featuring small school units
Restructure middle schools so that every child is connected to a
group of caring adults in each school
Change the employee appraisal system from an input based to a
results based approach
Implement (Total Quality Management) principles throughout the
organization
Intensify, focus and integrate professional development
opportunities
Align volunteer and partnership programs with new goals
Establish pathways for teacher sharing and teamwork
Establish a peer support system for principals
Identify a farm site where troubled youth can be educated using a
hands-on approach
Establish community-learning centers for children and families
Seek relief from state and federal rules and policies
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Identify priority schools for intensive problem solving support
(School Board Minutes, 1995, p. 439)

Shortly thereafter, Conn announced her priority schools list. The list included Wythe and
Armstrong High Schools; Boushall, Chandler and Mosby Middle Schools; Whitcomb
Court, Carver, Oberby-Sheppard, Chimborazo, Blackwell, and Oak Grove/Bellemeede
Elementary Schools. She said this list was determined through longitudinal school data,
system wide student testing and student attendance and student suspensions from 1992
through 1995. She believed by identifying schools with the greatest needs, the system
would begin to improve its image and student achievement. Conn also created several
task forces during her first year as superintendent; student progress, business and
community collaboration, civic values and service learning and school based planning
and management were examples of her initiatives to meet the needs of all students
(School Board Minutes, 1995, p. 455).
During Conn’s tenure as superintendent, the school board passed a
“Proclamation” on May 23, 1996, ten years after cross-town busing ended in RPS. The
Proclamation brought attention to the history of the school desegregation process of 1954
through 1986 and gave meaning to post-court mandated school desegregation in RPS.
The Proclamation stated in the post-Brown era, congressional response to inequity
ensured that dual systems of education were eradicated and the annals of the RPS reflect
the responses of the division and community to concerns and resolving solutions which
have shaped the district as it currently exists (School Board Minutes, 1996, p. 641).
The school board, superintendent and the entire Richmond community felt the
significance of this proclamation at this juncture of unitary status. After cross-town
busing ended, RPS strove to grapple with the socio-economic consequences of school
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desegregation. This Proclamation allowed for reflection and the realization that the
school district was still dealing with the remnants of cross-town busing.
Meanwhile, Conn continued to manage the district that, according to the
Richmond Afro-American Newspaper, had become synonymous with the word “turmoil”
(Crittendown, 1996, p. A14). Still, on June 17, 1996, Conn presented her two-year and
twenty-year visions for Richmond’s schools. She focused her vision for the next two
years on the Internet, keyboarding, technology and community partnerships. Her twentyyear vision was focused on general education giving way to high caliber academic and
technical education (School Board Minutes, 1996, pp. 669-671). Conn’s visions and
goals were aimed at helping teachers address the needs of their students for years to
come. Amid the challenges presented in the predominately black RPS, Chandler Middle
School Principal Anna Gee said, “There is no difference in educating black children as
opposed to white children…. You have to use different strategies with all kids”
(Crittendon, 1996, p. A14). Gee felt that education in Richmond was moving in the
direction it needed to go in 1996. She said, “By addressing the superintendent’s five
goals, we’re also addressing our children’s needs…. We’re in an era where we’re
experiencing diminishing parental control and involvement. We’re going to have to work
diligently with the community at large to establish partnerships (Crittendon, 1996, p.
A14). As RPS worked toward achieving success for its students throughout the district,
Conn was involved in a series of confrontations with school employees.
The quarrel began when Conn forced school employees to stay at work during an
annual basketball championship, which was traditionally taken off by some of
Richmond’s educators (Weatherford, 2003). Consequently, Conn transferred and fired a
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few school employees who were insubordinate in the matter. The school board later
removed the superintendent’s power to hire, transfer or fire employees. The board
publicly chastised Conn for her insubordination (Giampietro, 1997). Ultimately, on
January 16, 1997, the school board suspended Conn unanimously for 45 days with pay
(School Board Minutes, 1997, p. 190). Many positive and negative opinions about
Conn’s suspension were shared at the February 3, 1997 school board meeting. For
instance, community member Donald Hatcher expressed concern regarding racism in the
school system and hidden agendas. He claimed, “Citizens do not know what is going on”
(School Board Minutes, 1997, p. 210). On March 1, 1997, with a 5-4 vote, Conn was
terminated without cause and placed on administrative leave (contract boycott) for a
period of 90 days (School Board Minutes, 1997, p. 229). At the March 3, 1997 school
board meeting, more public reaction (mostly negative) was shared during the public
information period. People felt that a contract boycott was too costly and that the board
needed to reconsider their decision. People stated that it felt like there was a dark cloud
cast over the children and the division as a result of the disciplinary actions taken against
Conn (School Board Minutes, 1997, pp. 230-31). The school board immediately began
looking for a new superintendent in the spring of 1997. There were numerous public
hearings held during the summer of 1997 regarding the desired qualities of Richmond’s
next superintendent. In addition, there was a great deal of concern expressed about the
stigma the whole episode cast upon RPS and the future of it and its students (School
Board Minutes, 1997, pp. 11-14).
During the absence of a superintendent, the school board decided to revamp the
1995-1998 strategic plan Conn created, which was based on Brown’s original six year
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comprehensive plan (1991-1997). The board felt the reformatted goals created a clear
guidepost for excellence and were essential to creating a new focus during the
superintendent lull. Others in the district expressed their concern of having any changes
made before a new superintendent was appointed (School Board Minutes, 1997, p. 65).
Finally, on September 18, 1997, RPS appointed Albert Williams as the district’s
new superintendent. Under William’s leadership RPS aimed to establish consistency for
the district. Roger Gray, President of the Richmond Educational Association said:
Williams is going to need unified support to win the battle he’s up against:
(SIC) pitiful test scores—among the lowest in the state—bloated perstudent spending that’s among the highest in the state, large classroom
size, an aging infrastructure, and unwieldy proposed $200 million budget,
high truancy rates, teacher apathy, stiffer standards of accreditation tied to
funding and accreditation soon to be instituted by the state, and perhaps,
above all, a poor image (Giampietro, 1997, p. 15).
Williams encouraged all citizens of Richmond, including people without children in RPS,
to step up and get involved by volunteering in mentoring programs. He also asked that
Richmonders, who sent their children to private schools, to tell him what they were
getting elsewhere that they could not receive from RPS. He said, “Our school
administration can work toward creating a system that meets their needs” (Giampietro,
1997, p. 18). At the same time, RPS was receiving additional financial assistance from
the federal government based on the March 13, 1997, Partnership to Rebuild America’s
Schools Act of 1997. Under the Act, the federal government assisted states and
communities by providing up to half the cost of interest on bonds or other financing
mechanisms for schools construction, renovation, and modernization. Approximately $1
billion would go to states based on the existing Title I grant formula for disadvantaged
children, and about half would go directly to 100 school districts. RPS was one of the
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100 districts in the nation that met this criteria, thus they received $5,894,896 in
additional funding to address the needs of the system. (School Board Minutes, 1997, p.
295).

Improvement Obstacles
Still, the community was concerned about the direction of RPS. At the November
3, 1997 school board meeting, community member Urchie Ellis urged the board to make
its public schools more acceptable to middle-class families with children. He requested
the board coordinate with city council for city planning concerns to reorganize
boundaries of school attendance zones. He recommended the school board recognize
schools are the major reason for people not choosing to live in the City of Richmond
(School Board Minutes, 1997, p. 122). On May 4, 1998, the school system’s
“Reorganization of the Title I Program” occurred to optimally serve the students of the
division. It was announced that Title I funds would serve as many schools as feasible.
Resources were equally distributed among the schools based on the economic condition
of the children in each school’s community. Additional schools were afforded Title I
services, while schools currently implementing a Title I program would continue to
maintain high levels of quality (School Board Minutes, 1998, p. 241). The challenge of
meeting the needs of students with a lower socio-economic status, coupled with the
increasing call for higher levels of academic achievement, created a strenuous
environment within RPS.
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, RPS continued to face challenges
stemming from the past. After several years of varying initiatives, the district still strove
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to achieve continuity while trying to change its negative public image. For instance, RPS
set out to enhance the image of its schools and to engage the community as part of their
vision for the next 5-10 years (School Board Minutes, 2000, p. 23). Superintendent
Albert Williams and the Richmond Public School Board sought ways of working together
to address issues such as mismanagement of money, high arrest rates, a rising truancy and
dropout rate and low academic performance on the Standards of Learning (SOL)
assessments at almost all of Richmond’s schools. Additionally, the City of Richmond’s
demographics stabilized, with a largely poor black population making up the majority of
the school system by the year 2000. Richmond’s former School Board Chairman,
Reverend Miles J. Jones gave the reason for these issues in an interview with the
Richmond Times-Dispatch on October 15, 2000. He said, “Racism is a central element in
the school system’s problems. You can't possibly understand public education in this
region without understanding racism, regardless of the causes; the problems have to be
confronted” (Intress, 2000, p. 1). Former Richmond Mayor and middle school Principal
Roy West said,
Public education ought to be priority number one on the city’s list of
needs. Richmond’s worst problem is its schools, and they have reached an
abyss beyond description.… If I had children of school age, I wouldn’t
send them to Richmond public schools (Kollatz, 2002, p. 53).
These two perspectives of former contributors (both of whom are AfricanAmericans) to the development of RPS during and after cross-town busing help
illustrate the socio-economic conditions of the district as of 2000. The issues
defining the school system were deeply entrenched in a difficult and painful
history of segregation and resegregation by race and class. Local journalist and
interviewee “Mr. Jackson” summed up Richmond’s situation by saying:
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There was a lack of continuity that made a bad situation worse. This
abandonment of the system by the middle class, largely white, but some
blacks, made for a more challenging and expensive student body to
educate at a time when the tax base was shrinking and you had instability.
Never mind that in the backdrop of this, we got the crack cocaine
epidemic and triple-digit homicides during the 1980s and then into the
early ‘1990s. So it was just not a happy time. Half the town was just
collapsing around us. Retail-wise, the City of Richmond was having a lot
of problems, and those city schools were also having a lot of problems
(Jackson, 2008).
Former Richmond student and interviewee “Mr. Grant” added to Jackson’s summation:
“What we’re experiencing now is still an aftershock of those things that happened 30 and
40 years ago” (Grant, 2008). The insight provided by these informants depicts the
challenging situation RPS was in due to disastrous conditions of the past.
Plaguing RPS, among other things, was its flawed spending and accounting
practices. For instance, a school system auditor said, “The spending records of the
district’s exceptional education department were so badly kept that it was impossible to
determine how much was being spent on the program” (Foster, 2003, p. 2). The school
board was determined in 2001 to cut operating costs after the findings of a financial
report showed the system was spending an extra $25 million a year operating and staffing
too many old buildings at less than capacity. Also, Patrick Henry and Bellevue
Elementary Schools were both seen as obsolete and in need of renovation. School board
member Mr. Higgins was convinced that it was time to downsize the number of schools
in the district. Richmond was spending more per student than its suburban neighbors,
Chesterfield, Henrico and Hanover. For instance, with 58 buildings, Richmond operated
as many schools for its 26,000 students as Henrico did for its 39,000 students and
Chesterfield for its 50,000 students. To help address this financial disparity, the school
board began pondering the merger of Armstrong and Kennedy High Schools (Lazarus,
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1999). By 2003, the merger was set to happen; however, problems between the two
communities stirred fear that students from the two school zones would engage in violent
altercations if forced to attend the same school (Wermers, 2003).
In 2000, school violence was reported by the local media to be on the rise in RPS.
However, as noted in Richmond Magazine: “Statistics are difficult to assess since figures
such as ‘fighting’ are self collected by school divisions and sent to the State Department
of Education. And there is no clear delineation between what constitutes a fight and an
assault” (Kollatz, 2002, p. 70). For instance, Richmond reported 2 assaults and 599
fights for the 1999-2000 school year, while the adjacent Counties of Chesterfield posted
310 assaults and 791 fights, and Henrico reported 310 assaults and 131 fights.
Incidentally, both of these counties are predominantly white. Especially tarnishing to
Richmond’s image were two violent incidents between students and teachers that were
widely reported in the media (Kollatz, 2002). Two years later, according to the
Richmond Police Department, there were 206 arrests at Richmond city high schools. The
most common types of arrest were for disorderly conduct, assault and battery and
threatening with death or injury (Wermers, 2003). Reports such as these continued to
cast a negative light on the safety and security of RPS during the early years of the
twenty-first century. Thirty-year veteran teacher of RPS, Mrs. Hortense Mitchell Liberti
felt that the district was troubled, but not beyond hope. She said, “I simply get tired of
the negative press. Bad things happen in County schools, but of course, it isn’t banner
headlines in the morning paper” (Kollatz, 2002, p. 71).
Truancy was another problem that RPS was attempting to address. Truancy
officers and the Cities in Schools program were struggling to bring down the percentage
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of students with unexcused absences. During the 2000-01 school year, 29% of
Richmond’s students had accumulated more than 10 unexcused absences, which was only
down 1%t from the prior year (Wermers and Redmon, 2002). Specifically, the truancy
rate was 14% in the elementary grades, 39% in the middle school grades, and 56% in the
high schools. The district’s overall attendance rate was about 93% in its elementary
schools and about 87% for its secondary schools (Baugh, 2003). While battling truancy,
efforts continued on improving student achievement through a variety of programs
designed to reach accreditation standards.

High-stakes testing.
The Standards of Learning (SOL) assessments, which were administered for the
first time in the spring of 1998 as indicators of academic achievement in Virginia’s public
schools, only intensified the matter. The Virginia Assessment System was created by the
State Board of Education to measure student achievement. RPS created two
complementary programs that included the Virginia Standards of Learning Assessment
Program and the Virginia State Assessment Program. Both of these assessment programs
provided parents, students, and teachers with information about student achievement. In
compliance with state requirements, Richmond participated in both assessment programs.
During the spring of 1998, Richmond students enrolled in grades 3, 5, 8, and in selected
high school courses were administered the SOL’s. The SOL’s consisted of statedeveloped, criterion-referenced tests designed to measure student mastery of the
academic content and skills specified in Virginia's Standards of Learning. In June of
1995, the Virginia Board of Education adopted the revised Standards of Learning in four
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academic content areas: English, mathematics, science, and history/social science. They
specified in clear terms the academic content and skills that Virginia public school
students were expected to learn at each grade level. These Standards of Learning
represented high expectations for students (School Board Minutes, 1999, p. 203). While
RPS was preparing its schools for SOL testing, the superintendent worked on a two-year
and twenty year plan for restructuring the district.
The decline of student enrollment in the fall of 2000 further exacerbated the issue.
The student enrollment of RPS was down to 26,500; a 38% decrease from 1970.
Superintendent Williams claimed the school system was meeting the challenge with new
programs, standardizing schedules, content and teaching strategies. He said, "We have a
transient student population, now [with curriculum continuity], if a child goes to a new
school, the reading program will be the same. We don't have to waste days assessing the
child and seeing where he or she fits in” (Intress, 2000, p. 2). Williams felt the
improvement on 1999’s SOLs from 1998’s test scores demonstrated that the changes
were working. Three schools reached the level of state accreditation in 1999 compared to
zero in 1998 (Intress, 2000). However, student performance was low compared to where
the state expected the students to be academically. Former student and interviewee “Mr.
Grant” shared his reasoning for this subpar performance:
...in the mid-‘60s, this notion of disadvantage kinda came into the lexicon.
And the notion that, they [black students] can’t quite perform up to that
same level, they need some additional help. And I think, psychologically,
that shifted—the feelings of self-efficacy on the part of students and
maybe some expectations on the part of teachers in terms of what kind of
level of performance they could get out of these students. And I think we
were seeing the residue of that when [SOL] testing started (Grant, 2008).
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During the 2000-01 school year, RPS sought input from the community on how to
improve student achievement. The school board hired a Richmond-based architectural
firm to conduct a survey and host community dialogs to find out what Richmond
residents wanted out of their public school system. The survey results of about 250
people said that Richmond residents wanted strong neighborhood schools, but also the
choice of open enrollment to send their children elsewhere in the city (Wermers, 2002).
It was apparent that the issue of neighborhood schools and open enrollment was still
lingering ten years after the internal marketing efforts subsided with the controversy over
clustering students by race. Seemingly, the notion was poor black students were bringing
down the success of neighborhood schools in Richmond. According to educational
expert Beth Sattes:
With the Richmond Public School system now 90 percent black and
nearly 80 percent impoverished, the fact that family socio-economic status
is related to school achievement doesn’t mean that rich [white] kids are
smarter. It means that, in more affluent families [regardless of race],
children are more likely to be exposed to experiences that stimulate
intellectual development (Foster, 2003, p. 6).
Because RPS inevitably reflected the socio-economic conditions of the city’s majority
population, it now seemed too many observers that the difficulties of improving academic
achievement were greater than ever.
Magnifying the educational challenges of RPS was the No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) Act that was signed into law on January 8, 2002. This federal mandate required
all public schools to administer a state-wide standardized test annually to all students.
NCLB redefined the federal role in K-12 education to help close the achievement gap
between disadvantaged and minority students (School Board Minutes, 2002, p. 226). This
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accountability measure was in addition to the state accreditation standards already set
forth by Virginia’s Standards of Learning (SOL) assessments. NCLB stated:
Schools, school divisions, and states are rated according to the progress
toward the goals of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). This
federal law requires states to set annual benchmarks for achievement in
reading and mathematics leading to 100 percent proficiency by 2014.
Schools, school divisions, and states that meet or exceed all annual
benchmarks toward this goal are rated as having made adequate yearly
progress (AYP). Schools, school divisions, states must test at least 95
percent of students overall, and 95 percent of students in each of the
following subgroups: white, black, Hispanic, students with disabilities,
limited English proficient students, and students identified as
disadvantaged. Annual accountability ratings are based on achievement
during the previous academic year or combined achievement from the
three most recent years (NCLB, 2001, p. 4).
NCLB required that schools receiving Title I funding, based on high levels of students
eligible for free and reduced lunch must make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) on test
scores. This meant that each year students in schools with high poverty rates must do
better on standardized tests than the previous years by meeting set passing percentages or
face sanctions. NCLB stated:
If a Title I school fails to make Adequate Yearly Progress, then it is put on
a list of ‘failing schools’ published in the local paper, and parents are
given the option to transfer to another school. If it does not meet AYP for
a second year, then it must provide special tutoring for its economically
disadvantaged students or possibly face further sanctions of being taken
over by an outside agency (NCLB, 2001, p. 1).
During this time, William’s continued to battle with the school board over decisions of
how to address district priorities (Weatherford, 2003). In January of 2002, Williams
made an unexpected announcement. He stated, for personal reasons that he would be
retiring early from his position. Williams felt that he had done all he could to help RPS
during his five years as superintendent. When he left, he told the board: “You’ll either
get one of two people to replace me—somebody who is about to get fired, or somebody
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who is willing to be fired in six months” (Weatherford, 2003, p. 124). Williams was
politically savvy and lasted the longest of any superintendent since the end of cross-town
busing in 1986; however, he said, “I was tired of fighting with a squabbling, indecisive
school board (Weatherford, 2003, p. 124). The search for Richmond’s seventh
superintendent in 14 years began with hopes of finding someone who could effectively
lead under challenging circumstances.

Conclusion

This chapter critical analyzed the redirection efforts made by RPS that followed
its unsuccessful internal marketing approach of the early 1990’s. The high turnover rate
of superintendents was examined from the end of cross-town busing in 1986 through
unitary status in 2006. During this inconsistent period, RPS had seven different
superintendents and attempted many different programs and initiatives for establishing
consistency. Ongoing district challenges included a rapid turnover rate in district
leadership between 1995 and 1997, during which time RPS had three superintendents in
three years. The obstacles precluding RPS from making improvements were exacerbated
by the Standards of Learning (SOL) state assessments.
This examination into the effort of RPS to find direction during ongoing
challenges illustrated the complexities facing the district. Difficulties ranged from
district misspending, school violence, high truancy and dropout rates, low student
achievement and a high superintendent turnover rate in a mismanaged school district.
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The next chapter looks to the future and examines the impact of SOL testing on RPS in
conjunction with changing population patterns.
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CHAPTER 7
Accountability during Adversity
Introduction

This chapter examines the continued socio-economic challenges facing Richmond
Public Schools (RPS) at the beginning of the twenty first century, and analyzes the
administrative interventions taken during high-stakes testing. First, census data
pertaining to school enrollment, race, poverty status and median household income of
Richmond’s settlement patterns (1980-2000) are examined. This graphical analysis is
supported by interviewee testimony pertaining to Richmond’s metropolitan demographic
shift, leaving RPS anxious of what the future would bring. Next, approaches taken by a
new superintendent to address issues in 2002 as well as governmental intervention
programs designed to improve Richmond’s schools are analyzed. Then, the impact of
high-stakes testing on RPS through state and federal accountability measures is
scrutinized. Finally, twenty years of unitary status of RPS is examined by utilizing 2006
Standards of Learning (SOL) assessment results and other socio-economic indicators.

Demographic Settlement Patterns

This section illustrates the demographic trends of the Richmond metropolitan area
from 1980-2000, through Geographic Information Systems (GIS) census tract mapping.
Census data pertaining to race, school enrollment, median household income and poverty
levels in Richmond display the settlement patterns before and after the end of the crosstown busing in 1986. Evident by the white flight and declining tax base of the 1960’s
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and 1970’s, the mapping data in this section illuminates the resegregation of Richmond
and demographic shifts of the school system as of 1980.
To begin, Orfield said, “Desegregation plans tend to be more successful when
they involve both cities and suburbs” (“White”, 1992, preface section, para.1). A
number of city-suburban plans succeeded at desegregation in the United States, but courts
ruled against such plans in Detroit, Houston, Atlanta and Richmond; Judge Robert R.
Merhige’s proposal to consolidate the City of Richmond with Chesterfield and Henrico
Counties in 1970 was Richmond’s attempt at metropolitan desegregation. Still, Virginia
had the largest increases in the proportion of blacks attending predominantly white
schools in the United States during the 1970’s; however, most of the whites fled the city
schools during cross-town busing, leaving RPS predominately black and the city
resegregated.
RPS went through drastic demographic changes during the 1950’s, 1960’s and
1970’s. The outmigration of whites and middle-class blacks created an underclass in
Richmond during cross-town busing (Wilson, 1980). The socio-economic divide
between Richmond and the surrounding counties of Chesterfield and Henrico widened
during cross-town busing and thereafter. Major demographic differences developed
between RPS and neighboring school districts in Chesterfield and Henrico Counties. As
a result of the developed underclass, a belief construed in metropolitan Richmond that the
county schools were better than the city schools. “This is a falsehood,” says local
politician and interviewee “Mr. Thompson:” “The media plays a role in the reputation
and the perception that the schools in the county are superior to the city” (Thompson,
2008). According to a 1994 study conducted by Harvard University of predominately
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black school districts: “No evidence whatsoever” was found that the extra money given
to the all black school systems has resulted in better educations for their students
(Williams, 1993, p. B1). The study highlighted that $7,028 was provided per pupil for
Richmond students during the 1991-92 school year, which was the sixth highest rate in
the state and $3,000 more than Chesterfield. The study pointed out that in 1993 only
37% of Richmond’s sixth graders fully passed the Virginia Literacy Passport Exam. In
Henrico, Chesterfield and Hanover Counties, the pass rates were 68, 80 and 82 percent.
School board member and interviewee “Mr. Higgins” commented on the past
comparisons of Richmond’s schools to County schools by saying:
The poverty issue is the main reason why you got urban school systems
like Richmond struggling with the academic program and why it is so
unbelievably unfair to compare the progress of kids in Richmond to the
progress of kids in other school systems like Chesterfield (Higgins, 2008).
This issue points to the fact that RPS was dealing with socio-economic obstacles,
stemming from cross-town busing thus, hindering its students’ academic achievement
(Williams, 1993).
For example, Lauren Watkins, a sophomore at John Marshall High School in
Richmond, had no white teachers or classmates in 1994. The monochromatic classrooms
were nothing different from what her grandmother saw 60 years ago. Lauren believed
that it was not socially healthy to be in a predominantly black school in an increasingly
diverse world. She said, “It would help tremendously to come in contact with different
races and different cultures of people because America is not all black and America is not
all white” (Williams, 1993, p. B1).
To illustrate this point, the 2000 United States Census data of Richmond’s school
enrollment by census tract area of the city for both white and black students is mapped in
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figure 1 below. The top map shows the black student enrollment, and the bottom depicts
the white enrollment numbers of the public and private school students living in
Richmond as of 2000. Each map has a legend that contains five shades of a color
representing five different ranges of total number of students enrolled in school per tract
area. Dots are scattered across each map representing the city population density for each
race. Also on both maps are symbols representing the location of the public and private
schools in the city of Richmond.
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Figure 1:

(Created from U.S. Census data, 2000)
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Figure 1 shows the status of Richmond’s school enrollment numbers for the year
2000, by demonstrating the concentration of the black and white population throughout
the city, as well as the racially dominated areas of the city’s student enrollment. For
instance, much of the black population is spread throughout the city, whereas the white
population is condensed in central to western areas of Richmond; closer to more of the
city’s private schools. However, one census tract of Richmond has less than 75 black
people living in it (West End) as evident by the absence of a dot in this area. The school
enrollment of black students living in the city is predominantly on the South Side of
Richmond, as well as the North Side with very few census tracts representing less than
300 white students. The white student enrollment data illustrates the lack of white
students living in much of the city other than the West End. Most of the North Side is
abandon of white school-aged children. Once again, with RPS being 91% black and 8%
white in 2000, it is clear that the vast majority of white students living in the city were
attending private schools. Former RPS administrator and interviewee “Mr. Wright”
recalls discussions he had with people in the community about the before mentioned
demographics of Richmond. He said,
And it used to offend me when people at my church or people that I would
know who live in the counties would make stereotypical statements about
the schools where I worked, not knowing any of the kids or the lives that
they were living. So, it sort of made you a little defensive. You would try
to explain, but a lot of times you were talking to people who didn’t care. It
wasn’t their problem (Wright, 2008).
The fact that RPS was majority black and neighbored predominately white school
districts such as Chesterfield and Henrico, made it challenging for people working in the
city’s schools to not be affected by the negative perceptions of outsiders.
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Next, figure 2 exhibits the census tract percentage changes of Richmond’s overall
black population from 1980 through 2000. Census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000 is
depicted in the following three maps’ census tract areas. The legend contains percentages
of black population starting at under 10% and going up to over 55%. Each census tract is
shaded differently to represent these population percentages.
Figure 2:
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(Created from U.S. Census data, 1980, 1990 and 2000)
Figure 2 is a visual representation of the changing racial demographics before and
after cross-town busing ended in RPS. The top map shows the black population
percentages per census tract during 1980; it is noticeable that fewer of the census tracts
have over 55% of a black population compared to 1990 census data. The census tract
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areas increase slightly by 2000 as well. Richmond resident and interviewee “Mr.
Morgan” provided insight on the changing population of Richmond after the attempt to
desegregate the schools. He said,
So the population radically changed during those several decades, and the
numbers are just amazing. You know, so it really was the aftermath. The
consequences of desegregation, and I think you can see that in all of the
communities. From the 80s we probably begin to see that the black middle
class lives in the suburbs too. The great cradle of entrepreneurship and the
consequence of desegregation (Morgan, 2008).
It is interesting to note that the changes in census data from 1980 to 1990 are greater than
the changes in data from 1990 to 2000. It is apparent that the population patterns for both
blacks and whites stabilized during the 1990’s, after the drastic demographic shifts of the
school desegregation era. In turn, the predominately black study body in the city schools
was solidified. This demographic settlement occurred during the decade after cross-town
busing ended. Former school administrator and interviewee “Mrs. Lee” remembers
questions she was asked about the students with whom she worked with in the 1990’s.
People would ask her: “You work with all of those poor children who must have awful
behavior problems? Aren’t they all black” (Lee, 2008)? Lee recalls feeling bothered by
these perceptions, yet optimistic for the future of all her students, black and white.
Former Richmond administrator and interviewee “Mr. Miller” heard often in the 1980’s
and 1990’s that people felt the schools had deteriorated because they were all black
(Miller, 2008).
Figure 3 presents the poverty status of white persons in Richmond from 1980
through 2000. The census data is depicted in three maps showing shaded census tract
areas representing ranges of white persons at or below the poverty line. Dots are also
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scattered throughout the maps to show the population density of the white population in
the city during those twenty years.
Figure 3:

162

(Created from U.S Census data, 1980, 1990 and 2000)
Figure 3 demonstrates a significant change in the number of white people at or
below the poverty line from 1980 through 2000. It is clear that in 1980, there were
census tracts in Richmond comprised of white people living in poverty. Those areas
were mostly on the South Side; however, some North Side areas were highly
concentrated with poverty stricken white people. The census tract areas of the city with
over 1,500 white people at or below the poverty line actually increased between 1980 and
1990; a few areas on the South Side enlarged their numbers of white people living in
poverty. However, by 2000, the white people living in poverty within the city limits of
Richmond decreased sharply. Also, as evident by the bottom map’s concentration of dots
and darker shaded tracts in the West End, most affluent white people had migrated to
neighborhoods in this area of the city during the 1990’s. Interviewee “Mr. Wright” saw
living decisions made by white families first hand as a former school administrator in
Richmond. He said,
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In the North Side of the city, there were affordable homes and so, at the
elementary schools, you had larger percentages of white students. But as
soon as kids approached puberty and their parents were getting concerned
about their social relationships, that’s when there was a mass exodus. I
think for some people, they had a fear of the [inter-racial] dating issue. For
others, it was more a concern that their white children would be exposed
to a lot of profanity or sexual innuendos or talk about drug use. So, it
wasn’t purely race. I think in the ‘70s, we’re talking purely race. In the
‘80s, we’re talking socioeconomic and value-based concerns (Wright,
2008).
Further speculation for the extreme decline of white people living below poverty includes
the influx of affluent whites to the city as part of gentrification, and the exodus of white
people in poverty to the nearby counties of Chesterfield and Henrico.
Figure 4 presents the poverty status of black persons in Richmond from 1980
through 2000. The census data is depicted in three maps just as figure 3 demonstrated the
shaded census tract areas representing ranges of persons at or below the poverty line;
however, figure 4’s maps provide the poverty status data for black people. Dots are also
scattered throughout figure 4’s maps to show the population density of blacks in the city
between 1980 and 2000.

164
Figure 4:
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(Created from U.S. Census data, 1980, 1990 and 2000)
Figure 4 shows a slight flux in the poverty status of black people living in
Richmond between 1980 and 2000. There are some shifts in the concentration of census
tracts containing high numbers of black people living at or below the poverty line in
1990; however, no significant changes are detected over this twenty-year period, unlike
the shifts noticed in figure 3 for white people. Former central office administrator and
interviewee “Ms. Newman” said of the difference:
The poor kids got the poorest school experience. So even though they
were supposedly integrated, there was a great disparity in the experiences
of those going to the different schools (Newman, 2008).
The conclusion drawn by this comparison is that poverty stricken black people living in
the city after school desegregation were not only trapped in Richmond, as evident by
figure 4’s maps, but also remained in poverty over time. Former school administrator
and interviewee “Mr. Bean” worked with many families who lived in poverty. He said,
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Poverty is a bitch; you see I had kids whose parents left in the morning
before they got up and probably came home at night after they’ve gotten
home from school, so they hardly didn’t see their parents at all except for
a short time at night (Bean, 2008).
Bean highlights how the lack of parental involvement impacts the academic achievement
levels of students living in poverty. Interviewee “Higgins” felt there needed to be more
understanding by educators in the 1980’s and 1990’s that the students were in need of
assistance because they were in poverty not because they were black (Higgins, 2008). It
is also important to note that many of RPS employees who were black and living above
the poverty line where not residing in the city. According to Higgins:
I came to realize that the majority of our [black] employees lived in the
counties or sent their kids to the private schools…. As the middle-class
started leaving, the schools became filled with poorer and poorer children,
with the exception of some pockets [of the city] (Higgins, 2008).
The affluent pockets of the city were located mainly in areas of Richmond where
magnet programs or model elementary schools were located, which were serving
the most affluent and typically white students, who were attending their
neighborhood schools. Former RPS student and interviewee “Mr.Grant” had the
following perspective:
I think we do have a confounding of race and class that probably
exacerbated some of the issues, so it created these pockets of poverty in
the inner city that certainly relates to race because most of them are
African American, but it’s also a class issue (Grant, 2008).
Race and class both played a role in the decision making process of where people
would live and send their children to school. Resegregation by race and class was
having a profound impact on Richmond and the surrounding region. Richmond
School board member Carol Wolf stated:
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Society is multi-racial, but schools are still segregated. The economic
future of Richmond is at risk. The property tax base of the city is directly
linked to the quality of the education system. The failure of as a region to
address and diffuse the concentration of poverty in just a few
neighborhoods doesn’t only hurt Richmond, but it hurts the
competitiveness of the whole region (School Board Minutes, 2003, p.
416).
The focus of figure 5 is on median household income of blacks in Richmond.
Figure 5 shows the median household income of the black population for the
years 1990 and 2000. Each map has shaded census tract areas that correspond to a value
range for median household income. In addition, each map has dots scattered throughout
pinpointing the concentration of the black population in the city.
Figure 5:
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(Created from U.S. Census data, 1990 and 2000)
Figure 5 first illustrates high concentration areas of poor black people living in certain
sections of the city after the end of cross-town busing. Even though the median
household income for several census tract areas improved, the concentration of the poorer
black population intensified in a few sections by 2000. One census tract area in the West
End of Richmond, that is especially obvious, went from a median household income of
over $80,000 in 1990 to under $14,000 in 2000. This is a clear influx of white families to
the West End Mary Munford Elementary School neighborhood community, and an
outmigration of blacks, as a result of a booming housing market in a predominately white
safe haven section of Richmond. White parents moving out of Richmond after their
children completed elementary school was a common practice throughout the city in the
1990’s that cannot be seen in figure 5. However, noticeable from the maps in figure 5 is
the movement of more affluent black families towards the far West End and South Side
of Richmond. This dynamic left other areas of the city with high concentration rates of
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poverty stricken black families, and neighborhoods representing low median household
incomes. The low median household income for the black population of Richmond
combined with the poverty status levels of a de-escalating white populated school system
defined the socio-economic status of RPS as of 2000. According to the “State of the
City” report, racial healing and dialog between interest groups was needed to address
regional issues such as poverty (School Board Minutes, 2003, p. 249).

Administrative Interventions

In August of 2002, Deborah Jewell-Sherman officially became the seventh
superintendent of RPS since cross-town busing ended in 1986. Highlighted in JewellSherman’s three-year plan was her mission to change Richmond’s educational culture
(School Board Minutes, 2002, p. 66-7). She set out to improve Standards of Learning
(SOL) scores, the district’s management style and transportation policies (Pittman, 2002).
Jewell-Sherman’s three and one half year contract stated that her job was tied to the
performance of schoolchildren on SOL tests. Her contract specified by June of 2003,
when the first round of 2002-03 SOL results are released, at least 20 of the city’s 55
public schools must be fully accredited, which was double the 2002 rate. Also, at least
16 of the city’s 31 elementary schools were expected to have pass rates of 70% or higher
on third grade SOL tests for reading. Her contract also stated that no more than 12
schools could be accredited with warning (Weatherford, 2003).
Jewell-Sherman set out to meet this challenge by creating a culture of continuous
commitment to student success in Richmond. Her vision of an excuse free education and
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high expectations for all students was embraced by the district. Associate Superintendent
Yvonne W. Brandon said, “A commitment was made by the district to show that the
students would excel not in spite of whom they were or where they lived, but because of
who we are” (Brandon, 2007, p. 2). Jewell-Sherman met her contract challenge in 200203 when RPS had 23 schools fully accredited; however, preliminary scores listed only 11
schools as accredited before the school system adjusted its numbers to include test
retakes (School Board Minutes, 2003, p. 189). Also, 9% of the Richmond public school
students eligible to take the 2003 SOLs did not take them in 2002-03. Still, JewellSherman met her contract goal. School Board Vice-Chair Stephen Johnson said, “I don’t
know how [Jewell-Sherman] went from 11 [accredited schools] to 23. I’m going to ask
them to rerun those numbers…. I think they’re playing games” (Foster, 2003, p. 6).
Contrary to Johnson’s feelings, school board member Charles Nance attributed the
turnaround to Jewell-Sherman’s leadership. He said, “Most outspoken critics … should
now acknowledge the leadership of Dr. Deborah Jewell-Sherman, who set high standards
for Richmond children, and who refused to accept any excuses for failure” (Foster, 2003,
p. 6). Jewell-Sherman set out to build on these improvements and to prepare the district
for meeting the performance standards of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. In
2003, she acquired grant funding from the United States Department of Education
(USDOE) to have The Council of the Great City Schools strategically investigate the
effectiveness of RPS.
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New Direction
The Council of the Great City Schools report was entitled: “Charting a New
Course for the Richmond Public Schools,” and it set out to review the district’s efforts of
improving student performance and to propose ways to accelerate it (School Board
Minutes, 2004, pp. 194-196). The Council also reviewed the district’s federal programs
to ensure they were aligned with NCLB and to assess the district’s special education
operations. The main findings of the report were:

RPS needs to change some bad habits. The school board has been taken to
fighting the superintendent rather than battling the forces of illiteracy. The
biggest challenge facing RPS involves the system’s ability to pull together
and raise student achievement. The school district has a highly fractured
program to boost student performance, the legacy of too many initiatives
piled on top of one another over too many years. The district has, until
recently, lost its focus. Its efforts have become incoherent and
unintelligible; its moorings have loosened, and its unity of purpose has
splintered…. In short, the Richmond school district has had trouble hitting
its mark over the years because so many people in the system are aiming
in different directions (Baugh, 2003, p. 12).
The synopsis of the problems preventing RPS from achieving greater success provided
credible evidence for systematic changes to occur within the district. The Council
provided key recommendations for the system’s curriculum and instruction, federal, and
special education programs. They were:
A. Curriculum and Instruction
1. Develop a coherent vision for what it wants to achieve.
2. Set measurable goals for academic improvement.
3. Establish a new accountability system for attaining academic
goals.
4. Standardize district wide instructional strategies and curriculum.
5. Provide district wide professional development on the
implementation of the new curriculum.
6. Ensure that reforms are implemented at the classroom level.
7. Use data to monitor progress and decide on instructional
interventions.
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8. Incorporate literacy reforms into the preschool program and extend
them through the high schools, grade-by-grade.
9. Focus on the district’s lowest performing schools.
B. Title I and Other Federal Programs
1. Mesh NCLB’s adequate yearly progress goals with those proposed
for the district and individual schools.
2. Give principals greater latitude in the expenditure of Title I funds,
but target their use around a small set of district instructional
priorities.
3. Continue to blend the district’s open enrollment program with
NCLB’s choice requirements.
4. Require that supplemental service providers align their programs
with the district’s new reading and math initiatives.
5. Redeploy the district’s Title I parent set-aside funds to schoolbased activities.
6. Link the district’s tuition reimbursement program to NCLB’s
highly qualified teacher requirements.
7. Overhaul the school-by-school Title I allocation system to give it
more uniformity and fairness.
8. Use a grade span allocation system to target Title I funds on
elementary and middle schools where they can be more effective.
C. Special Education
1. Explicitly address special education students in the district’s new
strategy for improving student achievement district wide.
2. Establish clear and objective district wide criteria for placing
students in special education that rely less on subjective judgments.
3. Continue to encourage placement of students in the least restrictive
environment and collect better data, consistent with federal
requirements, on how this is being done.
4. Sharpen the district’s professional development to include
strategies to help both general and special education teachers
handle all identified disabilities and behaviors.
5. Reorganize the district’s Exceptional Education department.
6. Place greater focus on more instructional strategies for special
education and relatively less focus on compliance.
7. Boost school-level capacity to conduct manifestation
determinations.
8. Prepare a district wide special education policy and procedures
manual (Baugh, 2003, pp. 12-17).
The advice from the Council of the Great City Schools impacted RPS in designing
meaningful reform policy. Board member Malone reacted to the recommendations by
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stating: “Our alignment is questionable, we aren’t focusing on any real reform; we’re
just focused on the SOLs” (Wermers, 2004, p. A9). Conclusions from the Council of the
Great City School’s report on RPS efforts of improvement stated:
The Richmond Public School system made some important strides over
the last year or so. Still, the district is clearly working under a number of
socio-economic constraints. At the same time, the Richmond Public
School system has not made the situation much better for itself. The
School Board has been marked by a fair amount of internal squabbling.
The district has not provided the level of instructional direction and
support for its schools. The district’s instructional programs have become
incoherent. The district’s staff members are not always well-versed on the
latest reading and math research or prepared to implement it. The fact that
the district had no strategic plan for improving student achievement is
emblematic of the challenges that Richmond faces. The lack of direction
undercuts the district’s ability to accelerate student performance citywide
(Baugh, 2003, pp. 86-87).
Highlighted in the report were successful intervention programs designed to
improve student achievement such as programs at Chimborazo and Blackwell Elementary
Schools involvement of tutors, in-school remediation, Saturday school, community
volunteers, and extended day programs. The most notable program implemented across
RPS was the Partnership for Achieving Successful Schools (PASS) program developed
by the Governor’s office (Baugh, 2003, p. 41). Twenty-four schools in the city of
Richmond were utilizing the PASS program. For example, Whitcomb Court Elementary
turnaround in 2004 was attributed to the PASS Initiative. Whitcomb was partnered up
with a better performing school to learn what was working well there. A coach was then
assigned to Whitcomb from the state to help faculty and administrators focus their
attention on academic priorities (Kastner, 2004).
Other successful interventions included Woodville Elementary’s boosting of their
SOL scores through a non-faith based mentoring program. Woodville’s comprehensive
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approach included the formation of a special alternative classroom for disruptive
students, bringing parents in as volunteers, offering educational opportunities for teachers
and parents and utilizing the school social worker. Also, the Boys to Men Program at
Patrick Henry Elementary School was a successful intervention initiative that created an
alternative classroom for boys who were often classified as disadvantaged and not
expected to achieve academically (Goodrich, 2003). In addition, students from Huguenot
High School and James River High School students in Chesterfield County were seeking
ways to bridge the cultural divide through a special forum on race relations and cultural
diversity. According to a 2003 publication of The Parents’ Exchange, approximately 200
students discussed community stereotyping, segregation and affirmative action at a
community forum to improve race relations in metropolitan Richmond (Parent Exchange,
2003). Another bright spot occurring in RPS included George Wythe High School of the
Arts theater group’s 2002 selection as United States representatives at the Edinburgh
Theatre Fringe Festival in Scotland. Unfortunately, reported in Richmond Magazine, the
school system had not done a thing at all to publicize the story to the community
(Kollatz, 2002). Still, the PASS program developed by the Governor’s office to intervene
in 24 of Richmond’s public schools was finding the most success in the district through
its disbursement of funds for instructional purposes (Baugh, 2003).

State Government Interventions
Further intervention from Governor Mark Warner occurred in September 2003
when he announced a School Efficiency Review for three school divisions in Virginia as
part of his larger “Education for a Lifetime” initiative. RPS was one of three school
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divisions selected. The goal of the review was to identify administrative savings to be
gained through best practices in organization, service delivery, human resources,
facilities, finance, transportation, technology management, and other non-instructional
expenditures. This would allow divisions, such as Richmond, to put administrative
savings back into the classroom. The School Efficiency Review suggested that a net
savings of more than $2,139,292 annually or 4.5% of the 2003-04 non-personal services
budget of $46,772,894 million could be had if RPS fully implemented their
recommendations. To put the amount in perspective, the report stated: “The potential
savings is equivalent to the starting salaries of 47 new teachers (with benefits)” (Warner,
2004, p. 3). Also, RPS was seemingly spending an inordinate amount of funding on
transportation. The review claimed in 2001-02, RPS spent $475.20 per pupil for
transportation (Warner, 2004).
To assist with the efficiency of RPS and put more money into the classrooms for
instruction, 27 recommendations from the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Secretary of
Finance were provided in the review. These recommendations addressed a wide range of
district misspending that could have been directed at classroom instruction. Regardless,
the Governor’s Efficiency Review provided RPS a guide for creating a more
economically sound finance department. Commendations for RPS in the review included
an adopted teacher recruitment strategy that actively used the talents and resources of the
local business, banking, and commerce communities. By attracting the best candidates
and matching them with the most appropriate school and principal, RPS dramatically
reduced its first year teacher turnover rate from 25% to less than 4% between 1997 and
2003 (Warner, 2004, pp. 96-111). Most importantly, under Superintendent Jewell-
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Sherman, the district made great strides toward achieving full accreditation for all its
schools. The review stated: “This progress should be noted and celebrated. RPS faces
many obstacles and challenges that other divisions in the area do not face— but the
division is moving forward despite those challenges and not using them as an excuse for
failure” (Warner, 2004, p. 112). The review also commended RPS for the steady decline
in its dropout rate. In 1996-97 the RPS dropout rate was 6.5%, almost double the
statewide rate of 3.5%. The Richmond rate fell steadily, year by year since then. The rate
for 2001-02 was 2.7% compared to the state rate of 2.0% (Warner, 2004).
These interventions were aiming to address the spectrum of issues that were
impacting the district. However, the major concern affecting the entire district was the
spending costs for programs like the Community Education Partnership (CEP) program.
This program was designed to operate as an alternative program for students with
disciplinary or academic problems. Members of the Richmond Public School Board
were confused as to why Jewell-Sherman proposed CEP, which cost $5.7 million more to
fund than their already established alternative programs: Educare, Bridge and Richmond
Accelerated Program (RAP) (Goodrich, 2004). Regardless, the private company was
hired with criticism over Jewell-Sherman’s reasoning for proposing the new intervention
to conquer violence, truancy and poor performers in RPS (Roop, 2004).
By 2005, battles within the Richmond Public School Board lessened after
management recommendations were provided by the Council for Great City Schools and
the Commonwealth of Virginia. With the help of off-site retreat meetings between
school board members and school system administrators, trust began to build and
teamwork ensued (Foster, 2005). School board member Reginald Malone said, “There
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has been a transformation in Dr. Jewell-Sherman’s willingness to work with everyone,
and I think that’s a testament to her as well as School Board Chairman Steve Johnson”
(Foster, 2005, p. 20). For instance, Whitcomb Court and Patrick Henry closing in 2005
were unanimously decided by the Board 9-0 with Jewell-Sherman fully supporting the
decision (Kastner, 2005). Efforts by Jewell-Sherman and the Richmond Public School
Board to work together continued during the high-stakes testing era. The decisions made
by Jewell-Sherman and the school board through 2006 and their impact on the students
are looked at more closely in the next section.

Student Performance

Richmond was held accountable by state SOL assessments and the federal
government’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. The socio-economic conditions of
Richmond’s public school children developed a pressure-packed situation for the system.
The district’s goal was to ensure that the best educational opportunities were being
provided for its children beyond the SOLs. As of 2005, Jewell-Sherman was pleased
with the recent progress made in working with the school board to focus on student
achievement versus internal fighting. Based on the 2003 Council of the Great City
Schools report, the Virginia Department of Education required the Richmond Public
School Board to sign a “Memorandum of Understanding” for submitting a plan to the
state to improve faulty leadership and other inadequacies in the system. The agreement
with the state was set to last through December 31, 2006, and if RPS did not live up to its
end of the deal, a court order could compel it to do so (Kastner, 2005). Jewell Sherman
stated:
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I am very pleased and proud to report that our school board has embraced
[a cohesive] direction to the extent that they have signed a memorandum
of understanding with our State Board of Education to say what specific
things we are willing to hold ourselves accountable for (Casserly, 2005, p.
8).
With the actions of the board and superintendent demonstrating a unified management
system, the SOLs presented an opportunity for RPS to demonstrate academic
improvements in a district that was still perceived by many as substandard.

Strategic District Interventions
Under the adopted Regulations Establishing Standards for Accrediting Public
Schools in Virginia, students had to pass some of the SOL tests to earn a high school
diploma. Beginning with the graduating class of 2004, students had to earn verified
credits to qualify for a Standard or Advanced Studies diploma. A student earned a
verified credit by passing the course and the end-of-course SOL test for that subject. Six
verified credits were required for a Standard diploma; nine verified credits were required
for an Advanced Studies diploma. At all appropriate grade levels, schools were required
to include results from the SOL tests as a part of a set of multiple criteria in making the
promotion and retention decisions for individual students (School Board Minutes, 1999,
p. 212). In 2001-02, RPS reported graduating 1,201 students (647 standard high school
diplomas; 383 advanced studies diplomas; 27 special diplomas; 47 certificates of
completion; 88 GED certificates; and nine special certificates). The percentage of
students earning an advanced studies diploma decreased from 50% in 1997-98 to 32% in
2001-02 (Baugh, 2003, p. 14). The need for academic improvements grew as graduation
and Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) benchmark increased in the years to come.
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With RPS struggling to address graduation rates, the Commonwealth of Virginia
set its NCLB proficiency bars for the 2003-04 school year at 61% for all grade levels in
reading and 59% in math. Minimum subgroup size was set at 50 students. The district
had approximately 43 Title I schools, all but five of which were school wide. Data from
the 2002-03 state testing indicated that Richmond had approximately 18 schools in stages
I or II of school improvement under NCLB. Three schools were in school improvement
(level I), meaning they were required to provide choice under NCLB. Fifteen other
schools were in school improvement (level II), meaning they were required to offer
choice and supplemental services (Baugh, 2003, p. 14).
The continued efforts of Jewell-Sherman and the Richmond Public School Board
working together began to pay off over the next several years. On January 31, 2004, RPS
embraced its new vision statement:
RPS will become the ‘Capital Choice’ for families in Richmond City and a
nationally recognized ‘Flagship’ model of urban education as indicated by
our commitment to excellence, high student outcomes and continuous
progress in meeting state and national educational goals (School Board
Minutes, 2004, p. 219).
RPS tirelessly worked to come out from under the federal sanctions they were
given due to past low performance. Utilizing “Charting the Course,” and embracing Jim
Collin’s work from Good to Great, applied business principles to the district resulting in
improved student achievement. Former school board member and interviewee “Mr.
Higgins” said, “We got in a situation that was very difficult to turn around, but…we saw
some progress going on, which was very encouraging” (Higgins, 2008). Consequently,
RPS was featured in a study entitled, “Beating the Odds," released in 2005 by the Council
of the Great City Schools. The study showed that in the past three years, the percent of
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schools in Richmond reaching full accreditation increased from 18% in 2002 to 76% in
2005, an average annual improvement rate of 29%. Over two years, the rate of
improvement in the percent of Richmond's schools reaching full accreditation, which
means the students were meeting the benchmarks in reading, English, math, science and
social science, was 58%. Richmond's percent of improvement over the two-year period
was more than twice the percent of improvement for the state as a whole. During an
interview about the report Dr. Jewell-Sherman stated:

We embraced the notion that failure, for us, was not an option. As a team,
we started ‘Charting the Course.’ It's a course of action that entailed
central office staff going into every school and sitting down with school
staff and reviewing the data and disaggregating it along the lines of No
Child Left Behind. (Casserly, 2005, pp. 2-4).
After Richmond’s SOL improvements, Fairfax County began sending its administrators
and teachers to Richmond to find out how to close the achievement gap between
subgroups. Fairfax wanted to replicate what Richmond was doing to propel all of their
students, of all nationalities, ethnicities and abilities from good to great. RPS became
very scientific and thoughtful about what was being teaching, how they taught it and how
to intervene where necessary. Jewell-Sherman said, "The goal was to make sure that
every student is most adequately prepared, not only for those assessments, but for future
learning opportunities both in high school and after high school" (Casserly, 2005, p. 6).
Former Richmond school administrator and interviewee “Mrs. Lee” said, “I do believe
that under Deborah Jewell-Sherman there has been a tremendous amount of growth”
(Lee, 2008). The growth of RPS is measured in many ways ranging from management to
student performance. The rise in state accreditation levels and federal adequate yearly
progress attainments are examples demonstrating the system’s progress.
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Measuring Growth
By 2006, state accredited schools in Richmond rose to 44 (88%) from 23 (44%) in
2003. Schools achieving Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) in Richmond increased to 41
schools (82%) in 2006 compared to only 12 schools (23%) in 2003. “Higgins” saw high
stakes testing as an excellent opportunity for Richmond to improve its teacher quality.
He said:

I believe that the SOLs and No Child Left Behind really were tailor-made
for the school systems like Richmond… [prior to the SOLs] a number of
the teachers felt that, if a child came from the projects and didn’t have a
daddy, came in not knowing the alphabet, not knowing colors, not
knowing anything, that those kids—you just have to babysit them. So,
when the SOLs came along and we basically said, that our kids were
expected to pass the same test that kids in Chesterfield, Hanover, Henrico
had to pass; there was really a stellar change. And it really took hold when
we started having schools that were 95% African-American or 85% free
and reduced lunch becoming accredited. So, a lot of stuff simultaneously
kind of happened (Higgins, 2008).
The accountability aspects of NCLB focused on subgroups for English and mathematics.
NCLB’s mandate forced districts to look at the specific subgroups to ensure that students
representing those categories were achieving AYP on state tests. Table 8 illustrates the
achievement levels of RPS compared with the state averages by AYP subgroups
according to 2005-06 SOL English testing data.
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Table 8
Percentage of Students Passing 2005-06 SOL Assessments (AYP Subgroups)__________

(English Performance)

Richmond

Virginia_____________

All Students

72

84

Black Students

71

73

Hispanic Students

61

76

White Students

91

89

Students with Disabilities

69

64

Students Identified as Disadvantaged

70

73

Limited English Proficient Students
59
72________________
(Adapted from Virginia Department of Education Website, 2009, p. 4)
Despite the improved performance of RPS students, the division did not make
AYP for the 2005-06 school year. The only subgroup that missed the benchmark was
limited English proficiency scores. As a result the district was assessed as not making
adequate yearly progress in 2005-06. However, all other subgroup benchmarks were met
including those for math. Table 9 lists the math achievement levels of RPS compared
with the state averages by AYP subgroups for the 2005-06 school year.
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Table 9
Percentage of Students Passing 2005-06 SOL Assessments (AYP Subgroups)__________
(Mathematics Performance)

Richmond

Virginia_____________

All Students

66

76

Black Students

65

62

Hispanic Students

58

66

White Students

89

81

Students with Disabilities

62

53

Students Identified as Disadvantaged

64

62

Limited English Proficient Students
62
65_______________
(Adapted from Virginia Department of Education Website, 2009, p. 4)
As Table 9 illustrates, RPS met all AYP requirements for math in 2006. Results
indicated there was room for improvement. However, Richmond scored above the state
averages in four of the nine-subgroup categories. RPS did not shy away from the
challenges set forth by NCLB and worked diligently to concentrate its effort on
instruction for future state assessment opportunities (Brandon, 2007).

Looming Concerns
In 2005, controversy over the legitimacy of the SOL results at Oak Grove
Elementary School was reported in the midst of these improvements. Reports said that
educators at Oak Grove improperly changed answers before being submitted to the state
for scoring. State officials found changes on 141 different tests from Oak Grove due to
Principal Tommye R. Finely allowing teachers to transfer student answers from test
booklets to answer sheets (Lazarus, 2005). Also, as the district was improving its overall
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percentages of schools making AYP, Chandler Middle School had failed to make the
mark on their English SOL tests for the sixth straight year in 2006. This caused the
federal government to intervene, forcing the school to restructure. Chandler had already
been required to offer special services like tutoring and allowed students the option of
transferring to a better performing school. Restructuring of the school was a last-ditch
effort before being shut down, taken over by the state or becoming a charter school under
the management of a private organization (Kastner, 2006).
Truancy was another issue still afflicting RPS during improvements in SOL
scores. In 2005, Mayor L. Douglas Wilder developed a program to address truancy in
Richmond. He presented his plan to the school board that included:





Bringing parents in for conference when their children had three
unexcused absences.
Setting up a hot line to report truancy.
Launching citywide truancy sweeps; and
An intensive counseling and enforcement program in three
neighborhoods with high truancy and crime rates (Ress and
Kastner, 2005, p. 1).

Mayor Wilder’s plan was not well received by the Richmond Public School Board
including Superintendent Jewell-Sherman because the school system had already
implemented a program to combat truancy. The school district received a $695,000 grant
from the state in 2005 to address the truancy issue. As a result, truancy rates had
decreased in Richmond from 22% in 2003-04 to 12% in 2005-06 as a result (RPS, 2008).
Dropout rates were also declining in RPS. As of 2005-06 the dropout rate was down to
2.46% from 15.27% in 2003-04. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Richmond
Public School Board and Mayor Wilder was negative, as evident by the watchdog panel
he created for RPS in 2005 (Paris, 2008). Additionally, the relationship between the
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Mayor Wilder and the Richmond Public School Board caused strife in the community.
Discussion of changing constitutional authority to appoint the superintendent by the
mayor, and to move central administration out of City Hall damaged public opinion of
RPS (School Board Minutes, 2005, p. 18, 759).
Although negative public opinions about RPS remained, the leaders of the district
continued to work toward addressing the socio-economic issues of the city. Regarding
this pursuit, Richmond public school’s central office administrator and interviewee “Mr.
Smith” said,
I think Richmond has risen to the standards and actually is willing to
exceed, to go beyond the schools and into the community. I really believe
that—I see that in all of the tasks, all of the initiatives, all of the plans that
have been implemented (Smith, 2008).
RPS improved student achievement by developing, implementing and continuously
evaluating a rigorous and cohesive curriculum. Academic success on SOL assessments
helped foster the strategic gathering of information to improve instructional decisions
(School Board Minutes, 2007, pp. 1-5). Still, RPS remained racial polarized evident by
ethnic statistics for the 2005-06 school year. The student population, as listed in Table 10
below, is a result of the history leading up to 2006.
Table 10
Membership Totals of Richmond Public Schools (2005-06)______________________

Membership Totals

Black
21,990

White
1,732

Hispanic
835

Percent
88.93
7.0
3.38
(Adapted from Richmond Public Schools Website, 2008)

Other
167

Total
24,726

0.67

100.00

In addition to the ethnic data of Table 10, the percentage of students receiving free or
reduced lunch at the time of this study was 74.4% of the approximately 25,000 students
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attending RPS. By 2006, RPS developed into a stable operating system with many
students coming from unstable environments. Socio-economic conditions of the city
were impacting the schools despite the infrastructure development and regentrification
efforts in various pockets of the city. Yet, RPS remained socially, economically and
racially segregated in 2006.

Conclusion

The continued challenges facing RPS at the beginning of the twenty-first century
were highlighted to provide a closer look at the issues of most concern to the district.
Additionally, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) census data pertaining to school
enrollment, race, poverty status and median household income of Richmond’s settlement
patterns from 1980 through 2000 were mapped demonstrating migration patterns of white
and blacks. The development of small sections occupied by affluent whites and vast
areas of poor blacks living throughout Richmond illustrated cross-town busing’s impact
on Richmond’s settlement patterns in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The census tract maps were
supported by personal accounts pertaining to Richmond’s demographic shifts of the late
twentieth century.
The strategic approach taken by Superintendent Jewell-Sherman was analyzed
through outside agency investigations and governmental intervention programs designed
to improve the school system. In addition, strategic interventions by the district to
address looming concerns were scrutinized. The impact of high-stakes testing on RPS
was also examined through the improvement on SOL scores during a period in which
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socio-economic challenges persisted in the city. The demographics of RPS twenty years
after cross-town busing ended were listed for interpretations in the concluding chapter of
this study regarding unitary status in RPS (1986-2006).
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
Introduction

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the present study was to critically analyze post-court mandated
school desegregation in Richmond Public Schools (RPS) after Judge Robert R. Merhige
Jr.’s decision in Bradley v. Board (1986) ended cross-town busing declaring the system
unitary, meaning it was no longer operating as a dual school system for blacks and
whites. Furthermore, the present study analyzed the management of RPS from 1986
through 2006 concerning the socio-economic conditions of a resegregated city. Twenty
years of management decisions, community reactions, demographic changes, academic
performance and related controversies from 1986 through 2006 were critically examined
to provide an analysis of how RPS grappled with the after effects of the court mandated
school desegregation process. The effort was to tell the story of how RPS and the
community (i.e., its educators, policy makers, residents, parents, former students and
others) responded to the end of the desegregation process between 1986 and 2006. The
decisions and actions of RPS under unitary status were examined to illustrate the history
after Judge Merhige’s 1986 decree. Moreover, conditions pertaining to race and class
were critically analyzed to help expand understanding and to clarify meaning of this
period.
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Research Questions
Research questions used to help drive the present study were:
1. What role did de jure and de facto school desegregation in Virginia play in the
development of RPS since 1986?
2. What was the relationship of race and class in the perception of people working in
RPS from 1986 through 2006?
3. How did people associated with RPS deal with the results of school desegregation
after the end of cross-town busing in 1986?

Historical Background
The 1954 United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
(Brown 1) stated that segregated schools deprive minority children of equal access to
education (Brown v. Board, 1954). From 1954 through 1959, the Brown decision met
“massive resistance” in Richmond, which reflected Virginia’s official political state-wide
posture of resisting the integration of public schools.
The “passive resistance” era of 1959 through 1970 prolonged school
desegregation. Deliberate decisions and actions taken by the Richmond Public School
Board to delay school desegregation prompted court intervention. In 1962, Bradley v.
Richmond School Board sought a racially nondiscriminatory school system in Richmond
with the elimination of dual attendance zones for black and whites. After minimal
success in the 1960’s with freedom of choice desegregation plans, Judge Merhige
suggested the feasibility of the voluntary consolidation of Richmond and the Counties of
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Chesterfield and Henrico into one single school district in 1970. This suggestion was in a
response to the outmigration of whites and middle-class blacks to neighboring counties.
Merhige’s suggestion met opposition, and in Bradley v. Board (1970) he
mandated Plan III to bus students across town to desegregate Richmond’s public schools.
Judge Merhige continued to seek the merger of the City of Richmond and the Counties of
Chesterfield and Henrico until it was rejected on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court in 1973. This upheld the U.S. 4th Circuit Court’s decision in Bradley v. Board,
(1973) to continue cross-town busing in Richmond. The results of the cross-town busing
process in Richmond exacerbated segregation and stymied the opportunities of a growing
black underclass. By 1986, RPS had become 87% black, and by default was no longer
operating as a dual system for blacks and whites; Judge Merhige declared the district a
unitary system in Bradley v. Board (1986), thus ending court mandated school
desegregation.

Findings

The intent of the present study was to help fill the gap in the literature pertaining
to RPS during the years of unitary status from 1986 through 2006. The analysis of
archival information, historical documents, interviewee testimony and important
secondary sources regarding this period yielded several findings. These findings were
presented through the critical analysis of primary documents such as school board
minutes, newspaper articles, court decisions, government documents, school board
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policies and directives, census data, student demographics and test scores and other
pertinent documents.

Preparations for Unitary Status
Measures were taken for managing a resegregated school system prior to Judge
Merhige’s Bradley v. Board (1986) court decree. The decisions made in preparation of
the district’s unitary status were important for transitioning from cross-town busing.
Prior to 1986, cross-town busing was reduced in two phases. The first phase resulted in
court-approved modifications to Plan III in Bradley v. Board (1970). The changes to
Plan III included the 1977 K-5 Plan allowing students of two elementary schools to
attend their neighborhood school, and the 1979 adaptation of Plan III into Plan G, which
consolidated 7 high schools into 3 complexes. In the second phase, RPS realigned their
Pupil Placement Plan in anticipation of Judge Merhige’s 1986 decision to end cross-town
busing in Richmond. By 1986, the district was no longer held as a dual system as it was
prior to cross-town busing. With the changeover to unitary status in 1986, the district set
out to redefine itself by attempting to recreate neighborhood schools for children to
attend in their attendance zones, which were previously divided for desegregation
purposes. Open enrollment for students to attend any school in the city was also
promoted from 1986 through 1991 to lure whites and middle-class blacks back to RPS.
These efforts were a reaction to the fact that by 1986, RPS had become 87% black and
60% impoverished.
Richmond Public School Board minutes document the marketing efforts of the
district to retain and attract white and middle-class black students during and after cross-
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town busing. Interviewee testimony provided information about Richmond’s open
enrollment policy and use of magnet and model schools that began in 1969 at John B.
Cary Model Elementary School and expanded in the late 1980’s during unitary status.
Magnet schools focused on career-oriented programs at the high school level, while
model schools were created in middle and elementary schools to promote different
educational themes. Cary, Fisher and Bellevue Model Elementary Schools were touted
as some of Richmond’s best schools during that time, while other schools were battling to
become neighborhood schools. However, families of school-aged children continued to
make house-purchasing decisions based on available schools as well as the class and
racial composition of neighborhood attendance zones. The evidence from census data,
interviewee accounts and local newspaper articles is consistent on how race factored into
the school choice decisions made by Richmond residents during this time. The
changeover to a unitary school system included five years of restructuring efforts to
reorganize the district after court mandated cross-town busing ended.

Marketing Conflict
From 1986 through 1991, RPS marketed their schools in two different ways.
First, they sought to retain and attract whites and middle-class blacks through the
promotion of neighborhood schools. Secondly, they were promoting open enrollment
policies for which students could attend schools outside of their neighborhood. The
concept of open enrollment was utilized by RPS to promote magnet and model school
programs at various schools throughout the district. By 1991, RPS balanced the two
marketing approaches due to the contradiction of promoting open enrollment schools and

193
the attempt of creating neighborhood schools in the city. In 1991, Superintendent Lucille
Brown reaffirmed the district’s position in support of the open enrollment model school
concept while embodying the neighborhood concept.
The two enrollment policies were the neighborhood school concept, which
assigned most students to the school in their attendance zone after cross-town busing
ended in 1986, and the open enrollment model school concept, which allowed students
the option of applying to schools outside of their attendance zone. While various
newspaper articles depicted an optimistic community perspective of the balancing of
these two contradictory enrollment policies, minimal integration occurred throughout the
district. Hence, the problem of balancing these two policies eventually led to the
misguided attempt of diversifying schools by clustering white students in separate
classrooms.
As described by interviewees, the stigma connected to RPS prevented these
policies from halting the resegregation that occurred in Richmond and its schools. In
turn, the efforts to overcome this stigma led to the publicly embarrassing fiasco of the
controversial clustering decision at Ginter Park and Bellevue Model Elementary School
in 1992. Ineffective management further complicated the matter, which continued to
diminish the possibility of diversifying the district.

Clustering Students by Race
The clustering of students by race at Ginter Park and Bellevue Model Elementary
Schools had a negative impact on RPS in 1992. The harsh debate between the
community and the school system of how to handle the situation damaged the district’s
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marketing efforts to attract whites to the city’s public schools. Media reports tarnished
what little diversity had been accomplished prior to the clustering of white students in
classrooms at Ginter Park and Bellevue. Richmond’s clustering gained national and
international attention that negatively affected public opinion of the city’s public schools,
which altered the school system’s efforts to appeal to underrepresented demographic
groups within and outside the district. Efforts to desegregate schools during the crosstown busing era as well as during the first five years of unitary status diminished after
this misguided decision. The negative attention stymied efforts by the district to attract
whites and middle-class blacks back to Richmond’s schools. Thereafter, redirection
became difficult for RPS with existing struggles hindering the management process.
The underlying causes of this situation were embedded in the school
desegregation efforts of the past. Socio-economic resegregation developed in Richmond
prior to the end of cross-town busing, and the hope of diversifying Richmond’s public
schools under unitary status diminished with Ginter Park and Bellevue’s misguided
efforts to bring racial diversity to their schools. Consequently, the mistake lessened the
appeal of the district for underrepresented demographic groups. Since cross-town busing
was court mandated in 1970, negative perceptions of RPS were perpetuated in the eyes of
those who had abandoned it. Based on widespread negative media coverage of the
clustering controversy, the public’s opinion that things had gone wrong once again in
RPS reemerged. Furthermore, the impact of this situation was coupled with the City of
Richmond’s economic disparities.
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Instable Management
The instability of RPS after the system was declared unitary in 1986 is shown by
the rapid turnover of superintendents, which created additional confusion and highlighted
the lack of clear direction. RPS had seven different superintendents during the twentyyear chronology of this study. Following the clustering controversy of 1992, many
different programs and initiatives were undertaken in a haphazard fashion. The programs
and initiatives implemented during the 1990’s were debilitated by the high turnover rate
in superintendents. During a three-year span, three different superintendents exemplified
the rapid changes and inconsistencies in leadership. Frequent administrative changes
negatively influenced the public’s opinion of RPS.
Richmond Public School Board minutes documented a multitude of redirection
efforts by RPS to escape the trials and tribulations of the past. Difficulties grew for the
district by the twenty first century, with several administrative interventions not proving
beneficial. Also, the beginning of the high-stakes testing era put greater stress on the
system to improve academic performance. By 2000, the poor spending practices of the
district along with rising school violence, truancy, increased dropout rates and low
student achievement were making a bad situation worse.

Demographic Shift
A demographic shift occurred in Richmond’s population between 1990 and 2000.
Census data revealed that de facto segregation was alive and well in housing patterns
throughout the city, with small sections of affluent whites and much larger sections of
poor blacks becoming the dominate patterns. Richmond’s demographic shift of the late
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twentieth century reflected changes in school enrollment, racial migration, poverty status
and median household incomes. Resulting from white flight, the majority of Richmond’s
public schools were now black and poor.
The intensified negative image of RPS was reflected in Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) census tract mapping of Richmond from 1980 through 2000. The
demographic changes from 1990 to 2000 were especially noteworthy. The city of
Richmond’s demographics shifted dramatically into a poor black majority with a few
white residential pockets. This is supported by personal accounts of interviewees who
witnessed Richmond’s increased demographic shift during the 1990’s.
By 2000, the poverty levels of Richmond’s public school children were
disparately greater than that of affluent children attending private schools in the city.
These disparities were clearly defined by city neighborhoods. Worsening the class divide
was the racial makeup of the majority black Richmond student body living below the
poverty line in households with lower median incomes than that of white students. The
substantiated demographic changes occurring at the end of the twentieth century gave
even more reason for RPS to implement programs and initiatives to improve the district.

Interventions
After local and state investigations into the efficiency and effectiveness of RPS
were completed, the district charted a new course and created a unified management
system for working with the school board. Interventions taken by RPS to address these
issues began with an administrative effectiveness investigation by the Council of Great
City Schools and an Efficiency Review by the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Finance
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Office. Interventions helped the district develop the Charting a New Course report and
several recommendations for creating a more functional school system. Improvements
were timely with accountability mandates from the state and federal government calling
for increased levels of student performance.
The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 mandated states, school systems
and individual schools meet Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) in nine different student
subgroups including racial and economically disadvantaged groups. Increased levels of
student performance on Standards of Learning (SOL) assessments and schools meeting
state and federal accountability measures occurred after 2003. Improvements in SOL
scores signified an academic upturn for RPS. However, the diversification of students by
race and class remained unchanged. The district was 89% black and 74% impoverished
in 2006. Still, by 2006, the number of schools accredited by the state and those meeting
AYP under NCLB increased; Richmond met the call with tremendous percentage
increases of schools achieving state accreditation and students meeting AYP standards.
However, the racial and class diversification of its schools and student body remained
unchanged.
Discussion

The critical analysis of RPS as a unitary system attempted to tell the story of postcourt mandated school desegregation in Richmond. The chronicled years of 1986
through 2006 pertaining to unitary status in RPS call for discussion. Resulting from the
research questions of this study is an expanded understanding of this period. Three main
conclusions may be drawn from the findings of the present study. They are as follows:
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1. In anticipation of Judge Merhige’s 1986 decision to end cross-town busing RPS
prepared for unitary status to the greatest extent possible given the existing
residential segregation in Richmond.
2. The stigma connected to RPS during the 1990’s led to the misguided attempt of
diversifying schools with racial clustering and a high turnover rate in
superintendents.
3. Despite the lack of integrated schools, cohesive management designed to improve
district needs helped RPS demonstrate a new level of academic success on
Standards of Learning (SOL) assessments by 2006.

Conclusion #1
In anticipation of Judge Merhige’s 1986 decision to end cross-town busing, RPS
prepared for unitary status to the greatest extent possible given the existing residential
segregation in Richmond. Efforts by RPS to integrate schools during the transition from
cross-town busing to unitary status reached a limit by 1991. Triangulation of interviews,
court decisions and school board minutes provide evidence of this conclusion. De jure
desegregation and de facto segregation in Virginia played a significant role in the
development of RPS. The socio-economic conditions of Richmond and its public schools
between 1986 and 2006 illustrate the impact of both de jure desegregation and de facto
segregation. Because of de facto segregation in the metropolitan area, which created a
predominately black population in Richmond, a limit was put on the district’s ability to
follow the spirit of desegregation law. For instance, efforts to prepare for unitary status
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prior to 1986 under de jure desegregation helped solve short-term problems; however, by
1991 the system was caught in a paradox of marketing schools internally against each
other and in turn, the efforts of RPS to follow court decisions resulted in contradictory
policies.

Anticipation of unitary status.
The anticipation of unitary status is reflected in the events leading up to the end of
cross-town busing in 1986. For instance, in response to declining enrollment due to the
abandonment of whites and middle-class blacks from Richmond and its public schools,
modifications were approved during the 1970’s to Plan III of Bradley v. Board (1970).
For example, Fox and Mary Munford Elementary were returned to neighborhood schools
under the K-5 Plan of 1977-78. In 1979, Plan G was adopted as a feeder plan system to
consolidate 7 high schools into 3 complexes. These court decisions were an effort to save
on busing costs and to create diversity in schools. In the years leading up to 1986, school
leaders debated with the school board and local advisory groups on how to handle the
changeover to unitary status. By 1986, de facto residential segregation was solidified,
illustrated by 1980 and 1990 Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapped census data.
Resegregated neighborhoods were established and the city’s schools were predominately
black and poor.
Unitary status was declared with the court ordered end of cross-town busing
(Bradley v. Board, 1986) sixteen years after it began (Bradley v. Board, 1970). Legally
speaking, RPS was no longer operating a dual school system for blacks and whites;
nevertheless, the city’s schools were resegregated by 1986. Interviewee testimony and
news articles described the transition from cross-town busing to unitary status as a
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prepared and focused approach to restructuring the district. The court’s decree that RPS
had achieved unitary status meant the letter of the law was followed by no longer
operating as a dual school system for blacks and whites. However, the spirit of the law
was not achieved due to the consequential and unbalanced demographics of the district.
In other words, the process of attempting to desegregate schools led to a resegregation of
the city, which created distinguishable black and white neighborhoods throughout
Richmond. Predominately white neighborhoods sending their children to local private
schools instead of their neighborhood school motivated Richmond public school leaders
to market schools to those parents. On the other hand, the predominately black
neighborhoods lacked diversity in their schools because white students were no longer
bused out of their neighborhoods into a black neighborhood school across town. The
promotion of neighborhood schools, especially in predominately white neighborhoods,
was a direct effort to bring back the whites that had left during cross-town busing.

Actions during unitary status.
During the first five years after court mandated school desegregation ended,
actions were taken by RPS to improve the district. Extraordinary efforts were made to
diversify schools under the unitary status decree; however, the socio-economic realities
faced by RPS made this difficult. RPS developed a Pupil Re-assignment plan for most
students to attend their neighborhood schools with minimal busing needed. In 1986, RPS
sought further financial relief from the courts during the changeover process. The
adjustment period was difficult, and RPS grappled with several problems during the first
five years under unitary status. RPS spent a great deal of time and effort trying to get a
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foothold, and to align itself with the changing dynamics of city policies. The attraction of
private schools in the city made the task of retaining white and middle-class blacks
increasingly difficult. After a superintendent change in 1989, the restructuring of RPS
became the focus of the district instead of the political shenanigans that were negatively
impacting public opinion. Superintendent Jones’ reorganization plan of 1991 promoted
the development of model schools and schools with magnet and model programs. These
touted schools under Richmond’s open enrollment policy forced the district to literally
compete against its neighborhood school policy. The attempt of RPS to address the
internal marketing of its neighborhood and open enrollment schools was seemingly the
best approach it could take given the socio-economic conditions of the city.
The policy of establishing model schools at the elementary level after unitary
status was declared in 1986 contradicted the motives of the neighborhood school concept
already in place. For instance, the model schools that were created after cross-town
busing ended were in predominately black neighborhoods (Binford Middle, Fisher and
Bellevue Elementary). This concept was meant to lure whites to these schools to create a
diverse student body. The promotion of magnet schools in the late 1980’s, as well as
successes at the Governor’s School, Open and Community High Schools were also used
as marketing strategies by the district. In addition, model school programs were
implemented in nine different elementary schools by 1991. The open enrollment policy
that was in place for model schools and schools with model school programs allowed for
parents in Richmond to send their children to any public school in the city. The problem
that followed was the battle between schools to enroll students either in their
neighborhood schools, in model schools or in a school with a model school program
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across town. For example, Mary Munford Elementary acquired a model school program
in 1991, and after a decade of trying to bring whites back to their former neighborhood
school, it eventually became a desired school for students throughout the city. In turn,
this stimulated an influx of affluent whites to its neighborhood, and an enrollment waiting
list for students throughout the city. Consequently, the popularity of Mary Munford
affected the enrollment interests of city residents to nearby and once revered John B.
Cary Model Elementary School. The contradiction in terms of enrollment policy had to
be clarified by Superintendent Lucille Brown in 1991. The district stood behind both
policies in an effort to gain from the marketing approach of their internal conflict.
However, the reorganizing of the district was confronted with socio-economic
ramifications stemming from the school desegregation process of 1954 through 1986.

Conclusion #2
The stigma connected to RPS during the 1990’s led to the misguided attempt of
diversifying schools with racial clustering and a high turnover rate in superintendents.
The clustering of students by race at Ginter Park and Bellevue Model Elementary
Schools sparked controversy in the community, rehashing a past stigma of deep-rooted
racial and class division in RPS. Thereafter, inconsistent management practices between
1993 and 2003 resulted in a high turnover rate in superintendents. Based on the analysis
of primary sources such as school board minutes, newspaper articles, superintendent’s
reports and interviewee accounts, the recurrence of negative perceptions regarding the
values and behaviors of RPS entered the community. The historically entrenched stigma
of deep-rooted racial and class division associated with RPS resurfaced after this publicly

203
drawn-out ordeal unfolded in the media. The situation significantly impacted the
district’s marketing momentum of 1986 through 1991 for diversifying the schools by race
and class. Furthermore, after this fiasco, five different superintendents served over an
eleven-year period and three during a three-year span. The district’s management
inconsistencies were perpetuated with several different approaches for trying to establish
redirection.

Misguided attempt to diversify schools.
The historical practices of families resisting the desegregation of Richmond’s
public schools seemingly led to the ill-advised attempt of Ginter Park and Bellevue to
bring diversity to their schools by clustering white students in the same classrooms.
Since court mandated school desegregation began in 1970, many whites and some
middle-class blacks moved out of the city or sent their children to private schools. The
restructuring efforts of the district during the five years after cross-town busing ended
brought about various attempts to diversify the schools. The inability of these policies to
attract the desired demographic groups set the stage for the ill-fated clustering of white
students in classrooms at Ginter Park and Bellevue. Essentially, the intent of making
RPS desirable to whites materialized into the clustering fiasco at these elementary
schools. Inconsistent management began immediately after the Richmond Public School
Board became aware that Bellevue Principal Sylvia Richardson was clustering white
students in the same classrooms. The dispute between Principal Richardson and
Superintendent Brown demonstrated inconsistent policy interpretation. Richardson
justified her decision to cluster students by race based on section 8.20 of the district’s
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Bylaws and Policies concerning the social and emotional well being of students. Brown
adamantly refuted Richardson’s policy interpretation. Allegations and reports of
clustering cases at other city schools began to circulate in the media, but Brown
dismissed these cases after she conducted a three-day investigation. Soon thereafter, the
Chairman of the Richmond School Board announced that clustering was also taking place
at Ginter Park Elementary School. This raised the questions as to whether more cases
were occurring in the district, unbeknownst to Brown and the school board.
Attempting to resolve the matter at Bellevue, Brown did not feel Richardson
provided a professional response for viably rectifying the situation. Negative media
reports fueled the controversy, and parents began speaking out about the issue. Opinions
varied throughout the community on whether to cease clustering at the end of the
semester or school year. To the misfortune of district efforts to resolve the situation
quickly, a procedural loophole was found. As a result, the decision making process was
drawn out for another month. After an internationally publicized public hearing was
held, drudging up the history of school desegregation in Richmond, a decision was made
to end clustering immediately.
Clustering students by race rehashed a deep-rooted stigma of RPS. Once the
previous goal of bringing white and middle-class black families back to city schools was
diminished with the mismanagement of the clustering controversy, the possibility of
achieving an integrated district under unitary status appeared even less attainable. The
clustering controversy was a defining moment, leaving an indelible mark on the district’s
attempts at diversification in a de facto segregated city. Capping off the clustering case
was the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) finding that RPS violated the Civil Rights Act of
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1964 by discriminating on the basis of race. Later, the OCR concluded that RPS had
resolved the matter, not withstanding the stigma accompanying the process. The creation
of culturally isolated city schools after this incident was emblematic of the paradigm shift
that climaxed after cross-town busing ended in 1986. Deep-rooted racial and class
division continued to rehash itself.

High turnover rate in superintendents.
Over a decade of evidence from 1993 through 2003 illustrates the inconsistent
management practices that followed the 1992 clustering controversy. Despite attempts
by several different superintendents to control the issue and move forward, instability
within RPS resulted. In an effort to redirect RPS after the clustering fiasco,
Superintendent Brown and the school board hired a task force to address district
operations. A needs assessment generated by the task force spawned many programs and
initiatives that were of merit; however, inconsistencies prevailed in the streamlining of
efforts between the school board, community and the different superintendent regimes
that followed Brown’s. From 1995 through 2002, RPS had four different
superintendents. Each superintendent had a different approach for addressing district
needs. Quarrels and controversies between superintendents, school boards and
employees added to the complexity of moving on from the instability of the past.
Since the end of cross-town busing in 1986 through unitary status in 2006, RPS
had seven different superintendents. They were Dr. Lois Harrison-Jones (1985-1988),
Dr. James W. Tyler (1988-1989), Dr. Albert Jones (1989-1991), Dr. Lucille M. Brown
(1991-1995), Dr. Patricia Conn (1995-1997), Dr. Albert Williams (1997-2002) and Dr.
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Deborah Jewell-Sherman (2002-2006). Their average term was less than three years;
more poignantly, during the eleven years following the clustering cases, RPS had five
different superintendents and three within a three-year span. The high turnover rate in
district leadership began after Brown’s efforts to redirect the district were unsuccessful;
she retired early. Conn was hired in 1995, and amid controversy was dismissed from her
position in less than two years. Williams took over in 1997, and even with his five-year
stay, the high turnover rate of the position led to the reputation that RPS was difficult to
manage and the school board was viewed as hard to work with. Complaints about
favoritism in hiring practices of upper administrative positions were prevalent. In 2002,
Deborah Jewell-Sherman was hired and began her tenure as superintendent that
continued through the end of the present study.
In the middle of these superintendent changes, the state Standards of Learning
(SOL) academic performance assessments were implemented in 1998. RPS had to
comply with SOL testing and face public scrutiny for not meeting expected accreditation
standards. By this time, RPS reflected an increasingly lower socio-economic
demographic group, which magnified the district’s problems to the outside community.
For instance, in 1998 no schools were accredited and in 1999, only three schools met
state accreditation standards.
Mismanagement lurked into the twenty-first century. Issues such as money
management, high arrest rates of students, rising truancy and dropout rates, and low
academic performance were prevalent. According to interviewees, the byproducts of the
school desegregation process still loomed in the hearts and minds of Richmond residents.
Faulty spending and accounting practices, such as costly expenses for buildings with low
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student enrollment compounded the situation. Misleading school violence reports by the
media also added to the stigma of RPS. For instance, in 2002 statistics on fighting from
the State Department of Education had no clear delineation between what constituted as a
fight and an assault; however, reports portrayed RPS as more violent compared to
Chesterfield and Henrico Counties based on undefined figures. In addition to the high
turnover rate of superintendents were high levels of truancy and low student
achievement. RPS was desperate for finding a solution to this untimely downturn.

Conclusion #3
Despite the lack of integrated schools, cohesive management designed to
improve district needs helped RPS demonstrate a new level of academic success on SOL
assessments by 2006. Improvements in the district’s business operations in 2003 led to
greater academic success thereafter. Triangulation of primary sources including census
data, interviewee testimony and SOL data add credibility to this conclusion. By 2000,
the demographics of the City of Richmond stabilized leaving RPS with a largely poor
black majority. Academic improvements began with cohesive management practices
specifically designed to efficiently and effectively address district needs and student
achievement on the SOL assessments. In 2003, RPS underwent efficiency and
effectiveness investigations to improve business operations for student achievement. The
district suffered from inconsistent direction until management improvements were made
in 2003, which turned RPS into an academically improving district, as defined by SOL
scores. Essentially, the high-stakes testing era, including state and federal accountability
measures on SOL assessments set forth by No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2001,
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provided RPS with a simple goal to achieve as a district. However, divisions of race and
class remained in the city and the persistence of school resegregation remained.

Changing population patterns.
Richmond experienced demographic changes in its population trends during and
after school desegregation. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) census tract mapping
illustrated the population changes between 1980 and 2000 for the present study. Evident
by the white flight and declining tax base of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the mapping data in
this study illuminated the resegregation of Richmond and demographic shifts of the
school system as of 1980. By 1986, RPS was grappling with socio-economic obstacles
that were hindering academic improvement. The population patterns for both blacks and
whites stabilized during the 1990’s after drastic demographic shifts during school
desegregation occurred. The predominately black student body in the city schools was
solidified. This demographic settlement occurred during the decade after cross-town
busing ended. By 2000, the number of white people living in poverty within the city
limits of Richmond decreased sharply. Poverty stricken black people living in the city
increased. Race and class impacted where people were living and sending their children
to school.
Consequently, the already limited diversity in the district dissipated with
inconsistent management and low student achievement. Interest lagged for many whites
and middle-class blacks to send their children to a Richmond public school, especially
one with a high percentage of students who were black and of a lower socio-economic
status. During the 1990’s, the intensification of poor socio-economic conditions in the
city enhanced the public’s negative opinion of the district. As a result, little hope
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remained in attracting whites and middle-class blacks back to the district. Segregation by
race was evolving into segregation by class, evident by the concentration of poverty in
Richmond from 1990 to 2000.
In 2001, NCLB brought forth federally mandated state-wide standardized testing
and Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) measures for student performance. In 2002, RPS
strategically began seeking solutions to overcome the impact of poor socio-economic
conditions on student achievement. The Title I schools in Richmond faced the possibility
of federal sanctions if Annual Measurable Objectives (AMO) were not met in all nine
demographic subgroups for math and reading. Given the changing population patterns,
RPS set out to make improvements.

Implemented interventions for improvements.
After the Council of the Great City Schools and the Governor’s office conducted
effectiveness and efficiency reviews of the school system, a hands-on-detailed oriented
approach was created to meet management and curriculum objectives. Misdirected
efforts under the six previous superintendent regimes helped create district instability
since unitary status was declared in 1986.
Strategic administrative interventions in 2002 began the process of addressing
SOL standards. A commitment was made by the district to change the educational
culture through management operations and student performance. In one school year, the
number of schools accredited by the state went from 11 to 23. In 2002, the district also
developed a facilities master plan to prioritize school building needs for creating
attractive school environments. In addition, The Council of the Great City Schools
investigated the effectiveness of RPS and provided a report for the district entitled:
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“Charting a New Course for the Richmond Public Schools.” The findings of the report
suggested systematic changes for increasing student achievement. Twenty-seven key
recommendations were made by The Council to improve on curriculum and instruction,
Title I and other Federal Programming and special education needs. Meaningful reform
policy was created from these recommendations to enhance successful intervention
programs for improving student achievement. For instance, the Partnership for
Achieving Successful Schools (PASS) program positively impacted students and schools.
In 2003, RPS was selected by Governor Mark Warner of Virginia to undergo a
School Efficiency Review. The review yielded an identification of areas where
administrative savings could be found through non-instructional expenditures. The
outcome allowed RPS to put back over $2.1 million dollars into the classrooms. Twentyseven recommendations from the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Secretary of Finance
were provided to RPS for capitalizing on these savings. From these recommendations, a
simplified management system focused on resources and relationships to improve student
performance on SOL assessments was created. After the implementation of these
recommendations, more resources were redirected into the classrooms for instructional
purposes. Additionally, by 2005 the dropout rate decreased to 2.46%, down from 15.27%
in 2003. The adoption of the Community Education Partnership (CEP) program aided
this progress by providing alternative programming for students with disciplinary or
academic problems. Since efficiency and effectiveness actions were taken by RPS,
student performance became the district’s focus. The transformation of the district’s
business practices allowed for greater emphasis to be put on the academic needs of the
students.
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In 2005, a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) was signed by the
Richmond Public School Board and given to the Virginia Department of Education for
district improvement. In response to the MOU, RPS utilized the essential actions
prescribed by The Council of Great City Schools Report to develop a Balanced Scorecard
(BSC) for charting its course. The strategic management approach implemented by RPS
created a management system for translating its mission and vision into action. By
utilizing “Charting the Course,” business principles were applied to the district, which
resulted in improved student achievement. The 2005 Council of the Great City Schools
study entitled: “Beating the Odds,” presented the total number of state accredited schools
in Richmond increasing over three year from 18% to 76%. By 2006, the percentage of
Richmond’s state accredited public schools had risen to 88%. Also, by 2006, 82% of
Richmond’s public schools met AYP standards set forth by NCLB. Seemingly the
accountability measures of NCLB were allowing RPS to flourish academically. The
district as a whole did make AYP in 2005; however, in 2006, it only missed the mark in
the limited English proficiency subgroup for reading. In 2006, RPS scored above state
averages in four of the nine-subgroup categories.
Still, the stabilization of district management practices and student achievement
was hindered by controversy and low academic performance at some schools in 2005 and
2006. For example, in 2005 it was found that 141 SOL answers were changed at Oak
Grove Elementary, thus creating doubt about the legitimacy of academic improvements
made in RPS. Also, in 2006, Chandler Middle School faced federal sanctions due to their
inability to make AYP for six straight years. Public debate over how to handle truancy
was another issue impacting the perception of RPS. The unchanging demographics of
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RPS were most notably hindering the appeal of the city schools for whites and middleclass blacks that, for the most part, were continuing to stay away from the city’s public
schools. Membership totals reflected an 89% black school system, of which nearly 75%
were impoverished. Improvements on SOL assessments did not change the wellestablished resegregation throughout the city’s schools.
To conclude, by 2006 the high-stakes testing era, consisting of state and federal
mandates for increased student performance on SOL assessments set forth by NCLB,
provided RPS with the opportunity to achieve at something, given their unsuccessful
attempts of school integration. By 2001, AYP regulations by the federal government
forced RPS to make improvements. This accountability brought forth the task of meeting
Annual Measurable Objectives (AMO’s) for math and reading on SOL assessments for
nine different demographic subgroups. By 2003, the goal of the district as a whole was to
significantly improve SOL scores and to achieve state accreditation. Based on the
analysis of data sources, RPS accomplished this goal. The district’s increased academic
achievements on SOL assessments helped RPS gain some rare public approval, during an
era where student performance on high-stakes tests measured school success.
It seems that Richmond’s public schools benefited from the high-stakes testing
era, despite the poor socio-economic conditions of the district. The post-court mandated
school desegregation era of RPS is filled with trials and tribulations of attempting to
integrate schools, working to establish direction and efforts to increase student
achievement. After being declared a unitary system in 1986, RPS attempted to market
and diversify schools while grappling with the increased socioeconomic resegregation of
the city. The efforts of RPS to maintain direction during the 1990’s were met with
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stigmatizing controversies and a rapid turnover rate in superintendents. Finally, at the
turn of the twenty-first century, the high-stakes testing era created a need for systematic
changes for improving student performance. Interventions for cohesive management
between the school board and superintendent were established and “best practices” for
teachers were implemented to focus on academic improvements. Thereafter, RPS turned
into an academically improving district, at least as defined by SOL scores, yet they
remained a resegregated system.
In addition to the complexities driving RPS to meet accountability standards of
the 2001 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, the human factor was the impetus behind
district improvements. By 2003, the United States Department of Education (USDOE)
standards based accountability system led RPS to view SOL assessments as an integral
part of instruction and as a tool for enhancing learning. Federal and state pressure to
succeed on SOL assessments created a difficult situation for RPS’s precarious
management system, which was a result of previous leadership inconsistencies.
However, the educational culture of RPS changed in 2003 under the leadership of Dr.
Deborah Jewell-Sherman Richmond’s seventh superintendent since cross-town busing
ended in 1986. Jewell-Sherman set out to improve SOL scores by turning the district’s
management system around. Her leadership helped create a culture of continuous
commitment for student success.
Tremendous improvements in business operations for financial management were
made over the next three years. An effective and efficient management system led by
Jewell-Sherman helped put more money into classrooms for student achievement. The
district embraced her vision of an excuse free education with high expectations for all
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students. Improving student achievement by developing, implementing and continuously
evaluating a rigorous and cohesive curriculum complete with formative assessments for
academic success became the number one goal of RPS. The strategic gathering of
information, by educational leaders in the district, to improve instructional decisions
helped RPS demonstrate academic success on SOL assessments by 2006. Superintendent
Jewell-Sherman and her administrative staff demonstrated quality educational leadership
during a demanding period. Former school board member and interviewee, “Mr.
Higgins” encapsulates how administrative leadership helped turn around RPS:
In a system where teachers and principals had all wrote off a huge
percentage of the kids, all of a sudden now the attitude was that our goal is
to get everybody across the finish line.... I saw first hand how [NCLB and
SOL’s] were transforming Richmond Public Schools from a system that
felt that kids who were poor and came from families whose parents had
dropped out or their mothers had dropped out of school and we can’t do
anything to improve this situation, into this attitude that we can do it…and
we did (Higgins, 2008).
As a final point, metropolitan school consolidation is seemingly still the most
viable solution for integrating public schools in Richmond. The continued outmigration
of many whites and middle-class blacks from RPS, since cross-town busing ended in
1986, gives reason for this argument. As proposed by Judge Robert R. Merhige Jr. in
Bradley v. Board (1971), the merger of Chesterfield, Henrico and Richmond school
districts would create a racial and socioeconomic mix within the metropolitan area public
schools. However, the current Law of Virginia Code 22-30 states: “No school division
shall be composed of more than one county or city” (Virginia Code, 1971, § 22.1-25). It
is necessary to re-visit the General Assembly’s 1971 decision on Article VIII, Section V
of the Constitution of Virginia, entitled the “Powers and Duties of the Board of
Education”. A revision is needed to the statement that “the power to operate, maintain
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and supervise public schools in Virginia is, and has always been, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the local school boards and not within the jurisdiction of the State Board of
Education” (Va. Const., Article VIII, Section V).
The socio-economic consequences conveyed in this study’s critical analysis of
post-court mandated school desegregation in RPS provide justification for reconsidering
metropolitan consolidation. The implications of school desegregation on the Richmond
metropolitan area make the case for merging Chesterfield, Henrico and Richmond school
districts. However, approving the merger of these school districts requires changing the
Commonwealth of Virginia’s historical tradition with respect to its establishment and
operation of schools. Nonetheless, the Richmond metropolitan area has a collective
responsibility to address inner city decay and the negative implications of school
desegregation on RPS. The opportunity to deal with concentrated poverty and
resegregation in Richmond would be possible under the control of a single school board
for Chesterfield, Henrico and Richmond public schools. Metropolitan consolidation is
the most practical equalitarian concept for school integration.

Comparisons with Literature
Prior to this study, historical treatment of events in the Richmond public schools
after unitary status was declared in 1986 was limited. This study attempted to help fill
the gap in the literature by providing historical analysis of the twenty years after unitary
status was declared by Judge Robert R. Merhige Jr. in Bradley v. Board (1986).
The present study was built on the case study conducted by Johnson, McGrath,
and Williams (1989) entitled: Richmond Public Schools: A Citizens’ Perspective. Their
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study on the citizens’ perspective of the district provided an outline for the present
study’s historical research methods. The conclusions drawn from the research questions
of the present study add depth to Johnson, McGrath, and William’s research of unitary
status in RPS. Additionally, the timeline of events derived from the present study
confirms and builds upon the history chronicled by Callihan (1992): A Mini-History of
the Richmond Public Schools 1869-1992. The information analyzed from sources such
as school board minutes and Superintendent Reports in the present study add to the
history noted in the latter years of her report (1986 through 1992). Furthermore, the
present study critically analyzed the findings of those 6 years and an additional 14 years
(1993 through 2006) to provide a twenty-year comprehensive view of RPS (1986 through
2006). The demographic settlement patterns impacting the socio-economic conditions
found in the present study enhance Craver (1993) Black Richmonders’ Experience with
School Segregation and Desegregation: An Oral History Project at Virginia
Commonwealth University. The conclusions drawn from the interviews of the present
study complement Craver’s (1993) conclusion that some gains were had for blacks during
desegregation, while still a sense of community was lost during this process. The
perspectives of people from 1986 through 2006 in Richmond continued the series of
personal accounts compiled by Craver (1993), illustrating the difficulties that impacted
the community and school system during this time.
The present study also supplements the work of Philipsen (1999): Values-Spoken
and Values-Lived: Race and the Cultural Consequences of a School Closing. The social
and cultural consequences of school desegregation described in Philipsen’s study tie into
the present study’s analysis. Similar to the Richmond community, the ramifications of
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desegregation, school closings and cross-town busing in the small rural community
studied by Philipsen, had a profound effect on the schooling and academic achievement
of black students. These consequences, albeit in a larger community, were evident during
Richmond’s transitional years from cross-town busing to unitary status. This study’s
analysis of Richmond’s response to the high stakes testing era that began at the time
Philipsen’s study ended, added another dimension to the discussion. The present study
demonstrated the efforts of RPS to make the most of the academic opportunities given the
social consequences that weakened the black neighborhoods, as stated in Philipsen’s
work. The redirection efforts embarked upon by RPS, after the deep-rooted stigma of the
district was rehashed in 1992, demonstrated the daunting task of overcoming the social
consequences described by Philipsen. Ultimately, this present study found the process of
addressing these issues resulted in an emergence of an academically improving district
amidst a persistently resegregated city.
Adding to the existing body of knowledge is specific documentation about RPS
and the forces that shaped resegregation in the city. For instance, John Moeser’s (1981)
book entitled: A Virginia Profile 1960-2000: Assessing Current Trends and Problems
only predicted specific socio-economic factors affecting education in Richmond for
1982-2000. However, the hypotheses of Moeser (1981) are confirmed by 1980-2000
census data of school enrollment, racial migration, poverty status and median household
income mapped in the present study. Conclusions drawn from this evidence support the
predictions of Moeser and clarify meaning to the impact of these socio-economic factors
on RPS during unitary status.
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Moeser and Dennis’ (1982), The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a
Southern City only examined the limitations of the 1970 annexation of Chesterfield
County through a political, social and economic lens. John Moeser and Rutledge Dennis’
(1982) book neglected the educational impact of annexation on RPS. Furthermore, the
present study delved deeper into the ramifications of school desegregation and the socioeconomic effects on RPS in the years after 1986. The restrictions found in the present
study regarding Richmond’s efforts to address school desegregation after 1986 correlate
directly with Moeser and Dennis’ (1982) research up until this point in history.
An example of a published report ending its research at the time the present study
begins is Gary Orfield, Franklin Monfort, and Melissa Aaron’s (1989) Status of School
Desegregation 1968-1986: Segregation, Integration, and Public Policy: National, State
and Metropolitan Trends in Public Schools. The present study began where Orfield,
Monfort and Aaron left off, and further analyzed trends of resegregation throughout
Richmond. The specific socio-economic parallels that Richmond underwent since the
end of their study relate directly to the residential patterns of the city since the end of
cross-town busing. Additionally, the present study examined Orfield’s et al., (1989)
research of the district’s attempts to move forward as a declared unitary school system.
Another study that ended at the point the present study began is Daniel Arkin’s
(1991) dissertation on Regime Politics Surrounding Desegregation Decision-Making
During Massive Resistance in Richmond, Virginia. The present study provided a critical
analysis of twenty years after RPS was declared unitary, which Arkin (1991) briefly
touched upon through his depiction of the school desegregation process from 1954
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through 1986. The present study’s conclusions illustrated the effects, outlined by Arkin,
regarding the impact of Richmond’s political regime on RPS during unitary status.
Most importantly, the aim of the present study continued the historical analysis of
Robert Pratt’s (1992) The Color of Their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond,
Virginia 1954-1989. The critical analysis of the present study directly connected with
Pratt’s research from 1954 to 1989. Pratt’s conclusions that busing students within the
city prior to 1986 fell short, and the three years thereafter were filled with challenges to
deal with unitary status, were confirmed by the present study’s findings and conclusions.
Furthermore, Pratt’s analysis of material from 1986 to 1989 was subject to further
examination through 2006. For instance, the present study confirmed the
experimentation with magnet schools Pratt defined in his research as potential luring
mechanisms for whites to come back into the city. Additionally, Pratt pointed out that
people had concerns about the magnet school concept in that it would eventually lead to
socio-economic segregation within RPS. This belief came to fruition with the climatic
clustering controversy of 1992 that was a direct effort by Ginter Park and Bellevue Model
Elementary to counteract the racial segregation that was still occurring in RPS. These
misguided efforts of RPS to diversify its schools after cross-town busing resegregated
them led to further disparities in class status across the city. Segregation by race and
class prevailed even greater thereafter. Unfortunately, the situation rehashed the deeprooted stigma of RPS and diminished its already low appeal to whites and middle-class
blacks with inconsistent management during rapid turnover in superintendents. Not until
business practices and student achievement were addressed in 2003, did the academic
achievement of RPS begin to increase. Subsequently, the present study, in conjunction
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with the historical background established by Pratt (1989), helped tell the story of RPS as
a unitary school system.
Finally, the research of Christopher Silver and John Moeser (1995) in their book
The Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South 1940-1968, was useful for the
present study’s demographic analysis of RPS as a unitary school system. The present
study utilized Silver and Moeser’s (1995) research to address the neighborhood school
situations that were controversial during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The precarious
state of Richmond’s black separate city in 1995 described by Silver and Moeser (1995) is
confirmed through interviewee testimony and demographic changes found in the present
study. The transformation process of RPS into a unitary school system, given increased
segregation of the black community, was expanded upon in the present study.

Limitations to the Present Study
The limitations of this study include the following choices by the researcher. The
researcher chose to only look at perceptions of those individuals who directly worked in
or were affiliated with RPS during the time period of 1986 through 2006. Thus, only a
system’s level approach of the research was taken of how the history of school
desegregation impacted the unitary status of RPS from 1986 through 2006. The
researcher only chose to examine historical information and archival data directly related
to RPS between 1986 and 2006 from a district standpoint, thus limiting the depth of data
at school based levels. The data analyzed by the researcher only consisted of the
resulting conditions of RPS related to the end of cross-town busing in 1986. The
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researchers also only chose to focus on the impact felt on RPS without any direct
comparisons made with the neighboring counties of Chesterfield and Henrico.

The Need for Further Study
Further investigation of unitary status in Richmond is suggested by the researcher
to provide additional insight about RPS during this period. For instance, the specific
impact of the events depicted in the present study at the school and classroom level could
provide more conclusions about RPS as a unitary system. Poverty ratios and student
performance could also be studied further to determine the achievement levels of students
in RPS based on similar or differing demographics given post-court mandated school
desegregation effects found in this study. Greater analysis of Standards of Learning
(SOL) data could generate further conclusions about the impact of high-stakes testing on
RPS. Further analysis of individual school’s achievement levels and their history since
the end of cross-town busing could provide more meaning to schools’ academic
improvements on SOL’s as well. Also, comparisons with surrounding county school
systems to study the impact of school desegregation on the entire Richmond metropolitan
area would provide a greater scope of socio-economic implications on the region.
Additionally, a continuation of this study after 2006 would be beneficial for continuing
the story of RPS as a unitary school system.
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Appendix A
Initial Introduction Letter
Date
Dear Mr. /Ms. /Dr.,
Hello, my name is Joshua Cole. As a doctoral student in the School of Education at
Virginia Commonwealth University, I am writing this letter to you as an introduction of
myself and of my research.
I am currently an Assistant Principal at Hening Elementary School in Chesterfield. Prior
to my current position, I taught at Chalkley Elementary School, where I received the
National Milken Educator Award in ‘06. After teaching in Detroit and graduating with
my Masters from Wayne State University in ‘02, I moved to Virginia to pursue my PhD.
My current research is focused on the Richmond Public School system and the post
school desegregation time period of 1986 to 2006. I have discovered that since 1986,
there has been little documented analysis about the state of the Richmond Public School
system as it pertains to the post-cross-town busing era. Starting with the Brown v. Board
of Education decision of 1954 and continuing through the court case of Bradley v. School
Board of 1986 there has been a great deal of documentation. However, very little
research has been done regarding what has transpired within the Richmond Public School
system since 1986. Thus, perspectives on this recent era will be the focus of my study.
Please know that I will be formally requesting your participation in my study via phone
and/or email in 1-2 weeks. In the meantime, please consider the possibility of being
interviewed by me for this study.
If you have any questions or concerns at this time or in the future, please feel free to
contact me via phone or email. Also, if you have any questions or concerns about your
rights as a possible participant you may contact the following office:
Office of Research
Virginia Commonwealth University
800 East Leigh Street
Suite 113
P.O Box 980568
Richmond, VA. 23298
(804) 827-2157
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Joshua P. Cole
(804) 677-8768
joshua_cole@ccpsnet.net
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Appendix B
Interview Questions
1. How many years have you been associated with the Richmond Public School
system and in what capacity (ies)?
2. Has the topic of school desegregation in Richmond ever come up amongst people
you know? If so, what was said?
3. How did the desegregation process between 1954 and 1986 affect you?
4. How did it affect other people you know?
5. What role do you think school desegregation decisions from 1954 to 1986 in
Virginia played in the development of the Richmond Public School system since
1986?
6. How do you think history has shaped the present time?
7. How do you think Richmond Public Schools have dealt with the results of school
desegregation since the end of cross-town busing in 1986?
8. How do you think the issues of race and class have affected the perceptions of the
people working in the Richmond Public School system?
9. How do you feel the desegregation process of 1954 to 1986 impacted the students
in the Richmond Public School system during that time period?
10. How do you feel the students attending Richmond Public Schools at the time
cross-town busing ended in 1986 were impacted?
11. How do you feel today’s students are affected by what has happened in the past?
12. Any final thoughts on the last twenty years of the Richmond Public School
system as it relates to the post desegregation process?
Use the phrase “Tell me about” whenever they lead into a discussion.
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Appendix C
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM
TITLE:

The Richmond Public School System 1986 to 2006: Post School
Desegregation Era

VCU IRB NO.:

HM11335

This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask the study
staff to explain any words that you do not clearly understand. You may take home an
unsigned copy of this consent form to think about or discuss with family or friends before
making your decision.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to tell the story of how the Richmond Public School
community responded to desegregation between 1986 and 2006.
You are being asked to participate in this study because you are considered a key
informant for the period in question.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT
If you decide to be in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form after
you have had all your questions answered and understand what will happen to you.
In this study you will be asked to participate in one interview that will last approximately
30-45 minutes. You are one of 18 people who have received a request for an interview.
During the interview, you will be asked approximately 10-15 questions pertaining to the
purpose of this study. You will have the opportunity to talk about your perspective and
experiences as they relate to the purpose of this study. The interview will be digitally
recorded so we are sure to get your complete answers. but no names of participants will
be recorded.
Significant new findings developed during the course of the research, which may relate to
your willingness to continue participation will be provided to you.
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Sometimes talking about this subject causes people to become upset. Several questions
address potentially unpleasant issues. You do not have to talk about any subject you do
not want to talk about, and you may leave or stop the interview at any time.
BENEFITS TO YOU AND OTHERS
You may not get any direct benefit from this study.
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COSTS
There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend in
answering the interviewer’s questions.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Potentially identifiable information about you will consist of interview notes and
recordings, audiotapes of consultations and interviews. Data is being collected only for
research purposes. The data obtained will be identified by name. Audiotapes will be
kept in a locked file cabinet for 1 year after the study ends and will be destroyed at that
time. Transcribed data included in the final research study will be kept indefinitely.
Information from the study and the consent form signed by you may be looked at or
copied for research or legal purposes by Virginia Commonwealth University.
What we find from this study may be presented at meetings or published in papers and
other scholarly documents.
The digital recordings and the notes will be stored in a locked cabinet. After the
information from the recordings is typed up, the recordings will be erased.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at
any time without any penalty. You may also choose not to answer particular questions
that are being asked in the study.
Your participation in this study may be stopped at any time by the study staff without
your consent. The reasons might include:
 the study staff thinks it necessary for your health or safety;
 administrative reasons require your withdrawal.
QUESTIONS
In the future, you may have questions about your participation in this study. If you have
any questions, complaints, or concerns about the research, contact:
Maike Philipsen, Ph.D.
Virginia Commonwealth University
School of Education
804-827-2630
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may
contact:
Office for Research
Virginia Commonwealth University
800 East Leigh Street, Suite 113
P.O. Box 980568
Richmond, VA 23298
Telephone: 804-827-2157
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You may also contact this number for general questions, concerns or complaints about
the research. Please call this number if you cannot reach the research team or wish to talk
to someone else. Additional information about participation in research studies can be
found at http://www.research.vcu.edu/irb/volunteers.htm.
CONSENT
I have been given the chance to read this consent form. I understand the information
about this study. Questions that I wanted to ask about the study have been answered. My
signature says that I am willing to participate in this study. I will receive a copy of the
consent form once I have agreed to participate.

Participant name printed

Participant signature

Date

________________________________________________
Name of Person Conducting Informed Consent
(Printed)
________________________________________________ ________________
Signature of Person Conducting Informed Consent
Date
Discussion / Witness

________________________________________________ ________________
Investigator Signature (if different from above)
Date 4

240
Appendix D
Definition of Terms
AYP: Acronym for Adequate Yearly Progress to measure achievement levels
state-wide assessments.
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Federal law that made it illegal for schools and
businesses to treat people differently on the basis of
their race, religion or the country of their birth.
Clustering: Grouping students into classrooms by race.
Cross-Town Busing: The transporting of students across school-district boundaries,
usually court-ordered, to make schools more racially balanced.
Desegregation: Process of abolishing racial segregation in public schools.
Dual Attendance Zones: Division within a school district that has populations
representing two different sets of students based on a group
characteristic, such as race.
Fair Housing Act of 1968: Federal law that made it illegal for businesses to
discriminate against, or treat unfairly, different races in the
sale or rental of places to live.
Freedom of Choice: Process by which parents are allowed to choose the school of
choice for their student if they meet certain criteria for enrollment.
Grade-Pairing: Plan created to reduce busing and keep students together
through their entire public education. After finishing elementary school,
children would attend a nearby middle school; after middle school
children would attend one central high school.
Gray Plan: Collection of recommendations made by Senator Garland Gray and his
committee. The committee suggested that the local school boards be given
the right to decide which students would be assigned to which schools. It also
suggested that money be given to white parents to send their child to
segregated private schools instead of integrated public schools.
HEW: Acronym for United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. This
federal organization set up new desegregation guidelines in the mid-1960s. If any
school districts resisted integration, they would cut off federal funds to the
schools.
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Integration: Process of bringing together different races in order for all people to
enjoy the same benefits in society.
K-5 Plan (1977-1978): Desegregation plan created by Richmond Public Schools
Superintendent Richard C. Hunter that attempted to keep white
families in the city by keeping their younger children in
neighborhood schools.
Magnet Schools: Concept used to promote academic programs at the secondary level.
Massive Resistance: Process by which the entire political body of Virginia resisted the
integration of public schools.
Metropolitan Richmond Area: City of Richmond and the two neighboring counties of
Chesterfield and Henrico.
Model Schools: First designed in 1969 to reflect the ideal example of integration and
in the 1980’s developed into a marketing tool to promote academic
programs at the elementary level.
NAACP: Acronym for National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, organization that was started in 1909 in New York City to
improve the quality of life for African-Americans.
Neighborhood Schools Policy: Procedure for allowing students to attend school
within their neighborhood instead of being bused
across town.
NCLB: Acronym for No Child Left Behind, Public Law legislation enforcing
greater accountability upon states, districts and schools to meet
performance benchmarks.
Open Enrollment: Policy allowing students to attend schools outside of their
attendance zone.
Passive Resistance: Process by which individuals within the state of Virginia made
decisions and took action to integrate the public schools in a
non-deliberate manner.
Plan G (1979-86): Plan to prevent the closing of Richmond area high schools
by merging the seven schools into three: Marshall-Walker,
Armstrong-Kennedy and Jefferson-Huguenot-Wythe.
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Plan III: Name given to the plan developed to implement extensive cross-town busing in
Richmond Public Schools.
Pupil Placement Board: Committee of people designed by the state to make decisions for
student enrollment at schools based on a set criterion.
Pupil Placement Board (Virginia): Committee that had the right to decide what
school students attended. This decision was
based on race.
Resegregation: The process of segregating again; after attempts of desegregation
to re-establish neighborhoods, reflective of similar demographic
groups as they were prior to desegregation.
Segregation: Separating one group of people from another group through
customs, tradition, peer pressure, laws or personal preference.
Separate but equal: Concept that gives states the right to segregate races of
people in public transportation. This idea was extended to
allow races to have separate but similar quality facilities,
like schools and restaurants.
Socio-Economic Conditions: Social and economic factors involved in an
environment.
Symbolic Interaction: A person’s socially constructed self that may appear
centered, unified and singular within multidimensional and
diverse social relationships.
SOL Assessments: Acronym for Standards of Learning Assessments based on
State Standards of Quality curriculum objectives.
The Stanley Plan: Collection of 13 acts that were passed to keep schools from
integrating.
Tuition Grants: Device of massive resistance in which Virginia gave money
from public funds to parents to send their child to private schools
to prevent integration.
Unitary Status: Court declaration of no longer operating as a dual system for
blacks and whites.
White-Flight: Term used to describe the trend of white families moving out of
neighborhoods that black families have moved into.
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